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Poverty is a miserable condition: the lack of resources to satisfy basic human needs 
is a problem that needs to be solved and, preferably, prevented from occurring at all. 
Many countries have social protection policies aiming at assisting people to have and 
to maintain an acceptable living standard. However, designing a viable, sustainable 
and effective social policy is difﬁcult and requires a lot of information and analysis. 
This study addresses four key steps in understanding poverty and designing sound 
social policies: estimating the number of poor; identifying the poor; understanding how 
people deal with poverty and poverty risk; and assessing how social protection policies 
can be effective in assisting the poor and preventing poverty. The aim of the ﬁrst step 
is to ﬁnd out how much poverty exists. Getting such an estimate, however, involves 
making many conceptual and methodological decisions that affect the estimate. In the 
second step, the focus is on studying who is poor by identifying characteristics that are 
associated with a higher poverty risk. The third step aims at understanding what people 
do to make ends meet, why they do it and how these actions affect their well-being. The 
objective of the ﬁnal step is to analyse whether and how social protection policies can 
help alleviate poverty or reduce the risk of becoming poor. 
 
Starting from what is known from previous publications, this study addresses ﬁve 
speciﬁc issues related to the steps speciﬁed above:
-  The implications of using an absolute versus a relative poverty indicator when 
estimating the number of poor; 
-  The  implications  of  using  an  absolute  versus  a  relative  poverty  indicator  on 
identifying the poor and assessing the poverty alleviation effect of social policies;
-  The costs and beneﬁts of means-tested versus universal provision of social transfers 
as effective poverty alleviating instruments;
-  The relation between a household’s poverty risk and its ability to smooth consumption 
when faced with income shocks;
-  The consumption smoothing arrangements of households and the role of social 
protection policies as part of these smoothing arrangements.
Each issue is addressed in a separate paper and contributes to a speciﬁc academic debate 
and a speciﬁc discussion about policy options. The next sections discuss the academic 
and policy contexts in which our contributions should be understood. 1. Introduction
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1.1 Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and the EU? The battle of 
the rates 
In this paper we analyse how and to what extent technical reasons account for differences 
between absolute and relative poverty rates. We estimate poverty using the ofﬁcial 
poverty measures of the EU (relative) and the US (absolute) and representative survey 
data from 1994-2001 for 15 EU member states and the US. We identify methodological 
and technical decisions and explain how each of them contributes to the astonishing 
variety in the observed absolute and relative poverty rates. We compare and analyse 
differences within and between countries, at a given point in time and over time and 
compute, for each factor, its individual effect on poverty.
  The choice for a particular indicator inﬂuences the estimates of the number of 
poor. Most countries monitor income poverty using a speciﬁc poverty indicator but 
they generally use either an absolute or a relative indicator: the EU has a relative 
poverty indicator while in the US uses an absolute measure. The adequacy of such 
indicators is the centre of many political and academic debates. Since its introduction 
in the 1960s, the US poverty measure has been disputed and led to the instalment of a 
scientiﬁc research board that proposed an alternative absolute poverty indicator (Citro 
et al, 1995). In 2001 the EU endorsed a set of indicators including a relative poverty 
indicator but the recent enlargements of the EU have raised doubt on the adequacy of 
the relative poverty indicator to monitor progress on poverty (Marx & van den Bosch, 
2007).1 The Social and Cultural Planning Ofﬁce2 in the Netherlands also favours an 
absolute poverty indicator and recently proposed to use a poverty threshold that reﬂects 
the resources needed to satisfy a speciﬁc set of basic needs (Soede, 2006).  
  This study is one of the very few that provides comparable absolute and relative 
poverty estimates between the EU member states and the US. It is the ﬁrst and only 
study that estimates poverty using the ofﬁcial EU and US poverty measures. The effects 
of the analysts’ technological choices on poverty rates are discussed in the literature 
on poverty measurement. We use this literature to explain how these technical choices 
inﬂuence the estimates of absolute and relative poverty measures. Our extensive em-
pirical analysis of the individual effects of these technical decisions on the estimates of 
poverty improves the understanding of the consequences that such choices may have.  
1 These indicators are used to monitor progress on the ﬁght against poverty and social exclusion in its 
member states. Although the EU member states agreed at the Nice summit in 2001 to combat poverty and 
social exclusion, the design and implementation of policies to ﬁght these problems is the responsibility of 
the member states. This is the so-called open method of coordination. 
2 Together with the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, the Social and Cultural Planning Ofﬁce publishes 
the poverty monitor (Armoedemonitor). This annual publication provides an overview of the scope, causes 
and consequence of poverty in The Netherlands.4
  The paper starts with presenting a snapshot of our absolute and relative poverty 
estimates in the 16 countries. This is followed by a discussion of the key concepts in 
poverty measurement. Subsequently, we explain the methodology of the US and EU 
poverty measures, how we estimated poverty and we discuss some key issues regarding 
the cross-national comparability of the estimates. In the core of the paper we explain 
and show how a range of technical factors inﬂuence differences in the level and trends 
of absolute and relative poverty rates. We ﬁrst look at differences in poverty levels 
and explain how the position of absolute and relative poverty lines is inﬂuenced by 
differences in welfare and methods to compare the costs of living across countries. 
Secondly we explain how differences in poverty trends can be explained by methods of 
updating poverty lines and changes in the distribution of welfare. Finally, we examine 
the impact of (implicit) equivalence scales on absolute and relative poverty measures.
1.2 The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts: 
what’s in a number?
 
The ofﬁcial poverty headcounts receive a lot of attention in the media and changes in 
these ﬁgures are often interpreted as a measure for the failure or success of government 
policy. However, in order to make and evaluate speciﬁc poverty alleviation policies we 
additionally need to identify who is poor and how a particular policy affects poverty. 
Poverty headcounts are often used as a starting point in such analyses: since they 
determine which group of the population is further analysed in a poverty proﬁle they 
show whether policies are targeted to the right people and they are used to evaluate 
the poverty reduction effect of a policy. In this paper, we investigate whether the use 
of an absolute or relative poverty indicator has implications for the identiﬁcation of 
priority groups and the assessment of the poverty alleviating effect of social transfers. 
For these analyses we use the same data and poverty measures3 as in the ﬁrst paper but 
we additionally include long term poverty indicators as the chronically poor constitute 
a priority group for social policy in itself. While the ﬁrst paper points out that absolute 
and relative poverty measures can yield very different estimates of the number of 
poor, this analysis shows that using either of these poverty concepts also leads to the 
selection of different priority groups and to a different assessment of the efﬁciency and 
effectiveness of social protection policies.  
3 In the paper we make one adjustment to the US absolute poverty measure: we apply the EU equivalence 
scales  also  to  the  US  poverty  measure  because  equivalence  scales  alter  the  risk  of  poverty  between 
population groups and thereby also inﬂuence the characteristics of the poor. We thus only analyse the policy 
consequences of using either an absolute or a relative poverty line.1. Introduction
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  This research can be placed within the applied poverty assessment literature and 
uses common identiﬁcation and policy evaluation techniques such as poverty proﬁles 
and static impact analysis. Our ﬁndings are broadly in line with what is observed in 
this literature. However, we compare these issues for a group of these countries and 
simultaneously apply two popular types of poverty indicators. As a result, our research 
provides a unique illustration of the complex relation between social protection systems 
and the problem these systems try to address across countries. This study is also the ﬁrst 
and only to present comparable estimates of long term poverty using both absolute and 
relative poverty indicators for the 16 countries under study.
  In the paper we start by showing the extent to which absolute and relative poverty 
groups overlap in the EU member states and the US using both short-term and long-
term poverty indicators. Subsequently we analyse whether the characteristics of the 
people that are poor using both indicators are different from the people that are poor for 
only one indicator. We use the Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, the UK and the US as case 
studies. For the same group of countries we also evaluate the targeting efﬁciency and 
poverty alleviating effect of various social transfers by comparing the incidence and 
amount of these transfers for both poverty groups and the rest of the population. Finally 
we argue why, from a national policy and a cross-national comparative perspective, it 
makes sense to use both absolute and relative poverty indicators.
1.3 Size matters: targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction effects of 
means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
 
Policies that assist the poor can either be general or speciﬁc. For instance, access to low 
cost or free public services such as education and health care is typically not restricted 
to the poor population but it assists the poor because it enables them to use their limited 
resources to satisfy other basic needs. Certain transfers such as basic pensions or family 
beneﬁts can achieve a similar effect even though they are not speciﬁcally aimed at the 
poor population. The alternative is to make policies that speciﬁcally target the poorest 
part of the population.
  Counter intuitively, the ﬁrst option may be preferred when it is difﬁcult to 
distinguish those who are most in need from the rest of the population. It is not easy to 
ﬁnd out whether a person or household belongs to the target group or not, and gathering 
such information is costly. Moreover, other costs arise as a result of imperfect targeting: 
some people that are not in the target group will beneﬁt from the policy while some 
people  from  the  target  group  will  be  excluded. As  a  result,  the  decision  between 
universal or targeted policies is ultimately a cost beneﬁt analysis; when do the costs of 
targeting outweigh the beneﬁts in terms of poverty reduction? Within this broader 6
context of how social protection policies can be effective in assisting the poor, this 
paper compares the provision of means-tested versus universal social transfers. As a 
case study, we use a rich dataset that covers a period of policy change from a universal 
to a means-tested child beneﬁt regime in Russia. This information allows us to follow 
a  cost-beneﬁt  approach  and  analyse  these  delivery  mechanisms  both  in  terms  of 
targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction effects.4
  This research uses the literature on the theory of targeting in order to identify the 
determinants of the costs of each targeting mechanism and employs poverty impact 
measurement techniques to evaluate the beneﬁts in terms of poverty reduction. In the 
empirical strand of this literature contributions typically focus on the effects of means-
tested beneﬁts or contrast the role of means-tested beneﬁts to other parts of the welfare 
state such as social insurance programmes. Some clues with respect to differences in 
targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction impact between means-tested and universal 
beneﬁts  can  be  found.  Our  study,  however,  entails  a  direct  comparison  of  these 
effects.
  This paper starts with a review of the theoretical and empirical literature. We 
then explain the 2000 reform of child beneﬁts in Russia and analyse changes in targeting 
efﬁciency  and  poverty  reduction  from  2000-2004,  using  various  indicators  and 
employing  descriptive  and  econometric  techniques.  Finally,  we  simulate  different 
policy  options  and  compare  their  performance  and  costs  with  that  of  the  current 
system.
1.4 Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
In this paper we estimate to what extent Russian households are able to protect their 
consumption from income shocks and we analyse in what way this ability to smooth 
consumption is related to poverty risk. We estimate households’ consumption smoothing 
abilities  by  means  of  a  dynamic  panel  analysis  and  explore  whether  household 
characteristics associated with a low smoothing ability are similar to the characteristics 
associated with a high poverty risk.   
  In order to understand how people deal with poverty and poverty risk we must 
take a dynamic perspective; even when a household is not poor today, it faces the 
risk of becoming poor tomorrow. Households are exposed to a wide range of risks 
such as unemployment, illness, crop failure or loss of assets. They respond to such 
threats by saving, borrowing, adjusting labour supply and selling assets. They can also 
insure themselves against the consequences of such risks through informal, private or 
4 Despite the richness in information, our data do not allow us to take second order effects into account in 
this analysis.1. Introduction
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government risk sharing and insurance schemes. Depending on the success of such 
arrangements, a household may or may not end up in poverty when it is faced with 
a shock. In this and the next paper, we focus on households’ consumption smoothing 
behaviour with the objective of better understanding households’ risk management. This 
paper investigates the overall success of consumption smoothing arrangements and its 
relation to poverty risk. The next paper analyses how households smooth consumption, 
whether poor household use different arrangements and what role social protection 
policies play in households’ risk management.
  The  economic  literature  on  consumption  smoothing  behaviour  is  extensive 
and builds upon the work of Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis that aimed to 
explain the empirical observation that consumption is more stable then income (1957). 
Contributions range from the development and testing of microeconomic models of 
consumer behaviour in perfect ﬁnancial markets (developed economies) to the behaviour 
of self producing consumers dealing with risk in the absence of formal ﬁnancial markets 
(developing economies). One strand of this literature aims at measuring the degree of 
consumption smoothing or ‘insurance’. Although the underlying theoretical models 
differ, empirical models of smoothing abilities are very similar and typically capture 
short term responses to income shocks. However, the effects of an income shock do not 
necessarily inﬂuence consumption immediately and the degree of adjustment may also 
depend on previous levels of well-being. We model consumption smoothing behaviour 
using a more realistic model that incorporates both short and long term adjustments. The 
model reﬂects the basic idea that people have alternative means to ﬁnance consumption 
when their income is suddenly reduced but that, in the long term, their income and 
expenditures should balance.  
  To implement this model, panel data on income and expenditures covering at 
least three consecutive time periods are needed. Even though panel data are increasingly 
becoming available, data with such richness in information are scarce. We estimate our 
model using an extensive Russian household panel survey covering the period from 1994 
– 2004. This is an interesting period as it largely covers Russia’s turbulent transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. This period of structural 
change has been accompanied by a surge in uncertainty and economic shocks affecting 
the Russian people. We are thus able to investigate how well Russian households have 
been able to protect their consumption from income shocks during the transition. We 
also analyse whether those households that were having difﬁculties with smoothing 
consumption are more likely to be poor. 
  This paper is structured as follows: After a description of the data and the main 
variables we analyse macro-economic developments in Russia and estimate its impact 
on poverty during this period. Following a review of the literature on consumption 8
smoothing  we  introduce,  estimate  and  test  our  model.  Thereafter,  we  divide  the 
population in subgroups according to a number of potentially relevant characteristics 
and also estimate smoothing abilities for these subgroups. Finally, we discuss the 
smoothing abilities of these subgroups with their poverty risk.
1.5  Managing  risks:  what  do  Russian  households  do  to  smooth 
consumption?
Social protection systems are not the only arrangements that people use to have and 
maintain an acceptable living standard. As indicated in the previous section, people 
manage the risk of poverty in many ways. The relation between the various arrangements 
and the institutions involved in these arrangements is complex and highly context 
speciﬁc. To  understand  consumption  smoothing  behaviour  in  a  particular  country, 
region or within a speciﬁc group, it is also important to study how people actually 
smooth consumption. This paper develops and implements an approach to study the 
smoothing arrangements of households, which we apply to Russia: we empirically 
explore survey data to ﬁnd out what Russian households do at a given point in time and 
how these actions may contribute to consumption smoothing. In doing this, we also 
investigate the role of the Russian social protection system.
  Contributions to the literature on consumption smoothing seem to focus either 
on testing models that explain consumption smoothing in general or, on modelling 
and empirically testing highly speciﬁc consumption smoothing arrangements of people 
in particular regions or countries. However, households  generally employ a range 
of smoothing arrangements at the same time and the prevalence and success of one 
arrangement may depend on the availability or functioning of other arrangements. It is 
therefore also important to understand how these smoothing arrangements are related 
and why arrangements vary across groups in the population. The conceptual framework 
that is developed in this paper takes the household as the central institution that manages 
risks. It offers an alternative way to analyse and interpret existing information and 
data without a priori restricting the scope of the analysis to a particular smoothing 
arrangement. The analysis provides information about which smoothing channels are 
worth further investigation and which linkages have to be taken into account. Such 
information is also relevant for making policies that aim to assist households with 
their risk management. The information helps to determine the role, scope and type 
of government interventions as well as possible feedback effects to other smoothing 
channels.
  In this paper we ﬁrst present the conceptual framework to analyse households’ 
consumption smoothing strategies. Thereafter, we explain our data and point out in 1. Introduction
9
what way the selected smoothing indicators are linked to the conceptual framework. 
Subsequently, we analyse the smoothing indicators and sketch how Russian households 
smooth consumption, using which channels. We also investigate whether the observed 
patterns differ in terms of levels of wealth and rural or urban settlement areas. We 
conclude with a discussion of our main ﬁndings and hypotheses and we suggest a 
number of approaches to model speciﬁc smoothing arrangements. We further illustrate 
how this information can be used for policy making.
1.6 Outline
In addition to this introductory chapter, this dissertation consists of ﬁve papers (chapters 
2 to 6), a concluding chapter (chapter 7), a joint reference list (chapter 8) and a technical 
appendix (chapter 9). 
  In the conclusion we separately discuss the main conclusions of each paper and 
how they contribute to assessing and managing poverty risks. We also indicate the 
limitations of the study and point out which aspects merit further research. 
  The appendix explains in more detail the technical aspects of the headcount and 
other poverty estimates that are calculated and used in chapters 2 and 3.Relative or absolute poverty in the USA 
and EU? The battle of the rates 212
2.1 Introduction 1 2 3 4 
The differences in poverty levels between the European Union and the United States 
are striking: almost one out of four persons in the USA was poor in 2000 compared 
to around one out of ten in many European countries. More precisely, in 2000, 23.5 
percent of the US population lived below the poverty line if the ofﬁcial EU poverty 
estimation method is used. Following the same estimation method, poverty levels 
in 2000 were 13.3 percent in Belgium and 10.4 percent in Sweden. However, when 
using the ofﬁcial poverty estimation method of the USA, poverty rates for 2000 are 8.7 
percent in the USA compared to 3.6 percent in Belgium and 6.7 percent in Sweden. The 
‘ofﬁcial’ poverty estimation method for the EU (further referred to as Laeken method 
and Laeken indicators5) is based on a relative poverty concept. The ofﬁcial poverty 
estimation method for the USA is based on an absolute poverty concept (further referred 
to as Orshansky method and indicators). The differences between relative and absolute 
poverty estimates for the same country and the same year are considerable but far from 
uniform. The differences in the ﬁgures quoted above are, for example, very large for the 
USA and Belgium but much smaller for Sweden. For the ﬁrst time in poverty analysis 
research, this paper estimates poverty levels applying both methodologies to the USA 
and old EU countries (EU-15) and analyses the sources of the differences between the 
two estimates. The estimates can be made for all the years between 1993 and 2000.
  Table 2.1 provides the estimates according to the two methodologies for 1996 
and 2000 for the 16 countries under study. It can be seen that from the 16 countries the 
USA deﬁnitely shows the highest poverty rate when the EU (relative) method is used, 
1 This chapter is based on: Notten, G. & C. de Neubourg (2007). Relative or absolute poverty in the US 
and the EU? The battle of the rates. MGSoG Working Paper (2007/001), Maastricht Graduate School of 
Governance, Maastricht University.
2 In this chapter we use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The results and 
conclusions of this chapter are ours and not those of Eurostat, the European Commission or any of the 
national authorities whose data have been used.
3 This research beneﬁted from a grant provided by the EuroPanel Users’ Network (EPUNet) that ﬁnanced 
a research visit to CEPS/INSTEAD (Differdange, Luxembourg) and from a travel grant provided by the 
Dutch Scientiﬁc Organization (NWO) which funded a research visit to the Kennedy School of Government 
(Cambridge, USA).
4 We thank our colleagues at CEPS/INSTEAD (Differdange, Luxembourg), Kennedy School of Government 
(Cambridge,  USA),  National  Poverty  Institute  (Ann Arbor,  USA),  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics 
(Ann Arbor, USA) and the participants in the conference on ‘New Directions in the Study of Inequality’ 
(Princeton, April 2006, USA) who have contributed to the progress of this research.  We are especially 
grateful for the constructive suggestions of Emil Tesliuc, Christopher Jencks, Mary Jo Bane, Erzo Luttmer 
and Gary Sandefur. 
5 The Laeken indicators are a set of commonly agreed indicators which are used to monitor progress 
on poverty and social inclusion in the European Union and its member states. The Laeken indicators 
complement, but do not replace the poverty indicators used by each member state.2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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although the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) and Ireland show 
high ﬁgures as well. Using an absolute poverty estimate, as done with the US method, 
the picture becomes very different. Albeit still higher, the USA poverty rates do not show 
that much difference with most European countries while Greece, Spain and Portugal 
have ﬁgures four times higher than the USA. Excluding the Mediterranean countries, 
differences in poverty levels between countries seem smaller when an absolute poverty 
concept is used compared to a relative based estimate, but Belgium shows even lower 
poverty rates than Sweden that in turn does no longer differ that much from the USA. 
Even though we can not calculate absolute poverty rates for the new EU Member 
States, there are similarly large differences in relative poverty for these countries. For 
instance, Laeken poverty in Lithuania is 17 percent but only 8 percent in the Czech 
Republic which has the lowest poverty rate in the whole European Union!6 Moreover, 
Table 2.1: Poverty incidence (in % of individuals, 1996 and 2000) 
Laeken (relative) poverty Orshansky (absolute) poverty 
1996 2000 1996 2000
Belgium 14.2 13.3 6.1 3.6
Denmark 9.3 10.8 3.2 3.4
Germany 12.1 11.1 7.0 5.1
Greece 21.5 20.5 28.1 26.1
Spain  20.3 18.8 29.8 19.1
France 14.9 15.4 8.8 6.5
Ireland 19.1 21.4 20.1 10.6
Italy 19.5 19.3 23.0 16.7
Luxembourg 11.4 12.5 0.7 0.6
Netherlands 10.5 11.3 6.1 6.6
Austria 13.0 11.9 5.8 4.8
Portugal 21.6 20.1 38.1 32.2
Finland 8.3 11.4 4.5 4.9
Sweden 8.9 10.4 7.1 5.7
United Kingdom 17.8 17.1 11.4 9.3
United States 21.7 23.5 8.5 8.7
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID
6  These  poverty  statistics  have  been  retrieved  from  the  website  of  Eurostat,  http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=wel
comeref&open=/C/C5/C53&language=en&product=Yearlies_new_population&root=Yearlies_new_
population&scrollto=1068 (accessed March 2007). 14
differences between absolute and relative poverty rates not only inﬂuence poverty 
levels but also affect the poverty developments over time: since 1995 absolute poverty 
in Ireland declined by 9.5 percentage points to 10.6 percent in 2000; while relative 
poverty increased by 2.3 percentage points to 21.4 percent over the same period. How 
can these differences between absolute and relative poverty rates be explained?  This 
question will be addressed in the next sections.
  Focussing on (differences in) ofﬁcial poverty estimates makes a lot of sense, for 
these statistics are used by governments to evaluate and adjust social and economic 
policies. Politicians and interest groups quote them to argue their case and the publication 
of  the  results  receives  considerable  media  coverage  every  year. The  ofﬁcial  USA 
poverty measurement method was developed by Molly Orshansky in the 1960s and is 
based on an absolute concept of poverty. Albeit regularly criticized and at times hotly 
debated, the Census Bureau still uses this method for its annual poverty assessments.7 
At the start of this millennium, the Member States of the EU agreed to use a common 
set of poverty and social exclusion indicators also called the ‘Laeken’ indicators. The 
subset of these indicators that is concerned with ﬁnancial poverty in EU Member States 
uses a relative concept of poverty. 
  Given the importance of these ofﬁcial poverty statistics for policymaking and 
advocacy groups, it is important to be able to explain the differences between absolute 
and  relative  poverty  rates. Are  they  the  result  of  conceptual  and  methodological 
differences in the measurement of absolute and relative poverty or do they simply 
reﬂect differences in social and economic policy regimes? In this paper we focus on the 
technical reasons that account for the differences between relative and absolute poverty 
rates and their impact on poverty levels and poverty trends. This exercise improves our 
understanding of how poverty statistics are inﬂuenced by often hidden and forgotten 
methodological and technical decisions. Our analysis shows how some differences in 
poverty are inherent to choosing either an absolute or a relative approach to poverty 
while other differences are related to more general aspects of poverty measurement. In 
short, we explain and illustrate how differences in inequality and changes in inequality 
over time affect absolute and relative poverty levels and poverty trends. Additionally, 
we investigate the impact of Purchasing Power Parity rates (PPP) and yearly updating 
methods of poverty lines. Finally, even though equivalence scales are used in every 
poverty approach, we show that equivalence scales have a different impact on absolute 
and relative poverty rates and explain how this result comes about. 
  Section 2.2 deﬁnes the poverty concepts and notations used and section 2.3 
further explains the Laeken and Orshansky poverty indicators, discusses the data used 
7 We believe that the US method could be improved in many ways. For a comprehensive overview of its 
problems and how the method could be improved see Citro et al. (1995).2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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and also the main variables used in the poverty comparisons. Section 2.4 analyses the 
differences between relative and absolute poverty rates for the 16 countries under study 
and estimates the impact of various measurement choices on poverty incidence; section 
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Poverty measurement: concepts and deﬁnitions
There exists an extensive literature that elaborates at length on the wide range of issues 
involved in making poverty comparisons (see for instance Duclos & Araar, 2006; 
Ravallion, 1994). Although we certainly discuss some of the arguments used in this 
literature it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a comprehensive review. We brieﬂy 
introduce the general concepts and notation used in the analysis. 
  Key concepts involved in any poverty analysis are the welfare indicator, poverty 
line, unit of observation, unit of analysis, equivalence scales and poverty measure. 
The welfare indicator is a measure for the dimension of well-being (or deprivation) 
under study. In this study, we use disposable (after tax) income as a welfare indicator.8 
The poverty line represents the threshold value of the welfare indicator which in turn 
determines the poverty status. When income is lower than the poverty line, the unit 
of analysis is considered ‘poor’. With income poverty, the level at which information 
is collected (unit of observation) differs from the level at which poverty is calculated 
(unit  of  analysis).  Information  on  income  is  collected  at  a  household  level  while 
poverty is typically calculated counting individuals. This is because income and the 
items on which income is spent are generally shared at a household level and thus 
contribute to the level of well-being of all household members. Equivalence scales are 
then used to adjust for differences in household size and composition because these 
differences ceteris paribus also generate differences in well-being. Equivalence scales 
can adjust for differences in food requirements between age and gender groups. They 
can also take into account that larger households typically have lower expenditures 
per member because they share resources (i.e. house, car) or because they can buy 
larger quantities of food for a lower unit price. Equivalence scales may be used to 
correct the welfare indicator to an adult equivalent level, or they adjust the poverty 
line to ﬁt the characteristics of the household. Finally, a poverty measure aggregates 
the poverty result from the unit of analysis to the population. A widely used group of 
8 Thus, disposable income is used as an indicator for the economic well-being of their citizens. Income is by 
far the most important source for ﬁnancing consumption in developed economies. Nevertheless, measuring 
income has a number of drawbacks. One drawback of this indicator is that it labels households that are 
ﬁnancing current consumption from assets (such as savings or loans) as ‘poor’, while their stock of assets 
may be more than sufﬁcient to ﬁnance an acceptable level of economic well-being. Similarly, it can also 
label households that are ﬁnancing large debt repayments from current income as ‘non poor’. 16
poverty measures is the Foster Greer Thorbecke (FGT) class of decomposable poverty 
measures which reﬂect the percentage of poor individuals as well as the depth and 
severity of poverty experienced (Foster et al, 1984). In this study we mainly use the 
percentage of poor individuals, also called headcount or poverty incidence.
  Summarizing the above discussion more formally, we can denote adult equivalent 
income with y and let F(y) represent cumulative distribution function which gives the 
probability of observing someone with an income less than y. 
∫ =
y
dy y f y F
0
) ( ) (       (2.1)
where f(y) is the probability of observing income with a value of y. The poverty line (z) 
can take the values 0 < z < ymax, where ymax is the highest income value. The headcount 
index can be described as:
∫ = =
z
dy y f z F H
0
) ( ) (      (2.2)
 
The poverty line can be determined by using some objective benchmark such as the 
cost to fulﬁl basic needs (food, shelter, clothing etc.). It can also be set in relation to the 
typical living standard in a society. As commonly stated in the literature on poverty, we 
call the ﬁrst an ‘absolute’ method while we label the latter as ‘relative’. Authors such as 
O’Boyle (1999) and Ravallion (1994) have argued that this terminology is misleading: 
the term absolute poverty suggests that the approach taken is objective but every 
approach involves some normative judgement about what is insufﬁcient in a given 
society. Therefore, ‘an absolute poverty line is best thought of as one which is ﬁxed 
in terms of living standards and ﬁxed over the entire domain of poverty comparison; a 
relative poverty line, by contrast, varies over that domain and is higher the higher the 
average standard of living’ (Ravallion, 1994, p. 30). In formal notation, an absolute 
poverty line is determined by:
za = f(x)      (2.3)
where f(x) represents the value of attaining some benchmark x. A relative poverty line 
is determined by a fraction (k) of some moment (m) of the income distribution f(y), 
usually the median:
zr = k*[m | f(y)]      (2.4)
where 0 < k < 1. 2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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Absolute and relative poverty lines thus reﬂect conceptually distinct approaches to 
determining insufﬁcient levels of well-being: an absolute poverty line identiﬁes those 
people who have insufﬁcient resources to satisfy basic needs while a relative poverty 
line identiﬁes those who have much less than what is considered typical or normal in 
a given society. 
2.3 Methodology and data
The USA and EU have developed distinctive approaches to poverty measurement. The 
task of applying both approaches to each country or group of countries while ensuring 
comparability of the results is not an easy or a trivial one. In turn, we discuss the 
Laeken and Orshansky poverty measurement methods, the data and main variables 
used in the poverty comparisons.9
2.3.1 Laeken and Orshansky poverty measurement methods
The ofﬁcial poverty method (Orshansky) used in the United States is based on an 
absolute  concept  of  poverty  while  the  European  method  (Laeken)  uses  a  relative 
poverty concept. 
  The  US  poverty  line  was  developed  in  the  1960s  by  Molly  Orshansky,  an 
economist working for the Social Security Administration. The Orshansky poverty 
line incorporated both food and non-food components. Firstly, Orshansky used the 
cheapest food plan from the Agriculture Department, which measured the costs of food 
for families under economic stress, to develop a food poverty line. Subsequently, the 
poverty line was multiplied by the reciprocal of the average share of food expenditures 
in total income. Although there have been some minor changes in the method over 
time, the poverty line currently used is essentially the same as when it was developed 
in the 1960s. In fact, the Orshansky poverty line is a set of poverty lines; depending on 
the family size and the age of household members, one of the 48 poverty lines applies.10 
Every year, the poverty lines are updated for inﬂation using the consumer price index 
for urban consumers, which is the same for the whole USA.11 The ofﬁcial poverty 
rates are estimated annually by the Bureau of Census using the March Supplement of 
9 We have also documented these issues more in detail in Notten and de Neubourg (2007b).
10 The poverty lines do not differ by state or region in the USA. The thresholds are available for each year 
on the website of the Bureau of Census on www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld.
11 Thus, except for the annual adjustment with the consumer price index, the current US poverty lines are the 
same as those calculated by Orshansky in the sixties: they are based on the costs of a food plan in the sixties 
multiplied by the reciprocal of the food share of the average household in the ﬁfties. This is one of the main 
shortcomings of the Orshansky measure (for further information see Citro et al., 1995). 18
the Current Population Survey (CPS). The poverty status of a family is obtained by 
comparing its gross annual income to the poverty line of that family type. 
  During the Nice summit in 2001, the EU Member States decided to combat 
poverty and social exclusion by means of the open method of coordination. This method 
‘involves  ﬁxing  guidelines  for  the  Union,  establishing  quantitative  and  qualitative 
indicators to be applied in each member state, and periodic monitoring’ (Atkinson et al, 
2002). The design and implementation of policies to ﬁght poverty and social exclusion, 
however, remain predominantly the responsibility of the Member States. To monitor 
progress in these areas, a set of common statistical indicators was developed. Named 
after the Laeken European Council who endorsed the indicators in 2001, these ‘Laeken 
indicators’ cover four dimensions of social inclusion; ﬁnancial poverty, employment, 
health and education. We use the subset of the Laeken indicators that is concerned with 
ﬁnancial poverty. The Laeken poverty line is a relative poverty line that is set at 60% of 
national median disposable income. Household income is adjusted for the demographic 
composition of the household using the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scales.12 
2.3.2 Data
For the European Union we use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). 
The ECHP is a survey on household income and living conditions carried out in eight 
waves from 1994 until 2001 and includes the so-called EU-15 countries.13 The data 
provide cross-section and longitudinal information at a household and individual level 
on topics such as income, education, housing, health and social relations. Comparability 
of the ECHP data  is achieved through common survey structure and procedures, 
common standards on sampling requirements and where possible on data processing 
and statistical analysis as well as the use of a ‘blue-print’ questionnaire used as a point 
of departure for the national surveys. The European statistics ofﬁce (Eurostat) also uses 
the ECHP to calculate the Laeken poverty indicators.
  For the United States, we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) from 1994-2001. The PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal survey 
containing information on an individual and family level on economic and demographic 
topics. Started as an annual survey in 1968, the PSID became a biennial survey since 
1997. The PSID is available in two formats; the original PSID and the so-called Cross-
National Equivalent Files (CNEF) which contains equivalently deﬁned variables for 
12 The modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale gives a weight of 1 to the ﬁrst adult in the household, a weight of 
0.5 to other members aged over 14 years and a weight of 0.3 for children under age 14.
13 These are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria (1995-2001), Finland (1996-2001) and Sweden (1997-2001).2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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the panel surveys of four countries (Germany, United Kingdom, Canada and United 
States). We use the CNEF because the main variables in the PSID are harmonized with 
two datasets that are also the basis for the ECHP. This facilitates the construction of 
comparable welfare indicators. 
2.3.3 Making the comparison: deﬁnition and construction key variables
The main challenge lies in the construction of comparable welfare indicators and poverty 
thresholds. Both the EU and USA use income as a welfare indicator for the poverty 
analyses. However, in the US gross income is used while the EU uses disposable income. 
We prefer to use disposable income because disposable income better reﬂects the funds 
that a household can spend on consumption. The advantage of using the CNEF-PSID is 
that these data also include imputed variables indicating the tax burden of households 
and thus provide an indicator for disposable income in the USA.14 Furthermore, both 
datasets contain a range of variables indicating the annual value of various income 
sources such as wages and salary, earnings from self employment, capital, private 
transfers and social protection beneﬁts. Our indicator of total net disposable income 
includes income from these sources. Capital gains (or losses) and beneﬁts in kind are 
not included, with one exception. For the USA we included the value of food stamps 
because these can be considered as ‘near money’ as they are issued in the form of an 
electronic debit card that can be used to purchase food items in a range of supermarkets. 
Moreover, the food stamp programme is one of the main programmes that targets poor 
households in the USA; not including the value of these beneﬁts would ignore this 
important poverty reduction effort in the poverty estimates. 
  The income variables in the ECHP are constructed using the same (or similar) 
method for all Member States. There are, however, two aspects that may affect our 
cross-national poverty comparisons. Firstly, the use of register data for Sweden, Finland 
and Denmark may yield higher poverty rates than survey-based poverty estimates.15 
Secondly, the simulated tax burden in the CNEF-PSID also incorporates the higher 
deductions for low income families with children (Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
The simulated tax burden assumes a 100 percent EITC take up rate but not all eligible 
14 Federal and state income tax burdens have been imputed using the NBER TAXSIM model and PSID data 
while payroll taxes have been estimated using the tax rates reported by the Social Security Bulletin (Lillard 
et al, not dated).
15 ECHP data from Sweden, Denmark and Finland are based on statistical registers drawn from administrative 
records. Comparison of Finnish household survey data with the Finnish ECHP data based on statistical 
registers shows considerably higher income levels for the lowest two income deciles using survey data. As 
the other ECHP countries use survey data this affects cross-country rankings of poverty levels (Rendtel et 
al, January 2004). 20
households actually receive the EITC.16 This assumption may therefore result in an 
underestimation of USA poverty rates.
  While  both  survey  data  have  been  collected  from  1994-2001,  the  income 
variables reﬂect household income in the year previous to the survey (thus, from 1993-
2000). The information on the household size and composition, which is also used to 
determine the poverty rate, is based on the survey year. The calculated poverty rates 
therefore reﬂect the period 1993-2000 rather than 1994-20001. 
  We took the Bureau of Census US poverty lines and converted the 1993 dollar 
poverty lined to the Member States’ currencies using 1993 Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) indices. After converting the US thresholds to national purchasing power values, 
we updated the thresholds to other years using national consumer price indices. Our 
methodology thus translates the purchasing power of the 1993 US poverty lines to that 
of each of the member states, while the following annual adjustments of the poverty lines 
depend on the change in consumer prices in that member state.17 The Laeken poverty 
lines depend on the income distribution and are thus based on the income variable in 
both datasets. Furthermore, we constructed a variable indicating the household level 
weight of the modiﬁed OECD-equivalence scales and a variable indicating which of 
the 48 Orshansky poverty lines should be applied to the household. Tables 2.4 to 2.6 in 
the appendix summarize the number of households and individuals as well as the mean 
(annual) per capita and adult equivalent income levels by country and survey round. 
2.4 Dissecting the Laeken and Orshansky methodologies  
Using  the  method  explained  above  we  have  calculated  the  ofﬁcial  EU  (Laeken  - 
relative) and the US (Orshansky - absolute) poverty rates for each country over time.18 
Figure 2.1 shows that there are both level and trend differences in ofﬁcial poverty rates 
and that the experience differs between countries.19 Ireland shows opposing trends in 
poverty rates: according to the Orshansky indicator poverty declines over time while 
poverty increases using the Laeken indicator. For Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and 
16 To claim the EITC a special tax form has to be completed and submitted. According to a study of the 
Internal Revenue Service on participation in the EITC programme for the tax year 1996, up to 18% of the 
of the eligible individuals did not ﬁle a tax return (Internal Revenue Service, 2002).
17 This method ﬁrstly assumes that the current US poverty lines are still good indicators of the minimum 
costs of living in the US and, secondly, that these costs of living (in PPP terms) also reﬂect the minimum 
costs of living in the member states. Although it is likely that these assumptions are violated to some degree 
(see also footnote 10 and section 2.4.1.2), these poverty lines behave in a similar fashion. 
18 We thus compare the poverty rates of each EU member state with that of the USA as a whole. We focus on 
sovereign nations as the relevant group for the poverty comparison because this is the main level at which 
ofﬁcial poverty statistics are feeding into (national) policy processes.  
19 Table 2.7 in the appendix lists the annual poverty rates.2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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Note:  To  facilitate  comparison  of  Orshansky  and  Laeken  poverty  trends  within  countries,  we  used 
different  scales  on  the  vertical  axes.  For  the  USA  there  are  no  observations  in  1999  and  1997. 
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID
the United States both poverty indicators follow the same trend. In most countries, the 
Laeken poverty rates are higher than the Orshansky poverty rates but this does not hold 
for Portugal, Greece and Spain. The difference between Orshansky and Laeken poverty 
rates is larger in the United States and Luxembourg but considerably smaller in the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. 
  In order to explain and empirically illustrate the impact of methodological and 
technical decisions in relative and absolute poverty measurement methods we focus 
on three aspects: differences in poverty levels, poverty trends and poverty risk for 
particular population groups. Within each of these dimensions the effect of underlying 
determinants  was  analysed  while  keeping  everything  else  equal.  Firstly,  absolute 
and relative poverty levels are affected by income inequality and the conversion of 
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Figure 2.1: Poverty incidence (in % of individuals over the period 1993-2000) 22
relative poverty trends are inﬂuenced by inﬂation and changes in income inequality. 
Finally, we show how equivalence weighting affects absolute and relative poverty rates 
differently.
2.4.1 Differences in poverty levels
There are two important reasons why the Laeken and Orshansky poverty levels differ 
within  and  between  countries;  differences  in  inequality  (i.e.  shape  of  the  income 
distribution) and the use of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates to convert the US 
poverty lines to country speciﬁc thresholds. Differences in income inequality affect 
the relative (Laeken) poverty lines but not the absolute (Orshansky) poverty lines. 
Differences in cost of living and PPP rates affect the value of the Orshansky poverty 
lines.
2.4.1.1 Inequality in welfare 
Relative poverty rates depend on the degree of welfare inequality in a society because 
the threshold is set relative to the living standard of a ‘typical’ or ‘benchmark’ resident 
in that society. It is important to note that by taking a relative approach to poverty, 
one  is  not  concerned  about  inequality  as  such,  but  about  the  welfare  inequalities 
between the typical resident and those residents that have fewer resources than this 
person. Differences in relative poverty rates between countries (or any other group) 
arise because in some countries there is more dispersion at the left part of the welfare 
distribution than in others.20 In the Laeken method, the typical resident is the median 
and the poverty line is set at 60% of the income earned by the median person. When 
using the Laeken method (or any similar approach), higher inequality results in higher 
relative poverty rates; but only under speciﬁc conditions. This becomes clear when we 
try to state these conditions more formally. Firstly, we shift our focus from the whole 
income distribution to its left part only.21 Let  ) (y Fm  represent the cumulative income 
distribution up to the income of the typical resident, y(m):  
20 Thus, relative poverty methods do not necessarily yield higher poverty rates in a country with more 
inequality than in a country with less inequality.  For instance, countries X and Y have exactly the same 
welfare distribution at and below the ‘typical’ resident, but above this ‘typical’ resident the welfare in X is 
distributed more equally than in country Y. Country Y has higher inequality than country X but any relative 
poverty method will yield the same poverty rate for country X and Y.
21 We illustrate this argument using the median as the benchmark but we could have used the mean as well. 
In both cases one focuses on the left part of the distribution; in case of the median one focuses exactly on the 
lower half of the distribution while the mean typically covers a larger part of the distribution (as the mean is 
more sensitive to outliers in the right part of the distribution). 2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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         (2.5)
where f(y) is rescaled by y(m) such that 0≤y≤100 and y(m)=100.22 The relative poverty 
line (z) is determined as a constant fraction of the income of the typical resident (see 
equation 2.4). Now take two countries, whose cumulative income distributions are 
indicated with  ) (y F
A  and ) (y F
B . Country A only has higher relative poverty rates 
than country B when its cumulative income distribution evaluated at the poverty line, 
z, lies above that of country B.
) (z F
A
m  >  ) (z F
B
m       (2.6)
In other words, there is more income dispersion below the poverty line in country A than 
in country B. This is a very speciﬁc concept of inequality because country B could have 
higher relative poverty rates if we use other fractions (k) of the income of the typical 
resident or if we take another moment to select the typical resident.23 Relative poverty 
rates can also contradict other inequality measures as we will illustrate in Table 2.2. 
  Countries with higher income dispersion below the median have higher relative 
poverty rates. Moreover, as absolute thresholds do not take distributional characteristics 
into account, countries with a higher dispersion of income are more likely to have larger 
differences between absolute and relative poverty rates.24 Especially when the absolute 
threshold is based on an assessment of the minimum needed to cover the basic cost of 
living in a country, large differences between absolute and relative poverty levels can 
arise. 
  We now illustrate the income dispersion within the US and the EU Member 
States in a number of ways and examine to what extent they are consistent with the 
poverty outcomes. Figure 2.2 shows boxplots for each country using the 2000 income 
distribution.25 The boxplots are drawn using only the observations in the lower half of 
the income distribution. We have rescaled income by setting median income in each 
22 The rescaling allows us to compare the income distributions of different countries whilst only taking the 
dispersion of these income distributions into account.
23 If  ) (y F
A
m  >  ) (y F
B
m  for all incomes below y(m), country A always has higher relative poverty rates then 
country B.
24 Additionally, in countries with a high dispersion of incomes around the poverty line, poverty rates are 
very sensitive to the locus of the poverty line; a slight change in the level of the poverty line can have a large 
impact on the poverty rates (i.e. the poverty elasticity is high).
25 Boxplots are a means to graphically summarize a number of key characteristics of a distribution. The box 
includes all observations within the 25th and 75th percentile and the vertical line within the box indicates 
the 50th percentile (i.e. the median). The larger the spread of a distribution, the wider the box is. The lines 
outside the box are called ‘whiskers’, the end of the whisker does not necessarily indicate the lowest or 
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country to 100, so that the horizontal axis is the same for all countries. The wider the 
box, the larger is the income dispersion below the median. The vertical line in the ﬁgure 
at 60% indicates the Laeken threshold. Individuals with an income below this line are 
living in relative poverty.26 We can see that countries with higher dispersion below the 
median also have higher relative poverty rates (United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain). The position of the box also matters, if the box of 
the United States would lie more to the right, relative poverty rates would be lower than 
in the current situation. This underlines the argument that relative poverty methods use 
a speciﬁc concept of inequality; it is the degree of income dispersion below the median 
and around the poverty line that ultimately determines the poverty rate.
26 The relative poverty rate can also be read approximately from the ﬁgure. Take for instance Luxembourg. 
For this country the 60% of median income line coincides with the 25th percentile of the income distribution 
thus implying a poverty rate of 12.5%.




) (y F  
Gini of
) (y Fm  
zr/y(m) za /y(m) Hr  Ha 
Belgium 15,493 0.280 0.144 0.60 0.51 13.3 3.6
Denmark 20,620 0.216 0.139 0.60 0.50 10.8 3.4
Germany 15,760 0.253 0.142 0.60 0.54 11.1 5.1
Greece 7,119 0.328 0.200 0.60 0.80 20.5 26.1
Spain 9,034 0.327 0.191 0.60 0.70 18.8 19.1
France 14,914 0.270 0.160 0.60 0.54 15.4 6.5
Ireland 14,271 0.288 0.182 0.60 0.51 21.4 10.6
Italy 10,401 0.294 0.201 0.60 0.66 19.3 16.7
Luxembourg 23,114 0.265 0.136 0.60 0.36 12.5 0.6
Netherlands 13,820 0.261 0.150 0.60 0.57 11.3 6.6
Austria 15,292 0.242 0.145 0.60 0.52 11.9 4.8
Portugal 5,983 0.369 0.187 0.60 0.91 20.1 32.2
Finland 14,866 0.244 0.142 0.60 0.53 11.4 4.9
Sweden 16,353 0.242 0.142 0.60 0.54 10.4 5.7
United Kingdom 17,724 0.306 0.179 0.60 0.52 17.1 9.3
United States 24,785 0.394 0.228 0.60 0.39 23.5 8.8
Note: y(m) adult equivalent median income, F(y) total income distribution, Fm(y)income distribution 
below median, zr relative poverty line, za absolute poverty line  Hr  (relative (Laeken) poverty rate), Ha  
(absolute (Orshansky) poverty rate). za reﬂects the single working age adult US poverty line.  
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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  Table 2.2 relates the absolute (Orshansky) and relative (Laeken) poverty rates 
to a number of other indicators of dispersion. The second column displays the national 
median income expressed in Euros, using the average annual exchange rate in 2000. 
The third and fourth column show the Gini indices calculated for the whole distribution 
and for the lower half of the distribution. Countries with a higher Gini for the whole 
distribution also have a higher Gini for the lower part of the distribution. Empirically, 
countries that score high on this inequality measure also have higher relative poverty 
rates. Nevertheless, rankings between countries may differ according to the inequality 
indicator used. The Dutch Gini is lower than that of Luxembourg, but the Gini taking 
only the lower half of the distribution is higher in the Netherlands. Moreover, even 
though inequality below the median is higher in the Netherlands, the Dutch relative 
poverty rate is lower than that of Luxembourg. A similar observation can be made for 
Portugal and Spain.
  The other columns show the ratio of both poverty lines over median income and 
the headcount poverty rates. Clearly, differences between the income levels at which the 
absolute and relative poverty lines are set also affects the discrepancy between absolute 
Figure 2.2: Dispersion of income below median (2000)
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Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID26
and relative poverty rates. The extremely large difference between absolute and relative 
poverty rates in the United States can be explained by the high dispersion of incomes 
below the median and by the different position of the thresholds; the absolute threshold 
is much lower than the relative threshold. 
2.4.1.2 Cost of living 
The countries which we use in our poverty analysis have different currencies and 
different price levels. International poverty comparisons are only possible when the 
absolute poverty threshold reﬂects a similar living standard in each country. Thus, an 
income equal to the poverty line in Italy should allow a household to purchase the same 
goods and services as the income value of the poverty line in the United States. To obtain 
the absolute poverty lines for the European Members States we converted the ofﬁcial 
1993 US thresholds using the 1993 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates provided by 
the OECD. For the other years, we updated the national thresholds using the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) of each country.27 We discuss the appropriateness of using PPP rates 
and we show the impact on poverty of using a different benchmark year.
  The PPP indices have been developed to accurately compare macroeconomic 
indicators such as GDP while controlling for differences in price levels and exchange 
rates between countries. In practise, the PPP indices are used for various purposes, 
including international poverty comparisons (Schreyer & Koechlin, 2002; Smeeding et 
al, 2000).28 The dollar-a-day poverty estimates of the World Bank are obtained using 
the same method. The main problem with the PPP rates is that they may not reﬂect the 
actual costs of buying those goods and services that are consumed at income levels 
around the poverty thresholds. One problem is that PPP rates are based on the prices 
of a goods basket that does not only include consumer products. A second issue is that 
people with an average income may consume other goods than those with a (below) 
poverty line income. Moreover, the relative quantities of goods consumed also vary by 
income; low income individuals or households spend more resources on basic costs 
of living (food, shelter) while expenditures on luxury goods and leisure activities are 
proportionally higher as income is higher. The International Comparison Programme 
27 An alternative would be to construct for each country (including the US) a minimum goods basket along the 
same principles but taking into account local consumption habits. Such an effort, although evidently useful, 
was well beyond the scope and funding resources of this research project. Following the recommendations 
of a National Academy of Sciences panel (Citro et al., 1995), the US Census Bureau (June 2005) has 
constructed such a threshold and performed a poverty analysis for the US. Following a very similar method, 
Soede (2006) has constructed a similar poverty line for the Netherlands. 
28 See Gottschalk et al (2000) and Castles (1996) for a discussion on the use of PPP rates and micro-based 
data comparisons of well-being. 2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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(ICP) of the World Bank is currently developing so-called Poverty-relevant PPPs (PPPP) 
which speciﬁcally take into account the costs and quantities of goods and services 
consumed by people living on the threshold level.29 The PPPPs are not yet available, so 
we can only explore differences in poverty using PPP rates. Given our current poverty 
estimates, we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to believe that in 1993 about 40% of the Portuguese had 
an income that was insufﬁcient to cover the basic cost of living. We expect to ﬁnd lower 
absolute poverty rates for countries such as Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain if the 
absolute poverty line would be based on the newly developed PPPP rates.30
  Irrespective of the conversion rate used, poverty estimates are sensitive to the 
choice of the benchmark year. The PPP rate (q) is deﬁned as the number of currency 
units required to purchase the amount of goods and services equivalent to what can 
be bought with one unit of the currency of the base country. For the OECD PPP rates, 
the US is the base country.31 The poverty line (z) of country A at time t is obtained by 
multiplying the US thresholds with the PPP rate (q) at time t:
        (2.7)
Then, for any other year the poverty lines of country A are updated for the cost of living 
using consumer inﬂation rates (π): 
) 1 ( * 1 t t A t A z z π + = +      (2.8)
Year to year PPP rates change when the relative cost of living changes between countries 
(i.e. the inﬂation rates differ) or when there are changes in the exchange rate. If the costs 
of living in country A rise with respect to the cost of living in the United States, the PPP 
rate will increase (and the poverty line in country A as well). Even when inﬂation rates 
are constant, changes in the exchange rate inﬂuence the PPP rate and thereby the level 
of the poverty line.
  The choice for a particular PPP benchmark year thereby inﬂuences the poverty 
estimates. From 1993 to 2000, there were considerable changes in the PPP rates of 
countries such as Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. Take for instance Greece, 
29 These PPPPs will be made available in 2007 (ICP Newsletter, volume 3, number 3, October 2006, 
available on www.worldbank.org).
30 It is important that an absolute poverty line actually reﬂects a minimum living standard in a particular 
country, not only for monitoring socio-economic progress but also for policy making and evaluation (see 
also Notten and de Neubourg (2007a). 
31 If there is only one good in the basket, the PPP rate would be calculated as follows:  US A t P E P q / * =
where  A P is the price of this good in country A,  US P  the price in the United States and E is the dollar 
exchange rate.  
t t US t A q z z * =28
whose dollar PPP rate increased from 0.494 in 1993 to 0.685 in 2000 (an increase of 
38%).32 Figure 2.3 shows how absolute poverty in Greece changes by taking different 
benchmark years for PPP rates. The solid line shows the Orshansky poverty trends 
using the1993 PPP rates. The dashed line illustrates the Greek poverty rates if we would 
convert the US thresholds to Greek living standards every year. The impact of choosing 
a certain base year for PPP conversion on poverty levels is reﬂected by the vertical 
distance between the lines.33  
  Thus, if we had used the 2000 PPP rates, the absolute poverty rate in 2000 would 
be 30% as compared to 26%. Choosing a different base year therefore has an effect 
on the level of the absolute poverty rate but does not affect the poverty trend.34 The 
32 Expressed in ECU/Euro.
33 The difference in poverty levels in Figure 2.3 may not only arise because of exchange rate trends. It 
may also be the result of inﬂation differences between consumer goods (π) and the goods basket used for 
constructing PPP rates. 
34 Converting the thresholds every year using the yearly PPP rates is not a good alternative, particularly if 
one is interested in studying changes in absolute poverty over time. This is because changes in the exchange 
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Orshansky poverty (PPP=1993, CPI=1994-2000) _________
Orshansky poverty (PPP=1993-2000) _ _ _ _ _
Greece
Figure 2.3: Impact of PPP benchmark year on absolute (Orshansky) poverty in Greece
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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PPP changes for the other countries were considerably smaller and have therefore a 
much smaller impact on the level of poverty. Concluding, there is a certain arbitrariness 
involved in the choice for a benchmark year, although it makes sense not to choose an 
‘unusual’ year in terms of exchange rate or inﬂation levels.35
2.4.2 Differences in poverty trends
Orshansky poverty trends are explained by changes in price levels vis-à-vis changes in 
income while Laeken poverty trends are explained by distributional income changes. 
We study the impact of these mechanisms on Laeken and Orshansky poverty trends by 
analyzing the impact of changes in the year to year poverty lines on poverty rates (i.e. 
the updating mechanism) separately from distributional income changes (i.e. changes 
in inequality).
2.4.2.1 Method for updating the poverty lines 
As shown in equation 2.8, the US thresholds are updated annually with the change in 
the consumer price index.36 This implies that the percentage change in this absolute 
threshold is equal to the inﬂation rate.
π = ∆ a z %       (2.9)
The updating mechanism of the Laeken threshold is more implicit because the Laeken 
poverty  line  is  determined  by  the  yearly  median  income  level.  Thus,  the  Laeken 
threshold is updated every year with the percentage change in median income. 
m r y z ∆ = ∆ % %       (2.10)
35 Most of the EU-15 countries were member of the European Monetary System (EMS) during the observed 
period and were thus involved in a joint effort to curb volatility of exchange rates. We preferred not to use 
the late nineties because in these years the EMS was replaced by the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
which introduced a common currency for most of the Member States. Speculations on the success of these 
policy changes affected the exchange rates between those countries adopting the Euro and those not (United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark) as well as those with the most important reserve currency in the world, the 
US Dollar. Furthermore, we chose 1993 simply because it was the ﬁrst year in our data.
36 In addition to price changes, consumption patterns also change in a more structural way over time. 
For example, as the living standard of a country increases people typically spend a smaller share of their 
resources on food. As a consequence, the average food ratio will decline. Alternatively, certain goods (i.e. 
telephone, computer) increasingly play role in satisfying basic needs. Generally, the view is that such 
changes also need to be reﬂected in an absolute poverty line but that such adjustments should be made once 
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% change median income _________    Inflation _ _ _ _ _
Netherlands
In the countries we study here, low and stable inﬂation is an explicit monetary policy 
target and the monetary authorities are rather successful in achieving this target. As a 
result, price changes are less volatile than changes in economic growth (and income) 
over the business cycle. This implies that the updating mechanism used in the Laeken 
indicator functions as an in-built stabilizer on the poverty rates. In good times, the 
threshold is increased by the increase in median income but in bad times, the threshold 
could even decline (or increase by less than the inﬂation rate, a decline in real terms). 
Figure 2.4 illustrates with which growth rates the Orshansky and Laeken poverty lines 
are updated for the Netherlands. 
  Figure 2.5 shows the effects of both updating methods on poverty trends for all 
countries. To isolate the effect of the updating mechanism we start from the relative 
poverty threshold in 1993 and update this threshold using both methods.37 Subsequently, 
we calculate the poverty rate according to each updating mechanism. The updating 
methods inﬂuence the poverty trends in all countries; over time we can see a divergence 
Figure 2.4: Change in poverty lines due to different updating mechanisms
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID
 37 For Austria, Finland and Sweden we start with the year in which their ﬁrst survey was held.2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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in poverty trends with higher poverty rates when the change in median income as used 
as an updating mechanism. Divergence in trends is largest for countries that experienced 
high economic growth. This happens when median income levels also beneﬁt from real 
economic growth; then the poverty line is not only adjusted for inﬂation but it is also 
adjusted for real income changes in society. Ireland is the extreme case in this respect, 
because the poverty trends are not just diverging but even move into the opposite 
direction. Also, the poverty trends with the Laeken updating mechanism appear more 
stable than the trends using inﬂation updating. This observation empirically supports 
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Figure 2.5: The impact of updating mechanisms on poverty incidence
Note: For the USA there are no observations 1999 and 1997. 
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID32
2.4.2.2 Changes in inequality 
The previous section discussed that relative poverty lines are adjusted over time, in 
line with economic development. Another key factor in explaining poverty trends is 
distributional change (i.e. changes in inequality). Typically, the costs and beneﬁts of 
economic development are not equally distributed across the (income) distribution. 
Income changes at the lower end of the income distribution also affect relative and 
absolute poverty trends. The intuition is as follows. Relative poverty rates do not change 
when all incomes grow at the same rate. This is because the relative poverty line and 
everyone’s income are updated with the same percentage growth rate. If the income 
of the poorer percentiles of the population grows less than that of the median; relative 
poverty rates are likely to increase. When the income of low income groups increases 
in real terms, absolute poverty declines. 
  We use growth incidence curves (GIC) to further illustrate this argument. A GIC 
shows the growth of income at each percentile of the distribution. Using the cumulative 
income distribution (CDF) speciﬁed in equation 2.1 and following Ravallion and Chen 
(2003), inverting the CDF at the pth quantile gives the income of that quantile:
 
t t t t p L p F p y µ ) ( ) ( ) (
' 1 = =
−   ( 0 ) (
' > p yt )  (2.11)
where  ) (p Lt is the Lorenz curve (with slope  t t p L µ ) (
'  and the mean t µ ). The Lorenz 
curve shows the income share of total income owned by the bottom percent of the 
population (when incomes are ranked from low to high). The growth rate in income of 
the pth quantile is:
        (2.12)
Letting p vary from zero to one,  ) (p gt  indicates the growth incidence curve. It follows 
from equation 2.11 that:














p g γ     (2.13)
where  1 ) / ( 1 − = − t t t µ µ γ  is the growth rate of average income (µ ). Thus, if there are 
no changes in inequality (i.e. the Lorenz curve stays the same), the GIC will be a ﬂat 
line at the average income growth rate. If   ) (p gt  is a decreasing function for all p, then 
inequality is reduced over time (and vice versa). 
  A GIC explains the growth patterns of the aggregate distribution. It does not 
necessarily reﬂect the experienced income growth of the individuals or households 
1 )] ( / ) ( [ ) ( 1 − = − p y p y p g t t t2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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making up that distribution because they can also move within the income distribution; 
individuals lose a job, get promotion, retire and thereby change their position in the 
income ranking. Being poor (or not) is a status which applies to individuals and not to 
pth quantiles. Nevertheless, GIC’s are a useful tool to explain poverty trends because 
trends in aggregate poverty measures can, to a large extent, be explained by changes in 
the income distribution. 
  For simplicity, imagine a world with no distributional mobility (individuals do not 
switch ranks in the income distribution) or, equivalently, there is mobility, but each move 
in rank is compensated by a countervailing move. The absolute poverty is only adjusted 
for inﬂation. In such a situation, changes in absolute poverty can be entirely explained 
by the real income changes of the percentiles around the poverty line. Everything 
else equal, absolute poverty increases (decreases) when the real income growth rates 
of those percentiles just above (under) the poverty line are negative (positive). For 
relative poverty rates the argument changes because the poverty line is determined 
endogenously by the income distribution. In the case of the Laeken approach, relative 
poverty rates can be explained by a combination of the real income changes of the 
percentiles around the poverty line and those of the median (50th percentile). Relative 
poverty increases (decreases) when the real growth rate at the median is higher (lower) 
than the growth rates of the percentiles above (below) the poverty line.
  The  GIC’s  for  each  country  using  the  1993  and  2000  income  distributions 
are displayed in Figure 2.6 and express average annual real growth rates. For most 
countries, the growth rates are averaged over eight years. The curve shows the GIC and 
the horizontal line reﬂects the average annual growth rate of median income.38 If all 
incomes grow at the same rate, the GIC is ﬂat and there are no changes in inequality. 
Note that the GIC’s are drawn comparing the 1993 and 2000 income distributions; they 
do not necessarily reﬂect inequality changes occurring between intermediate years.
  The growth patterns of the countries are very different in terms of levels of 
growth as well as in the way growth in income is distributed over the population. In 
many countries, the lower end of the income distribution beneﬁted most from economic 
growth, but this is not the case in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Ireland where the opposite pattern occurs. To see how poverty trends can be explained 
by these growth patterns, we need to focus on those income percentiles around the 
poverty line and the median percentile (the latter only for Laeken poverty). The case 
38 To enhance comparability between countries, we excluded the lowest and highest 5 percentiles because 
they had a too large effect on the scaling of the vertical axis. For the same purpose, we allowed the scale of 
the vertical axis to differ by country.34
of Ireland clearly illustrates these effects.39 In the period from 1993 to 2000, Ireland 
experienced  rapid  economic  growth.  Every  percentile  beneﬁted  from  this  growth; 
percentile income growth rates are mostly at or above 4% per annum. As the Orshansky 
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Figure 2.6: Growth incidence curves (expressed in real annual growth rates, based on 
income distributions of 1993 and 2000)
Note: To facilitate comparison of Orshansky and Laeken poverty trends within countries, we used different 
scales on the vertical axes and excluded the lowest 5% and highest 5% observations.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID
39 Our analysis of Ireland conﬁrms what other contributions that speciﬁcally studied poverty in Ireland 
have found (Maitre et al, January 2006; Whelan et al, November 2003; Whelan et al, February 2006). In 
these contributions, developments in the relative Laeken poverty indicator are compared to the trend of a 
deprivation index: these studies report signiﬁcant reductions in the number of deprived people from 1994 
to 2001. This is because the deprivation index and our Orshansky poverty indicator both monitor real 
improvements in economic well-being while the Laeken indicator captures only relative improvements in 
well-being. Nevertheless, our cross-national comparisons emphasize the diversity in absolute and relative 
poverty experiences across countries: even among the faster growing member states the Irish experience 
is extreme. 2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
35
In 1993, 30% of the Irish had an income below the Orshansky threshold and in 2000 
this ﬁgure had decreased to below 11% (Table 2.7 in the appendix). However, the GIC 
from Ireland shows that the middle income groups beneﬁted much more than other 
groups; median income growth was above 6%. The relative poverty threshold therefore 
also increased by more than 6% per annum while the growth rates around the poverty 
line percentiles (16-21) were about 5%. Relative poverty consequently increased from 
17% in 1993 to 21% in 2000 in Ireland. For most of the countries, the GIC patterns 
explain the poverty trends rather well, although at low poverty rates and/or low growth 
rates it is more difﬁcult to graphically show the effects. Note that there are contrasting 
experiences among the faster growing countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland). 
In Greece, Spain and Portugal the lower 20 percentiles had higher growth rates than the 
median income percentile while Ireland experienced the opposite.
2.4.3 Equivalence scales and the impact on poverty rates
Equivalence scales adjust for the economies of scale that larger households have as 
compared to a single person household. They also adjust for differences in cost of 
living  for  different  age  and/or  gender  groups.  Cross-national  poverty  comparisons 
typically apply the same equivalence scales to every country even though it is likely 
that such costs differ between countries. The Laeken and Orshansky methods also use 
different equivalence scales. We explore how these weighting schemes differ and how 
they affect the Laeken and Orshansky poverty estimates. 
  The modiﬁed OECD equivalence scales used in the Laeken indicator assign 
a weight to each household member. The ﬁrst adult receives a weight of one and 
subsequent adults get a weight of 0.5. Children aged below 14, each obtain a weight of 
0.3. A household consisting of two parents and two children thus receives a weight of 
2.1. Adult equivalent income is obtained by dividing a household’s income by 2.1. All 
individuals in the household are poor when the adult equivalent income lies below the 
adult equivalent poverty line. The Orshansky equivalence scales are derived from the 
48 poverty lines; which poverty line is applied depends on the number and age of the 
household members. Household members under the age of 18 are counted as children. 
For the single and two person households a further distinction is made with respect to 
the age of the head of the household. If the head is older than 65, the household has a 
lower threshold. We calculated these implied Orshansky equivalence scales by taking 
the single adult household poverty line as a benchmark.40 
40 For example, the poverty line of a single adult is $1,000 and $2,000 for a household consisting of two 
adults and two children. The (implied) equivalence weight of the latter household is $2,000/$1,000=2.36
Table 2.3 compares the total household weights for a number of household types using 
the OECD and Orshansky weighting schemes. We have also included two extreme 
scales; the individual scheme which gives a weight of one to every individual and the 
household scheme which gives a weight of one to each household, irrespective of its 
composition. Single elderly households get a weight of one for all schemes except 
the Orshansky scheme, which attributes a weight of 0.92. Thus, single elderly ‘need’ 
only 92% of the income required for a single adult. Compared to the household and 
individual weighting schemes the OECD and Orshansky scales are rather similar. For 
most household types the Orshansky scales have a lower value than the OECD scales, 
which implies that the Orshansky scales assume lower cost to reach the same level of 
economic well-being.41 In contrast to the OECD scales, the Orshansky scales often 
give a slightly higher weight to children than to additional adults. For instance, single 
parents with one child receive an Orshansky weight of 1.32 and an OECD weight of 
1.3. For an adult couple household the OECD weight is 1.5 while the Orshansky weight 
is 1.29. Even though the differences between the Laeken and Orshansky equivalence 
scales are not so large, they can have a considerable impact on overall poverty rates 
as well as on poverty rates for certain groups in society. The impact is especially large 
when differences in equivalence scales apply to large parts of the population.
  Equivalence scales also affect the Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates differently. 
To see this, the adult equivalent income (y) of household i, is obtained by dividing 
household income by its equivalence scale i E . Then, for most households the OECD 
Table 2.3: Total household weight using various equivalence weighing schemes





Single adult  1 1 1 1
Single elderly 1 1 0.92 1
Adult couple 2 1.5 1.29 1
Elderly couple 2 1.5 1.16 1
Single parent, one child 2 1.3 1.32 1
Single parent, two children 3 1.6 1.55 1
Parents one child 3 1.8 1.55 1
Parents two children 4 2.1 1.95 1
Parents three children 5 2.4 2.29 1
41 For some more atypical households, notably households with many children and relatively few adults, the 
Orshansky scales indicate a higher cost than the modiﬁed OECD scales. 2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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equivalence scale is larger than the Orshansky equivalence scale, resulting in a lower 
equivalent adult income. Using the same absolute (equivalent adult) poverty line, it can 
easily be seen that absolute poverty rates using the Orshansky weights are higher than 
with the OECD scales. If, for most households, orshansky OECD E E > , then orshansky OECD y y <  
and for a given  a z  then  orshansky OECD H H > .
  Knowing the weighting schemes is not sufﬁcient to predict how equivalence 
schemes affect the relative poverty rates. This is because the equivalence scales not 
only weigh income differently, but they also determine the locus of the relative poverty 
line as median income (ym) is also affected by the weights. The net effect on poverty 
depends on the demographic composition of the population (the relative size of the 
three generations and how they are spread over household types) and the income of 
these households. If, for most households, orshansky OECD E E > , then orshansky OECD y y <  
and  ) ( ) ( orshansky r OECD r z z <   (because  ) ( ) ( orshansky m OECD m y y < ).    Because  a  lower 
equivalent adult income tends to increase poverty rates while a lower poverty line 
decreases poverty rates, the net impact on relative poverty is not clear.
  We have calculated the 2000 Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates using the 
modiﬁed OECD equivalence scales and the implied Orshansky weights. Figure 2.7 
shows the impact of both weighting schemes on the overall poverty rates by illustrating 
the percentage point difference for each poverty indicator (poverty rate using OECD 
equivalence scale minus poverty rate using implied Orshansky scale). As expected, 
Orshansky poverty rates are higher when using the modiﬁed OECD scales. For example, 
in Ireland Orshansky poverty rates are 5 percentage points higher if we would apply 
OECD equivalence scales. The differences in Laeken poverty rates are much smaller 
and are positive in some countries while negative in others. In general, relative poverty 
rates are less sensitive to the use of different equivalence scales. The magnitude of 
these differences varies by country and may thus affect international poverty rankings. 
The 2000 Orshansky poverty rate is 5.7% in Sweden and 5.1% in Germany. When 
Orshansky poverty rates are computed using the modiﬁed OECD scheme, poverty is 
now 6.8% in Sweden and 7.7% in Germany (Germany is now ranked above Sweden).
   We also illustrate the impact of the Orshansky and OECD weighting schemes 
for six household types: single adult, single elderly, adult couple, elderly couple, single 
adult with child(ren) and two adults with child(ren) (Figure 2.8). As the number of 
observations for single parents is very low in some countries, the results for this group 
should be interpreted with caution. Generally, Orshansky poverty risk increases for 
most household types when modiﬁed OECD weights are applied (excluding single 
adult households as they have the same weight). Austria is the only country where 
single parents (of one or more children) have a lower poverty rate using the Orshansky 
scales. The higher the proportion of a particular household in a population, the larger 38
is its effect on Orshansky poverty rates. The ﬁgure further shows that the small overall 
Laeken poverty differences mask considerable changes in relative poverty risk for 
different household types. The poverty differences are negative for some household 
types and positive for other types but the direction of the effect is common between 
countries. Poverty rates among elderly couples are greater in all countries when using 
OECD equivalence scales while poverty rates among single adults, single elderly and 
single parents are lower. The differences for adult couples and parents with children 
are only small. Thus, equivalence scales affect the relative poverty risks of groups in 
society; using a different equivalence scale alters the poverty risk of one group relative 
to the other. Knowing the equivalence weighting schemes, it is easy to assert the 
direction of change in absolute poverty risk for a certain population group or household 
type but the magnitude of the effect is determined by the share in the population of 
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Figure 2.7: Difference between Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates due to different 
equivalence schemes (in percentage points)
Note: The bars reﬂect the difference in poverty rate using OECD equivalence scale minus the poverty rate 
using implied Orshansky scale.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
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that particular group. If children receive a higher equivalence weight, child poverty 
increases. Using a relative approach to poverty, the direction of change in poverty 
risk for speciﬁc groups depends not only on the equivalence weights but also on the 
composition of the population. 
2.5 Conclusion
US poverty is much higher than poverty in Europe when a relative poverty measure 
is used. Using an absolute poverty measurement method, the picture looks different: 
poverty in some European countries is higher. Over time, both poverty indicators may 
develop in a parallel, converging or diverging fashion. In this study we applied the 
ofﬁcial poverty measurement methods of the United States and the European Union 
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Figure 2.8: Difference between Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates due to different 
equivalence schemes (by household type, in percentage points)
Note: The bars reﬂect the difference in poverty rate using OECD equivalence scale minus the poverty rate 
using implied Orshansky scale.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID40
to both regions in order to explain underlying reasons for these differences in relative 
and absolute poverty. We used within and between country perspectives to explain 
differences  in  poverty  levels  and  trends  and  showed  the  impact  of  each  of  these 
aspects on poverty levels and poverty trends while keeping other explanatory factors 
constant. Poverty ﬁgures reﬂect the net outcome of a complex set of factors. On the one 
hand they incorporate (changes in) the welfare dimensions they are meant to capture 
(minimum living standard, income inequality, economic development). On the other 
hand, technical aspects such as PPP rates and equivalence scales also have considerable 
inﬂuence on poverty rates. Our paper showed that there is a lot of variation across 
countries in the relative importance of each of these technical aspects on the difference 
between absolute and relative poverty headcounts. 
  As absolute poverty concepts are based on a minimum acceptable living standard 
while  relative  poverty  concepts  are  distribution  dependent  (but  in  a  very  speciﬁc 
way), resulting differences between poverty levels and trends across countries are 
explained by the interplay of distributional and non-distributional factors. The degree 
of income dispersion at and below median income inﬂuences relative poverty rates but 
also resulting differences with absolute poverty levels. Countries with wider income 
dispersion have higher relative poverty levels and the gap between absolute and relative 
poverty rates is more likely to be wider. However, over time, this gap between absolute 
and relative poverty levels may change. We showed that poverty trends are affected 
ﬁrstly by changes in the year to year poverty lines (i.e. the updating mechanism) and 
secondly by distributional income changes (i.e. changes in inequality). While absolute 
poverty  lines  are  updated  with  the  inﬂation  rate,  the  Laeken  relative  poverty  line 
changes with the percentage growth rate of median income. The ﬁnal impact on both 
poverty indicators, however, depends on the degree of real income change at the lower 
end of the income distribution; real income increases are sufﬁcient to reduce absolute 
poverty while income increases at the lower end need to be higher than proportional 
in order to reduce relative poverty. Although relative and absolute poverty indicators 
each evaluate the outcome of economic development by focusing on its impact on low 
income levels, their perspective on what constitutes progress in welfare is different; 
the absolute indicator evaluates real progress while the relative indicator only detects 
progress when it is more than proportionally shared. In sum, this research showed that 
the relation between a minimum income standard and inequality in the lower part of the 
income distribution differs considerably between countries and that this relation is also 
not stable within a country over time.
  Furthermore, in international poverty comparisons, PPP rates are often used to 
compare absolute poverty. However, differences in the development of living standards 
between countries are reﬂected in the PPP rate and thereby also affect the estimates 2. Relative or absolute poverty in the USA and EU?
41
42 Nevertheless, our absolute poverty lines behave in the same way as those that would be based on actual 
minimum living standards.
of absolute poverty in a country. Taking a different base year for the conversion of a 
foreign absolute poverty line can amount to a difference of various percentage points 
in  headcount  rates,  particularly  for  fast  growing  economies. We  also  showed  that 
equivalence scales change the shape of the income distribution and that even seemingly 
small differences in weights have a very large effect on estimating the number of poor. 
The net difference in headcount poverty is much larger for an absolute poverty indicator 
than  for  a  relative  indicator.  Nevertheless,  differences  between  equivalence  scales 
signiﬁcantly change the poverty risk of population groups for both indicators. The effect 
of equivalence scales on poverty risk, however, is also determined by the composition 
of the population in a country as well as their typical living arrangements.
  This suggests that it makes sense to use both absolute and relative poverty 
indicators. Absolute poverty analyses provide insights into the parts of the population 
that do not attain the minimum living standard. Relative poverty analyses inform about 
the group of people whose living standard is low compared to that of the society they 
live in. Relative and absolute approaches thus each portray different but common 
perceptions of poverty. Monitoring one dimension does not provide information on 
developments in the other dimension. Ignoring one dimension may lead to developments 
in society that at some point may conﬂict with societies’ preferences. In sections 2.3 
and 2.4.1.2 we discussed a number of drawbacks regarding the method that we used 
in this paper to construct the absolute poverty lines. What is important for the public 
and policy making is that an absolute poverty line actually gives an indication of the 
level of resources that is needed to satisfy a range of basic needs in a particular country. 
The limitation of our method is that the absolute poverty lines we used may not reﬂect 
such a minimum living standard.42 We therefore do not propose to use this method 
when developing a comparable absolute poverty indicator for the EU member states. 
‘Anchoring’ a relative poverty line is however not a proper alternative. An anchored 
poverty line is a relative poverty line that is updated to subsequent years using the 
inﬂation rate (the EU Laeken indicators also include an anchored relative poverty line). 
The problem with an anchored line is that the initial level of the poverty line is based 
on the income distribution and not on the costs of satisfying basic needs. Moreover, the 
analysis of growth incidence curves has shown that incomes grow differently across the 
income distribution. Thus, when an anchored relative poverty line differs considerably 
from that of an absolute poverty line, they may still show different trends in poverty.
  Even  though  most  countries  in  the  developed  and  developing  world  report 
(semi) ofﬁcial poverty statistics on a regular basis, only few countries actually report 
both absolute and relative poverty statistics. In fact, it is not easy to ﬁnd comparable 42
absolute and relative poverty data (the poverty research based on the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) data being a noteworthy exception). Unfortunately, it seems that 
a ‘battle of the rates’ takes place only when deciding about which ofﬁcial poverty 
indicator to choose (EU) or to discuss the deﬁciencies of the current indicator (US and 
EU). In the USA, a national academy of sciences panel proposed an improved absolute 
poverty indicator (Citro et al., 1995). Relative poverty indicators do not seem to play 
any role of signiﬁcance. Although in the USA inequality may generally be perceived 
as less problematic than in Europe, does that mean that any level of inequality is 
acceptable or that the situation of those having considerably less than the rest should 
not be monitored? Differences between absolute and relative poverty indicators are 
extremely large in the US; what are the implications for a society if about one quarter 
of its population has much less than its middle person? And why does the EU only use 
a relative approach while differences in living standards between Member States are 
large and have further increased with current expansions of the European Union? How 
should we interpret the fact that the Czech Republic has the lowest Laeken poverty rate 
within the EU? If the Laeken indicators were to be complemented with an absolute 
poverty indicator reﬂecting the cost of achieving a minimum living standard in each 
member state (including costs such as food, rent, clothing, health and education), the 
impact of the reforms resulting from the European integration process could also be 
evaluated from this perspective. The new Member States are still in the process of 
restructuring their economies and it is expected that there will be strong economic 
growth; all reasons for expecting divergence between absolute and relative poverty 
levels and trends in these countries. 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DThe policy relevance of absolute and relative 
poverty headcounts: what’s in a number? 348
3.1 Introduction1 2 3 4
Despite critical theoretical and technical concerns expressed by many scholars, ﬁnancial 
poverty indicators still play a very important role in policymaking and evaluation. Most 
countries use one or several ‘ofﬁcial’ ﬁnancial poverty indicators on which progress is 
regularly monitored and which serve as a basis for many large scale policy interventions. 
The United States use an absolute poverty indicator that is based on a minimum cost of 
living threshold which is compared to a families’ gross income.5 The ﬁnancial poverty 
indicator as used by the EU member states is based on a relative concept of poverty: 
the poverty threshold is set at 60 percent of national median income and compared 
to household’s disposable income. Every year, the annual publication of the ofﬁcial 
poverty estimates receives considerable attention in the media and public debate in all 
countries. The issue of ﬁnancial poverty rates is hotly debated especially when poverty 
rates increase or when ﬁnancial poverty among speciﬁc groups (e.g. children or elderly) 
is on the rise. Moreover, national governments use ﬁnancial poverty headcounts to 
illustrate the success of their policies or use them as a basis for target setting in the 
core political arena (e.g. Blair government on child poverty in the UK). The ﬁnancial 
poverty headcount ﬁgures are also used to guide and implement actual policy. The 
Orshansky poverty line in the US is, for example, used as a tool to determine eligibility 
for  programmes  or  beneﬁts  targeted  at  low  income  families  (e.g.  households  are 
eligible for food stamps if their income is below a value of 130% of the poverty line). 
1 This chapter is written as a separate paper: Notten, G. & C. de Neubourg (2007). The policy relevance 
of absolute and relative poverty headcounts: What’s in a number? MGSoG Working Paper, 2007/006, 
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University, Maastricht. As a result, part of the 
information in sections 3.1and 3.2 has already been discussed in chapter 2. In the concluding discussion 
of this paper we also draw upon the main insights from chapter 2 to argue why it makes sense to use 
both absolute and relative poverty indicators. Readers of chapter 2 can skip section 3.7 of  this chapter 
altogether.   
2 In this chapter we use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The results and 
conclusions of this chapter are ours and not those of Eurostat, the European Commission or any of the 
national authorities whose data have been used.
3 This research beneﬁted from a grant provided by the EuroPanel Users’ Network (EPUNet) that ﬁnanced a 
research visit to CEPS/INSTEAD (Differdange, Luxembourg) as well as from a travel grant provided by the 
Dutch Scientiﬁc Organization (NWO) which funded a research visit to the Kennedy School of Government 
(Cambridge, USA).
4 We thank our colleagues at CEPS/INSTEAD (Differdange, Luxembourg), Kennedy School of Government 
(Cambridge,  USA),  National  Poverty  Institute  (Ann Arbor,  USA),  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics 
(Ann Arbor, USA) and the participants in the conference on ‘New Directions in the Study of Inequality’ 
(Princeton, April 2006, USA) who have contributed to the progress of this research.  We are especially 
grateful for the constructive suggestions of Emil Tesliuc, Christopher Jencks, Mary Jo Bane, Erzo Luttmer 
and Gary Sandefur. 
5 This indicator was developed by Molly Orshansky in the 1960s and, except for some minor changes, has 
merely been updated for inﬂation ever since.3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
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In the EU member states the poverty indicators are mainly used as a monitoring tool.6 
However, the presence of European funds7 earmarked for socially excluded groups 
or the development of disadvantaged regions stimulates the use of ﬁnancial poverty 
indicators to tap into these funds by using them as solid arguments in funding proposals 
and project evaluations.8 
  The use of a particular ﬁnancial poverty indicator is often the result of a (political) 
debate in the past. Once chosen, it often proves difﬁcult to switch to or incorporate 
another poverty indicator. Choice then becomes convention. However, by choosing 
either an absolute or relative poverty concept, developments in the other dimension 
receive less attention or are missed altogether. In the US, relative poverty indicators 
play no role whatsoever while out of the 18 Laeken indicators in the EU there is not 
even a single indicator reﬂecting the minimum cost of living in a particular country or 
region. Even if poverty were to be considered predominantly as an absolute concept 
in a given society, does that mean that relative poverty can be ignored completely 
(or vice versa)? Is the ﬁght against poverty and social exclusion only an issue when 
poverty means that individuals have less than an agreed minimum living standard? Or 
is poverty also an issue when it means that certain groups of people have considerably 
less than what is considered typical or normal in a given society?
  In Notten and de Neubourg (2007c) we estimated both ofﬁcial EU and US poverty 
indicators for the US and 15 EU member states and analysed to what extent and how 
technical reasons account for differences between estimates of absolute and relative 
poverty headcounts. In this paper, we use the same poverty indicators but now we focus 
on the relation between poverty headcounts and their policy uses: poverty headcounts 
are not only used to evaluate economic progress and the overall effect of government 
interventions but they are also used when making and evaluating speciﬁc policies.9 
Poverty proﬁles based on headcount poverty statistics are key elements for the design 
and evaluation of poverty alleviation policies; they provide information about the size 
6 There is no common European social policy; each member state is responsible for its own social policies 
and may also use different poverty concepts. However, there are regular meetings between the ministers 
of social affairs and their employees and each member state is required to deﬁne and evaluate its targets 
in terms of poverty and social inclusion in National Action Plans on Social Inclusion (NAPincl) using the 
Laeken indicators on poverty and social inclusion (Atkinson et al., 2002; Marlier et al, 2007).
7 The European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).
8 For instance, during the second European Round Table on Poverty and Social Exclusion held in Turin on 
16-17 October 2003, a workshop was organized to examine the ways in which Member States have made, 
or plan to make, use of Structural Funds to support measures to combat poverty and social exclusion, as 
identiﬁed in their National Action Plans on Social Inclusion (NAPincl) for 2003-2005.
9 We refer to the US ofﬁcial poverty indicator as the ‘Orshansky’ indicator and to the EU indicator as the 
‘Laeken’ indicator (named after the place where the EU countries agreed upon the use of this common 
indicator).50
and characteristics of the target group and help policy makers and politicians decide 
about the potential scope of such policies as well as the type of policy instruments that 
can be used.10 Moreover, poverty headcounts are often used to evaluate the targeting 
efﬁciency and poverty reduction effect of a policy. In this paper we investigate the 
implications of choosing either a relative or an absolute poverty concept for these policy 
uses. We ﬁrstly analyse how these measures affect the size and proﬁle of the poor: would 
they lead to selecting different priority groups? We also estimate and study long term 
poverty headcounts as the chronically poor constitute a priority group for social policy 
in itself. Finally, we investigate the poverty alleviating effect of various social transfers 
using information on the incidence of beneﬁts and the amount of beneﬁts received: Are 
current social transfers successful in lifting people out of poverty altogether. Are they 
beneﬁcial predominantly for the group of ‘hard core’ poor (i.e. those people who are 
poor using both indicators) or do they reach the ‘single indicator’ poor and non-poor 
equally?
  We ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between poverty groups deﬁned by Orshansky 
and Laeken indicators in terms of size, characteristics, beneﬁt incidence and beneﬁt 
levels. The differences between groups in a particular year are in some cases already 
considerable,  but  the  implications  of  using  either  an  absolute  or  relative  poverty 
indicator over time could be great, especially for fast growing economies such as 
the new European member states. This also holds for countries with high levels of 
inequality. From a policy perspective, it would therefore make sense to use a poverty 
indicator reﬂecting the costs of attaining some minimum living standard as well as a 
poverty indicator that identiﬁes those that have considerably fewer resources than what 
is considered normal or typical in a society.
  The next section discusses the differences in the poverty headcount using the two 
poverty lines for the 16 countries under study. The impact of the choice of the poverty 
line on the size and the composition of the long term poor is the main issue discussed in 
the section thereafter. Differences between poverty proﬁles resulting from the absolute 
and the relative poverty analyses and their potential impact on social policy as well as 
the beneﬁt incidence and beneﬁt adequacy are covered in the two larger sections before 
the conclusion. The technical differences between the US Orshansky poverty count and 
the EU Laeken poverty estimates are brieﬂy explained in the appendix.
10 Poverty proﬁles also play an important role in formulating poverty reduction plans as they are now 
mandatory for obtaining funds from donors in nearly all developing countries.3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
51
3.2 More or less poverty? Orshansky and Laeken poverty in the EU and 
US
Laeken and Orshansky poverty measurement methods for the United States and the 
old EU member states (EU-15) yield considerable differences in terms of poverty 
incidence (Table 3.1). Using disposable household income to calculate both poverty 
indicators, the rate of relative poverty (Laeken) is considerably higher than absolute 
poverty (Orshansky) in the richer countries. For the Mediterranean countries the rate of 
Orshansky poverty is higher than that of Laeken poverty. It is not difﬁcult to understand 
that higher poverty rates put the poverty problem higher on the policy agenda. It thus 
matters for specifying policy priorities whether countries use a relative or an absolute 
indicator as their yardstick. The success of all poverty reduction programmes, typically 
being  judged  by  the  reduction  in  the  poverty  headcount  and  the  poverty  gap,  is 
consequently very sensitive to the choice of indicator on which the poverty line is 
constructed. More importantly, the choice for an absolute or a relative indicator may 
yield very different poverty proﬁles, which in turn may lead to differences in targeting 
groups in policy reduction policies. In order to analyse these differences, Table 3.1 also 
calculates the overlap between the households belonging to the poor according to the 
Orshansky and the Laeken indicator. Looking at the estimates for 2000, 88% of the poor 
in Spain and 83% in Italy is poor according to both indicators but the overlap is much 
lower for the other countries, with the USA (37%), Belgium (27%) and Luxembourg 
(4%) showing the smallest overlap. 
  Table 3.1 shows very clearly that it makes a big difference whether one uses the 
US Orshansky approach or the EU Laeken approach. The degree to which poverty is 
considered a serious or a modest problem depends on the magnitude of the phenomenon; 
it makes a difference in the minds of people (including those of policymakers and 
politicians) whether the ofﬁcial poverty indicator shows that ‘only’ 9% of the population 
is poor as compared to 24% (United States). Although the USA is an extreme case, the 
magnitude of poverty typically doubles going from Orshansky to Laeken poverty for 
the richer EU member states (2000). This difference in poverty does not only affect 
the general sense of urgency of the problem at hand but also has serious budgetary 
implications. The implementation of an income support programme may be ﬁnancially 
feasible when it assists 5% of the population but may soon become problematic when a 
substantially larger group of people is involved. Magnitude also inﬂuences the type of 
policy response (for instance transfers versus tax breaks or training programmes versus 
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  Comparing poverty in 1996 with 2000 estimates, it is also clear that Orshansky 
poverty is declining over time in most countries while Laeken poverty changes only 
moderately, albeit in either direction. This implies that according to one indicator the 
poverty situation in a country is improving while the other indicator may suggest no 
change or deterioration. Ireland is a striking example in this respect, having experienced 
a decrease in Orshansky poverty of nearly 20 percentage points and an increase in 
Laeken poverty of about 5 percentage points over the period 1993 to 2000. 
  Notten and de Neubourg (2007c) have shown the impact of the main underlying 
technical  mechanisms  determining  these  poverty  differences.  As  the  Orshansky 
poverty line is set irrespective of a countries’ income distribution while the Laeken 
poverty line depends on national median income, distributional characteristics are a 
main explanatory factor. The level of income inequality below the median and changes 
in this inequality affect the level of absolute and relative poverty rates. In countries 
with higher income inequality the overlap between Laeken and Orshansky poverty 
is typically low(er). Furthermore, differences between absolute and relative poverty 
trends are more pronounced in faster growing economies. Other factors explaining 
poverty differences are the use of Purchasing Power Parity rates to convert the US 
Orshansky thresholds to national price levels and the different equivalence scales used 
by the EU and the US poverty measurement methods. The effect of PPP conversion 
only inﬂuences differences between Laeken and Orshansky poverty levels but does 
not affect poverty trends because national inﬂation rates are used to update the poverty 
lines over time.11 Despite moderate differences in equivalence weighting schemes, the 
impact on the poverty estimates is considerable.
  We have therefore also calculated the Orshansky poverty rates using the modiﬁed 
OECD-equivalences weights as used in the Laeken indicator (columns 4 and 8, Table 
3.1).12  Using  the  same  equivalence  scale  for  both  poverty  indicators  considerably 
reduces the differences between Laeken and Orshansky estimates. In 2000, the effect 
is particularly large in Denmark, France, Spain and the Netherlands. The Netherlands 
is now the country with the highest overlap (88%). However, in most countries the 
overlap is below 70% and in Belgium, Portugal, United States and Luxembourg even 
below 50%. The use of the same weighting scheme also reduces the heterogeneity in 
11 In another paper we already indicated that the exceptional deviation of the Mediterranean countries may 
be related to the PPP converter that is used (Notten & Neubourg de, 2007c). In this paper we further discuss 
the appropriateness of using PPP rates.
12 The modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale attribute a weight of 1 to the ﬁrst adult in a household, 0.5 for 
subsequent adults and a weight of 0.3 for children under age 14. The Orshansky scales are implicit in the 
sense that there are 48 poverty lines, depending on the household size and age of household members. To 
calculate Orshansky OECD scale poverty rates we compared the single adult poverty line with the adult 
equivalent income of a household.54
the characteristics of both poverty groups (Notten & Neubourg de, 2007c). Differences 
between weighting schemes alter the poverty risk of demographic groups and the 
household types they live in. If additional children in a household have a lower weight 
than additional adults (as is the case in the OECD scheme) fewer children are counted 
as poor as compared with a scheme attributing equal weights. A weighting scheme 
that attributes higher economies of scale to larger households reduces the poverty risk 
of such households and its members. Moreover, as the share of large households in 
the population increases, its effect on poverty rates and risk proﬁles becomes larger. 
Given this impact of the US and OECD weighting schemes, we focus on the policy 
consequences of poverty differences caused by the Laeken and Orshansky poverty 
lines in the remainder of this paper (using the OECD modiﬁed equivalence scales to 
measure Laeken and Orshansky poverty). The next sections address the differences 
between the Orshansky and the Laeken methodology for analysing long term poverty, 
poverty proﬁles, social beneﬁt incidence and social beneﬁt adequacy.
3.3 Long term poverty
Compared to other groups in society, the group of long term poor is of special concern 
because having low income levels for a long time not only implies the lack of resources 
to ﬁnance current living standards, but also reduces investment opportunities in health 
and education thereby also reducing prospects of a better future (especially when asset 
levels are also low). Generally, long term poverty levels are considerably lower than 
annual poverty rates. But even when countries have similar poverty rates, their long-
term poverty rates may differ. Take, for instance, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Finland. The annual Laeken poverty rates in these countries are similar (10-
11%), but the long term poverty rates vary from 5.2% in Denmark to 7.1% in Austria. 
Or alternatively, countries with similar long term poverty rates such as Luxembourg 
and France (respectively 8.6% and 8.7%) have different annual poverty rates (12.5% 
and 15.4%). Exploiting the panel dimensions of the datasets we estimated long term 
Orshansky and Laeken poverty rates (Table 3.2). This indicator is also called the ‘at 
persistent risk of poverty’ rate and labels individuals as long term poor if they are 
currently poor and have also lived in poverty in at least two out of three previous years. 
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that is providing comparable estimates of long 
term poverty between Europe and the United States.
  Focussing on the ‘at persistent risk of poverty’ according to the Laeken indicators, 
the countries can be distinguished in two groups: Mediterranean countries and the USA 
with a high percentage of long term poor and the other European countries with a lower 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































poverty using the Orshansky method is consistently higher than the Laeken estimate 
for Mediterranean countries and Ireland and lower for the other countries. Exploring 
the changes between 1996 and 2000, it is clear that the changes in the relative indicator 
were very moderate while the Orshansky indicator showed a decline for all the countries 
(in some cases e.g. Ireland, spectacularly) except for Greece. It should be noted that the 
changes in the absolute poverty count are bigger than in the relative poverty estimate, 
suggesting that quite a lot of the long term poor experienced an income increase lifting 
them out of absolute poverty in that period but not getting them above the – for most 
countries – higher relative poverty line. 
  It is of course interesting to study whether the Orshansky poverty estimate 
would be a good proxy for the long term (at persistent risk of) poverty rate; Orshansky 
poverty estimates do not require panel data, but long term poverty estimates do. It 
would also be also interesting to know from a policy perspective to what extent there 
is an overlap between the poorest in any given year using an absolute poverty measure 
and the long term poor? A ﬁrst indication is given in the columns 5 and 10 of Table 
3.2 where it can be seen that the overlap between the two ‘at persistent risk of poverty’ 
rates is only considerable for four countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK. However, the overlap between the Laeken ‘at persistent risk of poverty’ rate and 
Orshansky ‘at persistent risk of poverty’ rate does decline considerably over the short 
period between 1996 and 2000, indicating not much stability. A more direct exploration 
is provided in Table 3.3.
  We  selected  a  number  of  ‘rich’  countries  with  varying  degrees  of  overlap 
between absolute and relative poverty groups: the Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, United 
Kingdom and the United States. For these countries, the Orshansky poor are a subset 
of the Laeken poor (Table 3.3). In 2000, the percentage of Laeken poverty is high in 
the United States and Ireland (well above 20%), low in the Netherlands and Austria 
(11-12%) and in between for the United Kingdom (17%). The overlap between annual 
Laeken and Orshansky poverty groups is highest for the Netherlands (88%) and lowest 
for the United States (47%). In Ireland, slightly less than half of the Laeken poor (about 
10% of the total population) have also been long term poor in a relative sense and are 
currently also poor in an absolute sense. In the other countries this group covers 42% of 
the Laeken poor in the UK, 33% in Austria and 29% in the Netherlands. The overlap is 
thus very limited and the Orshansky poverty rate cannot be regarded as a proxy for the 
long term poor.
   The overlapping group, that is to say, the group of people that are both absolute 
poor and long term poor is, however, very interesting from a policy perspective; not 
only do these individuals currently have a very low income (insufﬁcient to ﬁnance an 
acceptable minimum living standard), their income levels have been low compared to 3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
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the rest of the population over the past years as well. What are the characteristics of 
the people? From what sources do they derive their income? How did they end up in 
this situation and what do they think about their situation themselves? The limitation of 
this paper does not allow us to try to answer this questions but, clearly, such vulnerable 
groups can only be identiﬁed when poverty is measured using both relative and absolute 
poverty concepts. 
3.4 Poverty proﬁles
For policies to have a poverty alleviating effect, both the size and characteristics of the 
poor (poverty proﬁle) are relevant information. Such ﬁndings can be used to determine 
the type of assistance that could be provided to a target group. An increase in the social 
minimum pension is an obvious option if a large part of the poor are elderly people. In 
contrast, when working individuals and the households they live in are a major share of 
the poor, other policy options such as tax breaks may be considered. When especially 
families with children are victim to poverty, family allowances seem to be a serious 
option. When absolute and relative poverty lines are very different it may well be that 
the poverty proﬁles of the two groups of poor differ as well. 
  To study whether this is actually the case in the EU or the USA, we compare 
the characteristics of the group of poor who are poor according to both indicators with 
group of poor who are only poor according to one of the indicators. To avoid unreadable 
Table 3.3: Overlap between poverty groups (in % of individuals, 2000) 
# of poor individuals 2000








(% of Laeken 
poor individuals)
(% of Laeken 
poor  individuals)
Ireland 1,242 611 21.4 72.7 48.5
Netherlands 1,132 347 11.3 88.0 28.5
Austria 959 514 11.9 60.8 32.6
United Kingdom 2,032 937 17.1 71.7 41.8
United States 4,567 - 23.6 46.7 -
Note:  1 Orshansky OECD poverty incidence is calculated using Orshansky single adult poverty and 
modiﬁed OECD equivalence scales (which are also used for Laeken poverty). 2 Percentage is based on 
Laeken poor individuals in the panel. Individual are long term poor or ‘at persistent risk of poverty’ if they 
are currently poor and also lived in poverty in at least two out of three previous years. 
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID58
tables we focus on the same subset of ‘rich’ countries as in Table 3.3; in these countries 
individuals are either poor regardless of whether a Laeken and Orshansky poverty 
indicator is used, or only poor when using the Laeken indicator. As before we call the 
(overlap) group that is poor according to both the Orshansky and the Laeken indicator, 
the ‘Orshansky poor’ and we call the persons belonging to the other (single indicator) 
group ‘Laeken-poor’. We investigate differences in gender, age, household type and 
main source of income in 2000 and test whether the prevalence of these characteristics 
differs signiﬁcantly between both groups using a simple Wald test (taking the speciﬁc 
national sampling design into account). The results are displayed in Table 3.4. 
  Women are disproportionately more often poor than men in all countries, except 
for the Netherlands. However, the percentage of women being poor both according to 
the Laeken and Orshansky poverty indicator differs signiﬁcantly from the percentage 
of the women that is poor according to the Laeken indicator only in Austria. In that 
country the percentage of women being ‘Laeken poor’ (68%) is 10 percentage points 
higher than the female ‘Orshansky poverty ‘(58%). The differences between the two 
groups (‘Orshansky poor’ and ‘Laeken poor’) for the share of men are small and not 
signiﬁcant. Looking at different age groups, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between 
both poverty groups (‘Orshansky or absolute’ and ‘Laeken or relative’) for individuals 
between age 25 and 49 as well as for the elderly (65 or older) in Ireland, Austria and 
UK. In these countries the percentage of individuals aged 25-49 is lower than average 
in both poverty groups, but when they are poor they are more likely to be poor in an 
absolute sense. Older individuals in these countries, on the other hand, are more likely to 
be only poor when using the (relative) Laeken indicator. Note though, that their overall 
poverty risk may be high (Ireland and Austria) or low (UK) comparing their poverty 
rate with their population share. People aged 50-64 are more likely to be relatively poor 
in the Netherlands (‘Laeken poor’) rather than absolutely poor (‘Orshansky poor’).
  When looking at the type of living arrangements, signiﬁcant differences between 
the ‘Orshansky poor’ and the ‘Laeken poor’ are very different according to the country 
that we study. In the United States, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences for nearly all types 
of living arrangements (with signiﬁcantly higher absolute poor among single adult 
households and ‘other households with children’ and lower rates of absolute poor among 
couples and households with two adults and children), while there are no signiﬁcant 
differences between household groups in the UK. Single adults are more likely to be 
found in the ‘Orshansky poverty’ group in Ireland, contrary to Austria, where they are 
more likely to appear in the ‘Laeken poverty’ group. 
  When dividing the population according to their main income source, a more 
general pattern appears across countries. In the overlapping Laeken and Orshansky 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































either social assistance, unemployment beneﬁts or other beneﬁts are the main source of 
income, is larger than among the ‘relative poor’. On the other hand, individuals living 
in households with employment related earnings as the main income source are more 
likely to be present in the ‘Laeken poor’ group in Austria, the Netherlands and the USA. 
In Ireland and the UK, old age pensions seem to play an important role lifting people 
above the (lower) Orshansky poverty line but less often above the (higher) Laeken 
poverty line. It is remarkable that individuals living in households where private income 
is the main source of income are more often to be found in the absolute poor category 
than in the group of relative poor, although their poverty rate is much lower than that of 
any other income-source group: it seems that most people living on private income are 
doing very well and are not likely to belong to lowest income category.
  What is to be learned from this analysis of the differences in the poverty proﬁles 
between an analysis based on an absolute (Orshansky) poverty line and one that is 
based on a relative (Laeken) poverty line? Assuming that we would use the poverty 
proﬁle only for targeting social policy (and implicitly assuming our aim is to target 
social policy), we can now see which groups in which countries would get more or 
less attention according to the poverty measurement method that is used. The ﬁrst 
conclusion, however, should be that, for targeting purposes the choice of the poverty 
indicator does not seem to matter terribly for a large number of groups, especially in 
the Netherlands and the UK where we found few signiﬁcant differences between the 
two estimates in this respect. There are, however, differences that would lead to very 
different policy options depending on whether we base the poverty proﬁle of a country 
on a relative or an absolute poverty estimate. Adopting the lower absolute headcount 
would lead to relatively more attention to:
in the Netherlands:
  -  ‘other households with children’ and
  -  individuals living in a household with ‘other beneﬁts’ as the main income source;
in Ireland:
  -  individuals aged 25 – 49
  -  single person households and
  -  people living on an unemployment beneﬁt;
in Austria:
  -  individuals aged 25 – 49 and
  -  two adult households;3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
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in the UK:
  -  individuals aged 25 – 49 
  -  people living on an unemployment beneﬁt and 
  -  people living on other beneﬁts (largely social assistance);
in the USA:
  -  single adult household
  -  other families with children
  -  people with a social beneﬁt as the main source of income.
If we would use a relative poverty measure in the ﬁve countries we would target our 
policies more towards the following groups:
in the Netherlands:
  -  individuals aged 50 – 64 and
  -  wage earners;
in Ireland:
  -  the elderly age groups (65 and above)
  -  two adult households without children and
  -  pensioners;
in Austria:
  -  women
  -  the elderly 
  -  single adult families and
  -  wage earners;
in the UK:
  -  pensioners;
in the USA:
  -  two adult families
  -  two adult families with children and
  -  wage earners.
As already remarked and accounted for in more detail in Notten and de Neubourg 
(2007b), there is, however, a considerable degree of consistency in identifying the 
groups in the economy that are hardest hit by poverty between estimates based on a 
absolute and a relative poverty deﬁnition. For many of the breakdowns the choice of the 
poverty measurement method would have no inﬂuence on the group that experienced 
the highest poverty rate. 62
  Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that in quite some cases the poverty risk for a particular 
group is more or less pronounced when using either a Laeken or an Orshansky poverty 
line. The pension system seems to be another underlying factor contributing to many 
inconsistencies in poverty risk; inconsistencies between both poverty indicators occur 
more often with elderly age groups and households whose main source of income is a 
pension. It should also not be forgotten that absolute and relative poverty lines evaluate 
progress differently and may thus show opposing or diverging poverty trends. Over a 
decade, the underlying composition of both poverty groups may change considerably, 
especially in fast growing economies or countries experiencing substantial social and 
demographic changes or structural reforms. For these cases it still would make a big 
difference whether a relative or an absolute poverty line is chosen as a basis for targeting 
social and economic policy.
3.5 Social transfer incidence and adequacy
The tax and social transfer systems in Europe and the USA are complex systems that 
redistribute funds from rich to poor, from working age adults to the young and the 
elderly and from workers to non-workers. In doing so, they affect the shape of the 
(disposable) income distribution and thus also inﬂuence absolute and relative poverty 
rates. If one excludes social transfers from household income, Laeken poverty rates 
would be 35% in the Netherlands and Ireland, 38% in Austria, 39% in the United 
Kingdom and 33% in the United States. Orshansky poverty would be somewhat lower 
varying from 32% in the United Kingdom to 19% in the United States (Notten & 
Table 3.5: Incidence of social transfers1 (in % of individuals, 2000) 











Netherlands 18.7 46.7 13.2 3.5 8.5
Ireland 23.6 65.4 30.6 14.3 7.3
Austria  35.5 58.4 18.1 0.6 9.1
United 
Kingdom
29.1 47.6 18.4 - 15.0
United States5 22.7 13.7
Note: 1 The incidence rate represents the % of individuals living in households receiving income from 
a particular beneﬁt category.  2 Pensions include social and private pensions.  3 Other social insurance 
includes unemployment and sickness/disability beneﬁts. 4 Other beneﬁts include education, housing and 
other allowances.  5 For the United States we can only distinguish between pensions and other social 
transfers. 
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
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Neubourg de, 2007b).13 These numbers reﬂect the joint impact social transfers. Here 
we study the impact of transfers separately. Whether social transfers are targeted at low 
income groups and whether a particular type of transfer is successful in lifting people 
out of absolute (Orshansky) and relative (Laeken) poverty, are questions that will be 
addressed in the rest of this section. 
  We evaluate how various types of social transfers affect the poor and non-poor 
population, again dividing the poor population into the absolute (Orshansky) poor and 
the relative (Laeken) poor and contrast the presence of social transfers for these groups 
with transfers to non-poor population. More speciﬁcally, we investigate to what extent 
both poverty groups are covered by the social transfer system by looking at incidence 
rates (whether a person is actually receiving social transfers) and mean value (adequacy 
of social transfers). We examine three14 types of transfers: old age pensions (private and 
public), family allowances and social assistance. For the United States we have only 
two transfer types; pensions (social security pensions15 and private retirement income) 
and other social transfers (including temporary assistance to needy families and food 
stamps). 
  Table 3.5 lists the beneﬁt incidence of ﬁve social transfer categories in the same 
ﬁve countries that we studied in the previous sections. The incidence rates reﬂect the 
percentage  of  individuals  living  in  households  that  reported  receiving  a  particular 
beneﬁt. Although pensions, family allowances and other social insurance beneﬁts are 
common transfers in all countries, the incidence of these transfers clearly differs by 
country. The incidence of pensions varies from 23% in the US to 36% in Austria, while 
family beneﬁts have the highest incidence rates in the European countries varying 
from 47% in the Netherlands to 65% in Ireland. The lower incidence of non-pension 
social transfers in the United States can partly be explained by the fact that we ignore 
‘transfers’ through the tax system such as tax breaks and tax credits.16 Differences 
between the countries are not always a reﬂection of differences in policies but can also 
be inﬂuenced by basic demographic and economic differences: e.g. the incidence of old 
age pensions is clearly related to the share of elderly in the economy.
  The classiﬁcation of the transfer categories suggests which type of risk is being 
covered; old age pensions cover the risk of no or low income in old age while other 
13 Orshansky poverty rates calculated using the United States implied equivalence scales.
14 Except for the ﬁgures in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, we do report the results for two other types of beneﬁts 
that we studied - other social insurance beneﬁts (unemployment, sickness and disability) and other beneﬁts 
(housing allowance, education allowance and other stipends). The differences found were not very big or 
different from what we found for the three others.
15 Social security pensions include public old age, survivor and disability pensions.
16 Although our estimates of the US disposable income incorporate the value of such tax ‘transfers’, the 
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social insurance transfers insure the retention of some income in the event of illness, 
disability  or  unemployment.  Family  allowances  ﬁnancially  support  parents  with 
raising their children and social assistance helps households that have no (or a very 
low) income. This, however, does not mean that the prevention of that risk is the sole 
motive or that the transfer is successful in achieving its objective. The degree to which 
such transfers are targeted at those individuals that really need such support, differs by 
transfer category and by country. Some transfers are targeted at speciﬁc demographic 
groups while other transfers (also) require an income or means-test. Moreover, the 
generosity of each type of transfer varies, as does its resulting impact on the level 
of economic well-being of the individual and its household. In this paper we focus 
on evaluating the impact of these transfers on the partially overlapping absolute and 
relative poverty groups as compared to the rest of the population. This may, or may 
not, correspond with the actual objectives of these policies in the studied countries. 
Table 3.6 shows a decomposition of the beneﬁt incidence for three different groups: the 
‘Orshansky poor’, the ‘Laeken poor’17 and the non-poor in 2000. A ﬁrst observation 
is that incidence levels vary considerably between these population groups but not 
necessarily systematically across countries. We discuss each transfer category in turn 
(patterns in ‘other social transfers’ in the United States are discussed under social 
assistance beneﬁts).
Pensions
In the Netherlands, receipt of old age pensions in both poverty groups is signiﬁcantly 
lower  than  for  the  non-poor  group.  In  Ireland  and  the  United  Kingdom,  pension 
incidence in the Laeken and Orshansky poverty group is similar to that in the non-
poor group while it is much higher in the Laeken only group. There are no signiﬁcant 
differences between the population groups in the United States while in Austria the 
pension incidence is higher in both poverty groups. Thus, depending on the country, 
receipt of pensions is associated with a lower poverty risk (Netherlands), an increased 
poverty risk (Austria), with a higher risk for those in relative - Laeken only - poverty 
(Ireland and United Kingdom) or an average poverty risk (United States). 
  Pensions systems are complex systems that are designed to help individuals 
with smoothing their income over the life cycle. Although the prevention of poverty 
17 As in the former sections, ‘absolute or Orshansky poor or poverty’ refer in the case of the countries under 
study in this section to the people that are poor according to both the Orshansky and the Laeken poverty 
line; ‘relative of Laeken poor or poverty’ refers to the group of individuals that are poor according to the 
Laeken indicator only; they are the group between the 2 poverty lines as used in the ﬁgures; this all holds 
because for the ﬁve countries that we study, the persons poor according to the Orshansky poverty line is a 
subset of the group of people that is poor according to the Laeken indicator.66
at old age has certainly been an important motive for the development of pension 
systems, beneﬁts depend for a large part on the contribution history of the individual in 
a lot of countries. Persons with a long contribution record and/or high income during 
working life have acquired more pension rights and are thus receiving a higher pension. 
Another factor inﬂuencing incidence patterns is that pension recipients may be part of 
a household that also includes non-elderly persons. The indicator of pension incidence 
used in this paper counts only individuals living in the household receiving a pension, 
not just those individuals that are eligible. Even though an elderly person’s pension may 
be sufﬁcient to lift that person out of poverty, the pension and other income sources may 
fall short when all individuals of the household are taken into account (or vice versa). 
These explanations are consistent with the distributional patterns observed in Figure 
3.1 and Figure 3.2. The ﬁgures plot the mean incidence and value of pensions received 
against the mean income of the receiving individuals in 2000. Each dot represents 2% 




















































Figure 3.1: Incidence of pensions (below median income, 2000)
Note: The ﬁgures include only observations below median income and all values are expressed in equivalent 
adult values (thus 50% of the total sample). Each dot represents the mean incidence or value (only including 
positive observations) of adult equivalent pension received by 2% of the sample. The horizontal and vertical 
lines represent the adult equivalent Laeken (L) and Orshansky (O) poverty lines.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
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all values are expressed in equivalent adult values. The horizontal and vertical lines 
represent the locus of the Laeken (L) and Orshansky (O) poverty lines. Individuals with 
an equivalent income below and left of the poverty lines are living in absolute and/or 
relative poverty. 
  Figure 3.1 shows that the incidence of beneﬁts across the income distribution 
is approximately linear in the US but non-linear in the other countries. Interestingly, 
in the Netherlands and United Kingdom, incidence rates peak beyond the relative 
poverty lines. In Austria and Ireland the highest incidence rates are covering the area 
of the Laeken and Orshansky poverty lines. By determining who is eligible for how 
much beneﬁt, social transfer systems also exercise inﬂuence on the prevalence of 
particular individual and household level characteristics along the income distribution. 
For instance, the peaks in pension incidence also provide some information about the 
characteristics of the individuals in that area of the income distribution; a high incidence 








































Figure 3.2: Mean value of pension (below median income, 2000)
Note: The ﬁgures include only observations below median income and all values are expressed in equivalent 
adult values (thus 50% of the total sample). Each dot represents the mean incidence or value (only including 
positive observations) of adult equivalent pension received by 2% of the sample. The horizontal and vertical 
lines represent the adult equivalent Laeken (L) and Orshansky (O) poverty lines.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID68
the Netherlands, the share of elderly persons in both poverty groups is well below their 
average population share (Table 3.4). However, it need not be the case that high rates of 
pension incidence beyond the poverty line also imply that elderly persons also have a 
lower than average poverty risk. Take for instance the US, where there are no signiﬁcant 
differences in the incidence of pensions across the income distribution and where the 
age group 65 and above comprises 12% of the total population; the population shares of 
the poor pension aged individuals are well above their average population share (22% 
for the ‘Orshansky poverty group’ and 35% for the ‘Laeken poverty group’). Figure 3.2 
offers an explanation as the mean value of pensions received in the US lies well below 
the Orshansky and, in quite some cases, also below the Laeken poverty line.
  The pattern of pension transfers is proportional in all countries: as equivalent 
income increases, the mean equivalent value of pensions rises as well. The relation is 
strong in the Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States, somewhat weaker in 
Austria and rather weak in Ireland. The pension systems in all these countries have 
multiple pillars; there is a ﬁrst pillar reﬂecting a minimum or basic pension while the 
second and third pillars reﬂect contributions-related beneﬁts (International Social Se-
curity Association, 2002, 2003). The minimum pension is means or income-tested in 
most countries, except in the Netherlands where a basic pension is provided to every 
citizen. Despite the limitations discussed above, the ﬁgures provide an impression of 
the poverty reduction impact of these (minimum) pensions. In the Netherlands, most of 
the dots in Figure 3.2 lie to the right and above the absolute and relative poverty lines, 
implying that the mean value of pension received is sufﬁcient to lift an equivalent adult 
out of poverty. This happens much less in the other countries. Even though quite a 
number of dots lie to the right of the vertical Orshansky poverty line, most of those dots 
lie under the horizontal Orshansky poverty line (Austria, Ireland and the UK); although 
these individuals have sufﬁcient income to lift themselves out of absolute poverty, pen-
sions play only a partial role in achieving this outcome. As income levels increase, pen-
sions in the US clearly contribute to achieving above Orshansky poverty line income 
levels but not sufﬁciently to reach an income above the Laeken poverty line.   
  What are the possible scenarios when pension transfers are inadequate in order 
to ﬁnance a given living standard? In some cases, pensioners may have accumulated 
sufﬁcient assets over their lifetime to ﬁnance current consumption. For instance, when 
pensioners live in their own house with no need for mortgage payments (the disposable 
income indicator does not include imputations for home owners). As they do not have 
to pay rent, such pensioners may be counted as poor while their actual living standard 
may be above the poverty line. However, when low pensions are the result of a short 
contribution history combined with a low minimum pension, recipients most likely do 
not own large reserves of assets. As the opportunities of paid work are decreasing with 3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
69
old age, the main alternative to a life in poverty for these pensioners would be to move 
in with relatives. Looking at the incidence and mean value patterns in the ﬁgures, this 
option may explain the patterns in Austria and Ireland where a considerable subgroup of 
non poor is having rather low average pensions. Is it acceptable that (means or income-
tested) minimum pensions are not sufﬁcient to cover a minimum acceptable living 
standard? Or is it problematic when pensioners are more likely to be (only) relatively 
poor? The answers to such questions remain the responsibility of the political arena and 
ultimately the electorate. However, having ofﬁcial poverty indicators reﬂecting both 
absolute and relative dimensions may be very useful in such a discussion.
Family allowances
The incidence of family allowances is very high in the four European countries that 












































Figure 3.3: Incidence of family allowances (below median income, 2000) 
Note: The ﬁgures include only observations below median income and all values are expressed in equivalent 
adult values (thus 50% of the total sample). Each dot represents the mean incidence or value (only including 
positive observations) of adult equivalent family allowances received by 2% of the sample. The horizontal 
and vertical lines represent the adult equivalent Laeken (L) and Orshansky (O) poverty lines.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID70
groups and the non poor population (Netherlands and UK), there are no signiﬁcant 
differences between the incidence rates both poverty groups. Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 
indeed show that beneﬁt incidence is rather constant across income levels, although 
some local ‘peaks’ can be identiﬁed. The pattern is also relatively constant in terms 
of mean beneﬁt value. Clearly, beneﬁt levels are well below the adult equivalent level 
and one third of this level (the equivalence weight of a child under age 14). The mean 
values of family allowance received seem to be somewhat higher at income levels in 
the middle of the ﬁgures as compared to very low and ‘near’ median incomes; this is 
especially clear in the case of the United Kingdom. These peaks may indicate a higher 
presence of households with one or more children. Family allowances in each of these 
countries are universal and vary by country as well as by the number of dependent 
children (International Social Security Association, 2002). Only in Ireland are low 
income families and single parents eligible for an additional income-tested allowance. 













































Figure 3.4: Mean value of family allowances (below median income, 2000)
Note: The ﬁgures include only observations below median income and all values are expressed in equivalent 
adult values (thus 50% of the total sample). Each dot represents the mean incidence or value (only including 
positive observations) of adult equivalent family allowances received by 2% of the sample. The horizontal 
and vertical lines represent the adult equivalent Laeken (L) and Orshansky (O) poverty lines.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
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in the mean transfer amounts). In sum, the prevention of child poverty, either in an 
absolute or relative sense, is not the main objective of these allowances.    
Social assistance beneﬁts
Social assistance beneﬁts are typically provided to low income households. Often an 
income or means-test is accompanied by other criteria (i.e. having children, job search 
or willingness to work).18 We include the ‘Other social transfer category’ from the US 
under this heading as two of the main low income support programmes are included 
in these transfers (food stamps and temporary assistance to needy families). In some 












































Figure 3.5: Incidence of social assistance (below median income, 2000)
18 For details about the European systems of social assistance see de Neubourg et al. (2007).
Note: The ﬁgures include only observations below median income and all values are expressed in equivalent 
adult values (thus 50% of the total sample). Each dot represents the mean incidence or value (only including 
positive observations) of adult equivalent family allowances received by 2% of the sample. The horizontal 
and vertical lines represent the adult equivalent Laeken (L) and Orshansky (O) poverty lines.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID72
may  be  received  over  a  prolonged  period  (Netherlands).19  Incidence  levels  vary 
considerably between countries ranging from 42-46% of the Laeken and Orshansky 
poor individuals in Ireland and the US to 2% in the same poverty group in Austria. In 
the European countries signiﬁcant differences in incidence levels can only be found 
between the poor and non poor population groups while in the US the beneﬁt incidence 
level vary signiﬁcantly between all population groups. These patterns are conﬁrmed in 
the distributional plots; especially in Ireland and the US incidence levels show a steep 
decline as income levels increase. Such patterns correspond to slow phasing out of 
income support, in order to prevent the creation of a poverty trap. However, the plots 
of mean beneﬁt values show that the level of beneﬁts does not vary greatly by income 




































Figure 3.6: Mean value of social assistance (below median income, 2000)
Note: The ﬁgures include only observations below median income and all values are expressed in equivalent 
adult values (thus 50% of the total sample). Each dot represents the mean incidence or value (only including 
positive observations) of adult equivalent social assistance beneﬁt received by 2% of the sample. The 
horizontal and vertical lines represent the adult equivalent Laeken (L) and Orshansky (O) poverty lines.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID
19 The UK is not discussed as the ECHP data do not include separate information on social assistance 
beneﬁts in the UK.3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
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tested beneﬁts would be higher at lower income levels, but for Ireland, Austria and the 
US beneﬁts are rather constant and for the Netherlands the mean beneﬁt value increases 
as income increases. In the case of Ireland and the US, beneﬁts are clearly means-
tested but generosity is not higher for the worst off. The pattern in the Netherlands does 
not correspond with formal eligibility rules; even though in some cases recipients are 
allowed to some other earnings these are not large amounts.20 There exist two possible 
(non-exclusive) explanations. Firstly, part of reported income may not be formal and 
are thus also not reported to the beneﬁt agency. Secondly, part of other income is also 
derived from other income-tested transfers such as housing allowance or income-tested 
study grants for studying children.21 A general observation is that these beneﬁts, by 
themselves, are insufﬁcient to lift people out of absolute or relative poverty. However, 
with this type of beneﬁts it is probably more appropriate to look at shorter spells than 
annual ﬁgures as the typical spell of beneﬁt receipt may be shorter than a year.
 
3.6 Absolute and relative poverty concepts and policy: discussion
Using absolute Orshansky and relative Laeken poverty indicators on data from the 
EU  member  states  (EU-15)  and  the  USA  showed  signiﬁcant  differences  between 
these partially overlapping groups of poor. We found not only differences between 
the size of absolute and relative poverty groups but also signiﬁcant variations in terms 
of  characteristics  and  we  also  showed  how  such  differences  would  inﬂuence  the 
selection of priority groups based on each poverty indicator. Moreover, this variation 
is not necessarily systematic across countries or across time. We further discussed how 
various types of social transfers affect absolute and relative poverty groups differently 
(in terms of beneﬁt incidence and beneﬁt level). In this concluding section we discuss 
the relevance of monitoring absolute and relative poverty concepts from a more general 
policy perspective.
  Absolute and relative poverty indicators reﬂect related, but conceptually distinct, 
approaches to determining insufﬁcient levels of well-being. They are related because 
absolute or relative concepts of poverty may be applied to the same welfare dimension 
(i.e. economic well-being) and measured by the same welfare indicator (i.e. income, 
expenditures or assets). They are conceptually distinct because the benchmark used 
to determine the cut-off separating well-being from ill-being either depends on the 
distribution of this welfare indicator (relative) or on some assessment of what constitutes 
a minimum achievement, basic need or right (absolute). This difference in approach has 
20 See for instance the website Recht op Algemene Bijstand.nl http://www.rechtopalgemenebijstand.nl/
inhoud/index/pid/35#geen (accessed May 2007, in Dutch only).
21 These transfers are included in the ‘Other beneﬁts’ category but are not further discussed.74
important implications. Take for instance a country or region where large parts of the 
population are facing an ongoing struggle to satisfy their basic needs in terms of food 
and shelter. If having just one or two sober meals a day is common in this society, 
absolute poverty exceeds relative poverty. Imagine that the 50th percentile person in that 
society has two meals a day wile there is also a smaller group of persons having only 
one meal. Taking an internationally accepted standard of minimum food requirements 
or calorie intake as a benchmark, absolute (food) poverty rates may be well above 50% 
of the population. If, instead, one would use a relative poverty line where the middle 
person is taken as the benchmark, it is likely that only the persons having a single 
meal a day would be considered poor. The opposite situation may hold for a country 
in which the living standard is generally higher and perhaps some resources are being 
redistributed from the better off to the less well off; in such a country absolute poverty 
levels could be similar to relative poverty levels or considerably lower.22 
  ‘Not having enough to satisfy basic or main needs’ or ‘having much less than 
what is considered typical or normal in a given society’ are distinct concepts of ill-being 
and their indicators may yield very different outcomes, especially over time. From a 
national policy perspective, it is therefore relevant to monitor both poverty concepts. 
Take for instance a steadily growing economy where the beneﬁts from growth are 
equally distributed over the population; if one would only measure relative poverty 
one would ‘miss’ the fact that increasingly large parts of the population are able to 
afford a minimum basket of goods. If, instead, growth in this economy is unevenly 
distributed but nonetheless positive, a decrease in absolute poverty may be accompanied 
by increasing relative poverty. The groups of absolute and relative poor in a country 
partly overlap, but the degree of overlap changes over time. Thus, when designing or 
evaluating a policy, it makes sense to consider the potential impact that these policies 
may have on the absolute and relative poor. For the ‘richer’ countries (where absolute 
poverty is typically lower than relative poverty) a condition may be that only policies 
having a positive effect on absolute poverty reduction and a neutral effect on relative 
poverty will be given the consideration of actually being implemented. This is not to 
say that one should ignore other distributional effects, but from an equity perspective 
one might care more about those people having much less than what is considered 
minimal than those that have more. 
22 For some, this example illustrates the rationale for the argument that the use of relative poverty lines 
in poor regions or countries is nonsensical. We use this example because it illustrates that relative and 
absolute poverty statistics may yield very different outcomes. In addition, the example shows that there 
is a value judgement underlying every poverty concept of what is sufﬁcient well-being or not and that the 
determination of a poverty line is always relative to some kind of benchmark (whether this is the society 
being studied or some global standard).3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
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  Over time, the underlying composition of both poverty groups may change 
considerably, especially in fast growing economies or countries experiencing substantial 
social and demographic changes or structural reforms. As long as lower incomes proﬁt 
at least a little from economic growth in real terms, absolute poverty will typically 
decline. Trends  in  relative  poverty  rates  depend  on  the  distributional  implications 
of economic growth, social and demographic change and government policies in a 
particular country; these factors not only affect the number of people living below the 
poverty line (i.e. changes in the shape of the income distribution at its lower end) but 
also affect the determination of the relative poverty line itself (i.e. changes in the middle 
section of the income distribution). Changes in overall poverty trends can thus mask 
larger (and opposing) welfare changes between socio-economic groups. For instance, if 
(minimum) pensions are annually adjusted for inﬂation while wages increase in tandem 
with real economic growth; working households experience an increase in purchasing 
power while pensioner households do not. Moreover, as working households are often 
also found in the middle of the income distribution, the relative poverty line rises with 
the real wage increase of the median household. As a result, absolute poverty under 
pensioners remains equal while absolute poverty under working households declines. 
However, relative poverty among pensioners will rise while it may or may not remain 
constant among working households. This is certainly relevant for the new EU member 
states but the distributional impact of ageing societies in the US and the ‘old’ EU 
member states should also not be underestimated.
  The Laeken indicators as used by the European Union do not inform us to 
what extent the extent the Italian or Dutch population has the resources to ﬁnance a 
minimum basket of goods.23 They only tell us that only 8% of the population in the 
Czech Republic has an income that is lower than 60% of the income of the ‘median’ 
Czech (the Czech Republic has the lowest relative poverty level in the EU).24 Or take a 
country like Romania, with a relative poverty of 17% in 2000; it is very likely that an 
absolute poverty rate based on the minimum cost of living lies well above the current 
relative poverty rate. It is however, expected that the Romanian economy will continue 
to grow considerably, thereby reducing absolute poverty rates. Depending on how the 
23 The Laeken indicators also include a relative poverty indicator which is ‘anchored at a moment in time’ 
(Atkinson et al., 2002). This means that the relative poverty line for a given year is updated to subsequent 
year using the rate of inﬂation. However, the anchoring of a relative poverty line over time is not an 
alternative for a minimum living standard indicator because the initial level of the poverty line is based on 
the income distribution and not on the costs of satisfying basic needs.
24  These  poverty  statistics  have  been  retrieved  from  the  website  of  Eurostat,  http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=wel
comeref&open=/C/C5/C53&language=en&product=Yearlies_new_population&root=Yearlies_new_
population&scrollto=1068 (accessed March 2007). 76
beneﬁts of this growth will be distributed across the population, relative poverty will 
increase, decline or remain constant. In the United States there is an ongoing debate 
over the problems associated with the Orshansky poverty indicator. As a result of 
this general dissatisfaction, the Bureau of Census also publishes alternative poverty 
statistics computed using various income deﬁnitions and another absolute poverty line 
which better reﬂects the current costs of basic needs but a relative poverty indicator is 
not part of such analyses (US Census Bureau, June 2005). Absolute and relative poverty 
statistics enable the identiﬁcation and monitoring of distinct but partially overlapping 
groups. Each group reﬂects a vulnerable group in society and should be given special 
consideration. It therefore makes absolutely (!) sense to monitor progress using both 
relative and absolute poverty indicators.
3.7 Appendix: ofﬁcial poverty in the EU and US – methodology and data
The key difference between the US and EU ofﬁcial poverty measurement methods, 
is that the US method is based on an absolute poverty concept while the EU method 
is based on a relative poverty concept. The US poverty line was developed by Molly 
Orshansky in the 1960s and has been based on a low cost food plan for families under 
distress but also includes a non-food component. Being annually updated for inﬂation, 
the current US poverty line is essentially the same as the 1960s poverty line. Although 
there is general agreement that the US poverty line is outdated because its monetary 
value is not based on a recent assessment of the minimum costs of living in US society, 
it is still being used simply because replacing it is politically not feasible. In Europe, 
and certainly at a European Union level, there is a tradition of using relative poverty 
lines especially in cross-national comparisons (Atkinson et al., 2002). Thus, when the 
ﬁght against poverty and social exclusion also became an objective for the EU after the 
Nice summit in December 2000, a relative poverty line was the (politically) preferred 
option to measure ﬁnancial poverty. 
  The Laeken and Orshansky poverty measurement methods also differ in other 
aspects; the EU and US methods use different equivalence scales to adjust for differences 
in household size and demographic composition and even though both methods use 
income as the indicator of household welfare, the EU method uses disposable (after 
tax) income while the US method uses gross income.25 
  We apply both the Laeken and Orshansky poverty lines on nationally representative 
survey data from the United States and the old EU member states (15 countries). 
The USA data come from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) and for the 
25 See section 9.2 in the appendix Poverty in Europe and the USA (Notten & Neubourg de, 2007b) for a 
more elaborate discussion on the conceptual differences between both methods. 3. The policy relevance of absolute and relative poverty headcounts
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European member states we use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). 
Although our main focus is on the years 1996 and 2001, we also have information 
covering the period 1994-2001. Household annual disposable income is our welfare 
indicator. For the US we use the Cross National Equivalent Files (CNEF) version of the 
PSID because this dataset includes information on disposable income while the original 
PSID does not. The income variables in the ECHP are generally collected to provide 
an indication of household disposable income. In both datasets, the variable for total 
disposable income includes income from comparable sources such as wages, salaries, 
(entrepreneurial) earnings, other private income from transfers and capital as well as 
a range of social cash transfers. We use the resulting national (equivalent) income 
distributions in the data to derive the Laeken poverty lines for each country in each 
survey year. We converted the Orshansky poverty lines to the national price level of 
each European member state using 1993 Purchasing Power Indices. Subsequently we 
re-valued these poverty lines to later years using the national Consumer Price Indices.26 
When analyzing the results, we assume that the absolute poverty line indeed reﬂects the 
cost of a minimum basket of goods in each country.27 
  Because both datasets also include a panel component, we not only estimate the 
percentage of poor individuals in each country but are also able to provide estimates 
of long term poverty. To estimate long term poverty we follow the deﬁnition of the 
so-called  ‘At-persistent-risk-of-poverty’  indicator  as  used  by  the  European  Union. 
Individuals are considered long term poor if they are poor in the current period and 
they have been poor at least twice in the previous three years.
26 See section 9.3 in the appendix Poverty in Europe and the USA (Notten & Neubourg de, 2007b) for a 
more elaborate discussion on the preparation of both datasets and the cross-national comparability of the 
poverty estimates. 
27 This assumption is not crucial to the main objectives and arguments in our analysis as our absolute 
poverty indicator behaves in a similar manner as a minimum cost indicator. Nevertheless, it is likely that 
this assumption is violated (Notten & Neubourg de, 2007c). Size matters: targeting efﬁciency and poverty 
reduction effects of means-tested and 
universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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4.1 Introduction1 
The  debate  whether  universal  or  means-tested  beneﬁts  are  the  preferred  policy 
instrument in reducing (child) poverty is a longstanding one and centres around costs, 
incentives and the political economy. Under the condition of a constrained budget and 
assuming perfect targeting, poverty is reduced more effectively and efﬁciently when 
beneﬁts are targeted to the poor based on means (Besley, 1990; Besley & Kanbur, 1990). 
Higher administrative costs, targeting errors and labour market disincentives reduce the 
efﬁciency and effectiveness of means-tested beneﬁts (Atkinson, 1998; Walle van de, 
1998). Proponents of universal beneﬁts argue that the costs related to means-testing 
may outweigh the actual beneﬁt. Using the introduction of means-tested child beneﬁts 
in Russia in 2000 as a case study this paper assesses the impact of a policy change from 
universal to means-tested child allowances in terms of targeting efﬁciency and poverty 
reduction. We focus on the core costs of targeting; namely leakage, exclusion errors and 
beneﬁt costs, and relate these to the beneﬁts in terms of poverty reduction. 
  Our focus is on child beneﬁts because, as in many other countries, children 
in Russia are particularly at risk of living in poverty. In 2003, the poverty incidence 
among children younger than 16 years old was 27% compared to the national average 
of 20%. Young children have an even higher risk of living in poverty (World Bank, 
2004). Family allowances are the main instrument in most social protection systems to 
provide income support to families with children, and they always played an important 
role in Russian (and Soviet) social policy. In 2000, the eligibility requirements for child 
beneﬁts in Russia changed from universal to means-tested allocation.
  We  compare  means-tested  and  universal  child  allowance  schemes  both  in 
terms of targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction. Using the cross-section and panel 
dimensions of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) from 2000 to 2004, 
we investigate changes in targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction over time. We 
measure targeting efﬁciency using a range of coverage and adequacy indicators; by 
calculating these indicators for two poverty lines and the quintiles of the expenditure 
distribution we gain insight into the scope of inclusion and exclusion errors. The 
poverty reduction impact is measured in three dimensions; poverty incidence, poverty 
gap and chronic poverty. Finally, we also simulate various means-tested and universal 
child beneﬁt schemes using static micro simulation and analyse differences in poverty 
reduction and total beneﬁt expenditures. 
1 This chapter is based on: Notten, G. & F. Gassmann (2006). Size matters: Poverty reduction effects 
of means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia. MGSoG Working Paper(2006/001), Maastricht 
Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University. A more recent version of this paper is forthcoming 
in The European Journal of Social Policy (2008).4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: ﬁrstly we review the main 
arguments of the debate between proponents of universal and means-tested cash beneﬁts 
as the most effective and efﬁcient instruments to support poor households and we 
discuss which aspects of this debate have been empirically investigated and which not. 
Then, we discuss the data and variables used in our analysis followed by a discussion 
of the poverty indicators used as well as their trends from 2000-2004. Sections ﬁve and 
six respectively analyse the targeting performance and poverty reduction effectiveness 
of the current child beneﬁt scheme in Russia. Section seven simulates different policy 
options and compares their targeting performance with the current system. The ﬁnal 
section summarizes the main ﬁndings. 
4.2 Universal versus means-tested cash beneﬁts 
The debate whether universal or means-tested child beneﬁts are the preferred policy 
instrument in reducing child poverty, is a longstanding one and centres around costs, 
incentives and the political economy (Atkinson, 1998; Barr, 2004; Besley, 1990; Besley, 
1995; Coady et al, 2004a; Walle van de, 1998). Strictly speaking, a policy maker has 
two choices: allocate a beneﬁt to all children of a certain age-group, i.e. provide a 
universal beneﬁt, or limit the eligibility to children of poor families. Under a given 
government budget constraint, allocating the beneﬁts to poor children will result in a 
higher beneﬁt for each eligible child, and consequently, will have a greater effect on 
poverty reduction. However, targeting comes at a cost. 
  If beneﬁts are targeted to the poor, the policy maker will have to determine an 
indicator that identiﬁes the poor children. Governments have imperfect information 
about the true welfare level of households. It is difﬁcult to ﬁnd out whether a person or 
household belongs to the target group or not, and gathering such information is costly. 
In addition to screening costs, other inefﬁciencies arise as a result of imperfect targeting: 
some of the beneﬁts will ﬂow to children outside the target group while some children 
in the target group will not get a beneﬁt. The former inefﬁciency is called ‘leakage’ or 
‘inclusion error’ while the latter is known as ‘exclusion error’. When screening costs 
are high and there are errors of inclusion and exclusion, universal beneﬁts become 
more attractive as a beneﬁt allocation mechanism. Moreover, as targeting becomes 
stricter in order to reduce leakage, screening costs rise further and exclusion errors 
also increase. Therefore, the decision between universal or targeted child beneﬁts is 
ultimately a cost beneﬁt analysis; when do the costs of targeting outweigh the beneﬁts 
in terms of poverty reduction?
  It makes sense that a targeting regime which aims at poverty relief needs to 
use poverty indicators as a screening device. There are, however, a number of pitfalls 82
involved in poverty measurement that need to be considered. One issue is that poverty 
is a multidimensional concept; another is that there are various ways to measure each of 
these dimensions. Additionally, to determine whether a person is poor or not involves 
the (subjective) choice of a poverty threshold below which a person cannot fulﬁl his/
her basic needs, has poor health or an unacceptably low standard of living. Firstly, this 
implies that it is a priori not clear who the target group is (one ﬁrst needs to determine 
the relevant dimension(s)). Secondly, the target group differs in size and characteristics 
according to the chosen measurement method and poverty threshold.   
  The academic literature also identiﬁes other targeting costs such as incentive 
costs, social costs and political costs (Atkinson, 1998; Barr, 2004; Coady et al., 2004a; 
Gelbach & Pritchett, 1997; Moene & Wallerstein, 2001; Sen, 1995). Incentive costs 
arise  when  households  adjust  their  behaviour  in  order  to  meet  eligibility  criteria. 
These responses can involve a cost (i.e. a household reduces labour supply so that 
their income falls below the eligibility threshold) but can also be beneﬁcial (i.e. school 
attendance increases because beneﬁt eligibility requires the children to go to school). 
Strict targeting might also increase social costs such as stigma and reduce the available 
budget for transfers if the budget is politically determined.
  In addition, poverty alleviation may not be the only objective of child and other 
social beneﬁts. Most social protection systems have several functions. They alleviate 
poverty, smooth income over the life cycle, provide insurance against certain risks and 
redistribute welfare. A beneﬁt that is said to be ‘poorly targeted’ based on the poverty 
objective may be effective in terms of another objective (Atkinson, 1998). 
  In this paper we analyse the core costs of targeting, namely leakage, exclusion 
errors and total beneﬁt expenditures, and relate these to the beneﬁts in terms of poverty 
reduction. We limit our focus because the data allow for a thorough analysis of these 
aspects while they do not provide sufﬁcient information to analyse the inﬂuence of 
other factors such as administration costs, incentive costs, social costs and political 
costs.2 Although there are various other targeting methods (Coady et al., 2004a), we 
focus on means-testing and compare the efﬁciency of this targeting method to one of 
universal provision in the context of child beneﬁts in Russia. 
  Our analysis contributes to the debate in a number of ways. Firstly, many studies 
focus either on targeting efﬁciency or on poverty reduction (Coady et al., 2004a; 
Edmonds, 2005; Förster & Tóth, 2001; Immervoll et al, 2000). The discussion above 
2 Information about the scope of, and cross-country variations in, administrative costs can be found in 
Coady et al (2004a). Furthermore, there is a large body of literature that empirically studies behavioural 
effects of government interventions. Especially, the effects of interventions on labour supply have received 
a lot of attention (among others Alvarez, September 2001; Blank, 2002; Cantillon et al, 2004; Cantillon 
& van den Bosch, December 2002; Mofﬁtt, 2002, 2003). In section 4.8 we discuss how such costs could 
inﬂuence our results. 4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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suggests that there is a trade off between the costs of targeting and the beneﬁts in terms 
of poverty reduction for means-tested and universal child beneﬁts. This implies that it 
is important to measure both effects. Secondly, other contributions only focus on the 
effects of means-tested beneﬁts or contrast the role of means-tested beneﬁts to other 
parts of the welfare state such as social insurance programmes (Behrendt, 2000; Heady 
et al, 2001; Nelson, 2004; Sainsbury & Morissens, 2002). Such analyses are useful 
in the sense that they provide information about how social protection programmes 
can complement each other or about the variation in impact of different means-tested 
schemes. However, they do not provide insights into the differences in impact of 
means-tested vis-à-vis universal cash beneﬁt programmes for a speciﬁc group in the 
population. In this paper we analyse the impact of universal and means-tested child 
beneﬁts using various targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction indicators and apply it 
to the recent reforms of the Russian child beneﬁt programme. Another contribution of 
this paper is that, in addition to the poverty incidence and poverty gaps indicators, we 
also analyse the poverty reduction impact of these schemes in terms of chronic poverty. 
The chronically poor, measured in this paper as those households that have average 
expenditures below the poverty line over a given period, are of particular interest 
because of the potentially high costs that long-term poverty has on the development of 
children.
  The empirical literature provides some clues regarding to differences in targeting 
efﬁciency and the success in reducing poverty between means-tested and universal 
beneﬁts. Matsaganis et al (2004) and Edmonds (2005) indeed ﬁnd that under means-
tested programmes leakage of beneﬁts to the non-poor is considerably lower than under 
a universal programme, resulting in a higher share of the beneﬁts going to the poor 
with means-tested child beneﬁts (Matsaganis et al., 2004). A cross-national comparison 
of 122 anti-poverty interventions Coady et al (2004a) show that in terms of median 
targeting  performance  both  means-tested  beneﬁts  and  child  beneﬁts  score  highest 
when compared with other targeting methods but both methods have approximately 
equal scores. Thus, both means-tested and child beneﬁts distribute more resources to 
the poor than any other targeting method. However, because their deﬁnition of child 
beneﬁt programmes includes all types of child beneﬁts (universal, (proxy) means-
tested, geographical etc.), it is not clear whether means-tested child beneﬁts outperform 
universal beneﬁts in terms of targeting efﬁciency (p 27–31, table 3.3). 
  The problem of exclusion or under-coverage receives attention in studies like 
Behrendt (2000) and Edmonds (2005), albeit from different perspectives: Behrendt 
evaluates the reduction in poverty of means-tested beneﬁts and notes that recipient 
rates are ‘astonishingly low’ (i.e. exclusion rates are high, p. 31). Edmonds, being more 
concerned about the targeting efﬁciency of means-tested child beneﬁts in Slovenia, 84
mentions that the problem of under coverage does not appear ‘to be so large that it 
could  undermine  the  progressiveness  of  the  means-tested  programme’  (p.  195). 
Additionally, both studies report that leakage of means-tested beneﬁts is mainly to the 
‘near poor’ population and thus less of an efﬁciency problem.  It is important to realize 
that the problem of under-coverage represents a missed opportunity in terms of poverty 
reduction while at the same time it is the result of (increased) targeting efﬁciency. By 
comparing means-tested and universal schemes, our study therefore also analyses the 
potential poverty reduction that can be achieved by universal schemes. 
  According to the empirical literature, the impact of means-tested and universal 
schemes on various poverty measures differs. Forster and Tóth (2001) identify a move 
from universal to means-tested beneﬁts in the Visegrad countries3 during the mid-
nineties and ﬁnd that the impact on poverty in terms of poverty incidence was reduced 
after reforms but that beneﬁts were better targeted in terms of intensity and thus had 
a greater effect on the reduction of the poverty gap. In the study of Matsaganis et al 
(2004), which compares current (mostly means-tested) and simulated universal child 
beneﬁt schemes in Southern European countries, the reduction in poverty differs not 
only per poverty measure but also per country. Unfortunately, it is not clear to what 
extent the poverty reduction effects can be attributed to the means-tested – universal 
difference or to other differences in programme characteristics such as the type and 
level of beneﬁts (ﬂat-rate – progressive, smaller or larger) and differences in beneﬁts 
according  to  the  number  of  children.  Nevertheless,  Matsaganis’  study  also  shows 
another important point; other targeting criteria and/or beneﬁt variations matter for 
the impact on poverty reduction and targeting efﬁciency. For instance, high poverty 
risk groups can be targeted by including their demographic characteristics as eligibility 
criteria (Greece for instance provides special beneﬁts to households with three or more 
children). Another point that is addressed by the empirical literature is the manner 
in which the programme is implemented is of great importance, also for targeting 
efﬁciency and poverty reduction (Behrendt, 2000; Coady et al, 2004b).
  A ﬁnal aspect is concerned with the adequacy of the beneﬁt level. The amount 
of beneﬁts clearly matters; more generous beneﬁts have a larger impact on poverty 
(Matsaganis et al., 2004). On the other hand, higher beneﬁts put a larger strain on 
the government budget. If the beneﬁt is small, the costs of strict means-testing may 
outweigh the beneﬁt, both for the beneﬁciary and the administrator. 
  As for the means-test itself, the underlying objective is essential for its validation. 
Does the means-test aim at targeting the poor or is it meant to cut-off the wealthy 
households and to redirect some of the resources to poorer households? The latter ‘mild’ 
targeting may offer an alternative that comes close to an optimum as discussed by 
3 Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary.4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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Besley and Kanbur (1990). In addition, the amount of leakage of beneﬁts to households 
close to the poverty line may not be considered as a cost under the presumption that 
the poverty line is not a stringent concept. This ‘mild’ evaluation takes into account 
that income may not be perfectly observable and that there is no such thing as a single 
poverty  line.  This  study  therefore  uses  various  beneﬁt  levels  for  the  simulations, 
measures the poverty reduction impact using two poverty lines and analyses targeting 
efﬁciency in terms of the expenditure distribution in the population.
4.3 Russia – from universal to means-tested child allowances 
Child allowances and other family policies always played a prominent role in Russian 
(and Soviet) social policy. The objective of providing child allowances is to assist 
families in having and bringing up children (Karelova, 2003). The main law regulating 
child and family allowances was passed in 1995.4 Up to 1999, child allowances were 
ofﬁcially allocated according to the universal principle but as early as 1995 some 
regional governments decided to introduce means-tested child beneﬁts (Denisova et 
al, 2000). In 1999, federal law ofﬁcially introduced a means-test for child allowances. 
The eligibility rules changed two more times before they were ﬁnally set and approved 
in the amended law (2000). In 2001, child allowances started to be ﬁnanced from the 
federal budget.5 6
  Families with children aged under 16 (or 18 if they still go to school) and with 
average per capita income below the Minimum Subsistence Level (MSL) are entitled 
to a child allowance. The methodology for calculating the MSL is governed by federal 
law. Regions are free within the boundaries of the law to determine the content of the 
minimum consumer basket and adjust its composition to regional needs and habits.7 
The income-test for child allowances only takes the income of the parent(s) into account 
and divides the total family income by the number of family members, i.e. parent(s) 
and underage children. The application procedure is un-bureaucratic and simple. One 
of the parents (usually the mother) has to apply for the child allowance at the social 
security ofﬁce in her home town. The test includes all formal income from employment 
4 This legislation describes a package of family and maternity beneﬁts; we only focus on the monthly child 
beneﬁts to families with children below 16 years (or 18 if still in school).
5 The allocation of the funds is based on applications from the regions. Transfers are earmarked and cannot 
be used for other purposes than targeted child allowances. This ﬁnancing procedure was legally established 
in 2002.
6 Our analysis covers the period 2000-2004 but reforms in child beneﬁts continued to take place. In 2005, 
‘the authority to ﬁnance and legislatively regulate this beneﬁt was transferred back to the level of the 
Russian Federation constituent entities’ (Ovcharova & Popova, 2005). 
7 As a result, the value of the ofﬁcial MSL may differ per region, and sometimes even within regions 
(Gassmann, 2003).86
or self-employment including bonuses, all types of pensions, beneﬁts and allowances 
and income such as alimony payments over the three months prior to the application. 
The applicant ﬁlls in an application form, stating the total family income (no ofﬁcial 
documents or further income documentation have to be submitted) and providing the 
birth certiﬁcate for the child. The beneﬁt is 70 ruble per child from 18 months to age 16 
(or 18 if still in high school) (International Social Security Association, 2004). In the 
case of a single parent or when one of the parents is avoiding alimony payments, the 
beneﬁt is higher (140 and 105 ruble).
4.4 Data and methodology 
This study uses data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) from 
2000 until 2004.8 The RLMS can be used for (repeated) cross-section as well as panel 
analyses. For most of our analysis we use the cross-section dimensions which are 
representative for the Russian population as a whole.9 Included in the cross-section 
are those households that were observed in at least one round and had no missing 
observations on demographic, expenditure and income variables. We use the panel 
dimension of the RLMS to analyse the impact of child beneﬁts on chronic poverty. 
Households are part of the panel if they participated in all ﬁve rounds and if they have 
no missing observations for the main variables. 
  The RLMS includes variables on household demographics, expenditures, income, 
poverty lines, education, of child beneﬁt receipt and some variables on household 
participation in the labour market. We measure the poverty status of a household using 
the RLMS poverty lines and household expenditures. The RLMS poverty lines are 
based on regional age-gender speciﬁc food-baskets that are valued at regional prices.10 
We prefer to use expenditures instead of income because households have a tendency 
to underreport income from informal and semi-formal activities (Atkinson et al, 1995; 
Deaton, 1997; Ravallion, 1994). Household income is therefore systematically below 
expenditures, which is a common feature of these data. Total expenditures are composed 
of food and non-food goods and services.  Total food consumption is obtained by 
adding the expenditures on all foodstuffs, both purchased and from home produced 
8 For detailed information on the RLMS project, see www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/home.html.
9 We use the RLMS post-stratiﬁcation weights to obtain representative estimates.
10 The RLMS poverty lines are based on an individual subsistence food basket but also include a non-
food component. Individual poverty lines are aggregated to the household level and subsequently adjusted 
for economies of scale. The adjustment factor varies between 1 for single person households and 0.7 for 
households with six or more members. Poverty lines are updated annually using the consumer price index.4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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consumption.  Total  non-food  consumption  consists  of  expenditures  on  tobacco, 
clothing, fuel, health, services, luxury goods, rent, and utilities.11 
   We focus on households with children aged 16 years or 18 if still in school 
because these are the households that are potentially eligible for child beneﬁts.12 For 
children under 18 months there is a ‘child care leave allowance’; this social insurance 
beneﬁt is set at 500 ruble a month (70 ruble for unemployed workers). Although we 
want to analyse the impact of the child allowance for children of 18 months and older, 
we can only distinguish between the beneﬁts received by these age categories from 
2003 on.13 To maintain consistency over time we therefore decided to use the slightly 
larger group of households with children below 16 (or 18 if in school) for our targeting 
and poverty impact analyses. Table 4.1 shows that the total number of households with 
children in this category is decreasing over time. This is in line with demographic trends 
reported in other data (Federal Service of State Statistics, 2002; World Bank 2005). It 
Table 4.1: Households with children
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# of households with children 1,280 1,269 1,232 1,207 1,136
# of children 1,836 1,795 1,728 1,683 1,580
Households with child (%) 42.5 41.0 40.1 39.1 35.8
Excluding children under 18 months (%) 40.9 39.2 38.2 37.2 34.0
Households with children 
per expenditure quintile (%)
I 50.5 40.4 40.2 37.2 41.3
II 44.2 42.1 41.1 41.7 36.7
III 41.0 41.6 41.6 40.3 35.4
IV 38.4 41.9 40.3 40.3 33.5
V 39.4 39.8 37.8 36.6 33.2
Note: Includes all children aged up to 16 years, or 18 years if they are still in school.
Source: Own calculations based on the RLMS.
11 Not included are gifts or loans provided to other households, expenditures for tax and insurance, and 
savings and expenditures on stocks and bonds because these expenses are not made for the beneﬁt of 
the household or are not used for current consumption. Also excluded are expenditures on durable goods 
because the consumption beneﬁts from such goods extend over multiple periods.
12 The main characteristics of the households in the cross-section and panel dimensions are summarized in 
the appendix. Comparing the weighted cross-section with the panel samples shows that in the panel urban 
households are underrepresented while households with children are somewhat overrepresented. Income 
and expenditures are somewhat lower in the panel, but the main trends are similar. 
13 From 2003 on the household questionnaire makes a distinction between the child care allowance received 
for children below 1.5 years and beneﬁts received for children between 1.5 and 16 years old (or 18 if still 
in high school).88
can also be seen that households with children ﬁnd themselves disproportionately more 
often in lower expenditure quintiles. 
4.5 Prevalence of (chronic) poverty in families with children
We analyse trends in poverty using poverty incidence and poverty gap measures (Foster 
et al., 1984)14 as well as a spells-based chronic poverty indicator (Hulme & Shepherd, 
2003). We have calculated these poverty statistics for the RLMS poverty line and 
for a value of 150% of the RLMS poverty line. We do this for two reasons. Firstly, 
poverty statistics are sensitive to the level of poverty threshold and we want to evaluate 
the manner in which changing the threshold level inﬂuences our poverty estimates. 
Secondly, the Russian authorities use a different poverty line (Minimum Subsistence 
Table 4.2: Poverty indices (in % of individuals, 2000-2004)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
100% RLMS Poverty line
Poverty Incidence:
All Russia 21.7 14.5 12.3 9.4 10.7
Children 25.6 14.7 11.9 9.5 11.7
Poverty Gap:
All Russia 7.3 4.9 4.3 3.1 3.4
Children 8.8 4.9 4.1 2.9 3.7
150% RLMS Poverty line
Poverty Incidence:
All Russia 39.3 29.8 26.0 21.5 23.3
Children 43.9 30.3 27.8 21.6 26.7
Poverty Gap:
All Russia 15.1 10.5 9.2 7.1 7.9
Children 17.7 10.5 9.4 7.0 9.1
Note: Includes all children aged up to 16 years, or 18 years if they are still in school. 
Source: Own calculations based on the RLMS.
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, where n = total number of individuals, q = number of poor, z = poverty line and ci = individual expenditure. 
If α = 0, the equation represents the headcount index (poverty rate). Taking α = 1 results in the poverty gap, 
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Level) to establish whether a family falls below the income threshold and is thus eligible 
for child beneﬁts. The 150% RLMS cut-off is comparable to the Minimum Subsistence 
Level and thus better reﬂects the target group at which the child beneﬁt programme is 
aimed.15 
  The expenditure-based estimates in Table 4.2 show that all poverty indicators 
declined  until  2003,  and  rose  again  in  2004.  In  2004,  11%  of  the  Russians  had 
expenditures below the poverty line, having an average shortfall of expenditures over the 
total population of 3.4% and poverty severity index of 1.7%. Using the 150% threshold 
values most poverty indices more than double in value, a sign that the expenditure 
distribution around the poverty line is rather dense. In other words, many Russian 
households have expenditures that are only slightly above the poverty line; a shift of 
the poverty line therefore has a large impact on poverty indicators.16 In comparison 
with the total population, children have a higher than average or average poverty risk, 
depending on the survey year. 
  For  our  analysis  of  chronic  poverty,  we  use  an  indicator  that  is  based  on 
a  combination  of  the  number  of  poverty  spells  and  the  mean  value  of  household 
expenditures vis-à-vis the poverty line. Households are classiﬁed in four categories: 
always poor, usually poor (mean expenditures under the poverty line), occasionally 
poor (mean expenditures above the poverty line) and never poor. Chronic poverty 
studies have shown that the experience of poverty is not homogenous over time; some 
individuals experience poverty only once, others regularly and some only know a 
life of poverty. In terms of need, the chronically poor are a group that should receive 
special attention from policymakers. Children living in chronically poor households 
are of particular concern because the sustained low level of household resources also 
increases the risk of living in poverty as an adult due to insufﬁcient investment in health 
and human capital. In Russia about one third of the panel’s households experienced 
poverty at least once in the period 2000-2004 (Table 4.3). The ‘occasionally poor’ 
comprise the largest group with 30% while 7.3% can be classiﬁed as chronically poor 
15 Comparing the average household poverty lines used in the RLMS with the average Minimum Subsistence 
Level (MSL) in the Russian Household Budget Survey for the year 2000 shows that the average weighted 
MSL is about 150% of the average weighted RLMS threshold. Note that the RLMS poverty lines assume 
economies of scale while the MSL is based on a per capita basis. Thus, even if the individual RLMS and 
MSL poverty lines were the same, households with children are more likely to be poor using the MSL 
method than the RLMS method. As we do not have more details on the methodologies for the construction 
of both poverty lines, we cannot make any further inferences as to why the poverty lines differ.
16 The use of a different welfare indicator and/or poverty line threshold can have large effects on aggregate 
poverty indices, particularly in a country with a tight welfare distribution at the lower end. We therefore 
checked the consistency of our estimates with other poverty studies. Other studies using different welfare 
aggregates and/or poverty thresholds (Gassmann, 2003; World Bank, 2004) ﬁnd higher poverty rates in 
general as well as an increased poverty risk for children but the overall trends in poverty indices are very 
similar to our ﬁndings. 90
i.e. those households with mean expenditures under the poverty line. Using the higher 
poverty line, about 22% of Russians lived in chronic poverty and 38% experienced 
occasional poverty spells. Children have a higher than average risk to live in either of 
the poverty groups; they are more likely to live in chronically poor and occasionally 
poor households. 
4.6 Targeting efﬁciency of child allowances
We have seen that, even though several local administrations already introduced some 
form of means-testing during the mid-nineties it was only in 1999 that child beneﬁts 
became means-tested by federal law. Since mid-2000 there were no further changes in 
eligibility requirements. Therefore, we use the 2000 survey data as a benchmark year 
for analyzing changes in the targeting efﬁciency. We measure targeting efﬁciency by 
using a range of indicators on child beneﬁt coverage and adequacy; coverage indicators 
provide information on the beneﬁciaries while adequacy indicators give insight into 
the size beneﬁts and the allocation of total beneﬁts. To analyse whether child beneﬁts 
indeed target poor children in Russia and to what extent, we relate our coverage and 
adequacy indicators to the poverty status of the beneﬁciaries as well as the poverty 
threshold. For instance, the percentage of children receiving beneﬁts indicates which 
proportion of the children in Russia receives child allowance, but it does not indicate 
to what extent these beneﬁciaries belong to the target group (correct targeting) or not 
(leakage or inclusion error) and which part of the target group is excluded (exclusion 
error). By calculating the percentage of poor beneﬁciaries we can gain insight into 
these targeting aspects (using the same poverty thresholds as in the previous section). 
Under a means-tested scheme, leakage of beneﬁts to ‘near poor’ children is typically 
considered less problematic than leakage of resources to ‘rich’ children (Atkinson, 
1998; Behrendt, 2000). In addition, the poverty analysis in the previous section has 
Table 4.3: Chronic poverty (% of individuals in 2004, 2000-2004 panel)
100% RLMS Poverty line 150% RLMS Poverty line
All Russia Children1 All Russia Children
Always poor 2.0 1.4 6.9 7.6
Usually poor2  5.3 6.9 15.2 17.9
Occasionally poor3  29.5 34.0 38.2 39.7
Never poor 63.2 57.7 39.7 34.8
Note: 1 Includes all children aged up to 16 years, or 18 years if they are still in school. 2 Mean expenditures 
≤ poverty line 3 Mean expenditures > poverty line.
Source: Own calculations based on the RLMS.4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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shown that the size of the target population is very sensitive to the choice of the poverty 
line. We therefore complement our analysis of targeting efﬁciency by decomposing our 
indicators into expenditure quintiles.
  Households in Russia with children under 16 (or 18 if the child is still going to 
high school) are potentially eligible for child beneﬁts under the current means-tested 
scheme, but all would be eligible under a universal beneﬁt. Table 4.4 shows that beneﬁt 
coverage increased over the whole period; the percentage of children receiving child 
beneﬁts doubles from 33% in 2000 to 63% in 2004. From 2001 onwards, poor children 
are more likely to receive beneﬁts than their non-poor. This suggests that there have 
been two effects. Firstly, there has been a general increase in the number of beneﬁts 
provided. It is likely that the move from local to federal funding of earmarked beneﬁts 
has been an important contribution in this respect.17 Secondly, the increase in coverage 
of poor children as compared to overall coverage rates suggests that the means-test 
indeed targeted the poor.18 
  Nevertheless, one third to a quarter of the poor children does not receive a 
beneﬁt. It is not clear whether the applications for child beneﬁts were denied or whether 
the parents decided not to ﬁle an application. The only insight that the RLMS provides 
is whether the household thinks it is eligible for child beneﬁts.19 In 2004, 32% of the 
non-poor households with children thought they were not eligible as compared to 23% 
of the poor households. This suggests that lack of information might be one reason for 
non-take up. The distributional decomposition of the data conﬁrms that child beneﬁts 
are progressive; children in lowest two quintiles have higher coverage rates. There is 
nevertheless considerable leakage to other quintiles. 
  Coverage  rates  only  show  one  aspect  of  targeting  efﬁciency.  The  selected 
adequacy  indicators  show  how  much  beneﬁt  is  received  in  three  dimensions;  the 
absolute level of beneﬁts, the level of beneﬁts as compared to total expenditures and 
the share of total beneﬁts going to the lowest expenditure quintiles. A ﬁrst indicator of 
beneﬁt adequacy is the beneﬁt level. We only report median beneﬁt levels because there 
are a number of outliers in the reported child beneﬁts which cannot be fully explained 
by supplementary beneﬁts, birth grants or maternity beneﬁts (from local authorities or 
employers). To facilitate comparison between survey years, we denote the values of 
17 Denisova et al (2000) mention that funding problems greatly reduced provision of child beneﬁts during 
the mid-nineties. 
18 Incidence rates look at receipt of beneﬁts over the total population while coverage rates focus on beneﬁt 
receipt among children or households with children. The trends in terms of incidence rates (not shown here) 
are similar to the coverage rates but differ in level; they increased from less than 13% in 2000 to 21% in 
2004. There was a strong increase in beneﬁt receipt among (consumption) poor households.
19 For more information check for instance the household questionnaire of 2004, question 5 page 24F (http://
www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/data/questionnaires/rmhouse.pdf , accessed October 2006).92
Table 4.4: Targeting efﬁciency of child beneﬁts (2000-2004)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Beneﬁt Coverage
# of children, % of which 1,280 1,269 1,232 1,207 1,136
-  receives child beneﬁts 32.5 49.8 57.8 60.9 62.9
-  is poor and receives child beneﬁts  
(100% RLMS poverty line)
31.7 60.3 73.6 78.8 67.0
-  is poor and receives child beneﬁts  
(150% RLMS poverty line)
31.3 58.5 68.4 74.3 73.4
Children receiving child beneﬁt per expenditure quintile (%)
I 34.2 61.2 71.0 74.8 74.3
II 29.0 59.7 62.7 74.3 72.5
III 36.5 49.4 59.9 60.7 60.0
IV 30.5 43.7 53.5 54.8 58.0
V 31.8 34.4 39.5 39.0 45.2
Beneﬁt Adequacy
Child allowance per child (median)
Nominal rubles 60 70 73 70 80
Real 1992 rubles 85 84 76 65 66
Total beneﬁt as % of household expenditure for poor household (median)
-  Poor (100% RLMS Poverty line) 6.9 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.9
-  Poor (150% RLMS Poverty line) 5.3 4.0 3.6 2.9 2.5
Total beneﬁt as % of household expenditure per expenditure quintile (median)
I 8.0 5.0 4.3 2.9 2.7
II 3.3 2.7 2.0 1.6 1.6
III 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.0
IV 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.7
V 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4
Beneﬁt share to the poor as % of total beneﬁts (excluding outliers)
-  Poor (100% RLMS Poverty line) 25.1 18.2 17.1 13.6 14.4
-  Poor (150% RLMS Poverty line) 46.5 37.2 33.6 28.6 32.6
Beneﬁt share per quintile as % of total beneﬁts (excluding outliers)
I 26.9 25.1 26.7 26.1 28.8
II 20.5 26.0 20.8 26.6 22.9
III 18.5 19.8 21.4 20.0 17.8
IV 16.3 16.8 18.4 16.2 16.6
V 17.8 12.3 12.6 11.2 13.9
Note: Includes all children aged up to 16 years, or 18 years if they are still in school. 
Source: Own calculations based on the RLMS.4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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child allowances in real 1992 ruble as well as in nominal values. The nominal amount 
of child allowance received in 2004 is 80 ruble. The median value of child allowance 
has been decreasing in real terms since 2000. This is mainly because child beneﬁts are 
not indexed for inﬂation.20 
  What is the relative contribution of child allowance to the household budget? 
Compared to average monthly expenditures, child beneﬁts are rather modest. The 
beneﬁt shares are also decreasing over time. For the lowest welfare quintile the beneﬁt 
share over total expenditures decreases from 8% in 2000 to 2.7% in 2004. This decline 
can be explained by an increase of household real expenditures (33% for the lowest 
quintile)21 combined with a decline in the real value of child beneﬁts (22% for the 
median child beneﬁt). 
  To what extent do programme beneﬁts ﬂow to households in the target group 
and what proportion of the beneﬁts is spent on beneﬁciaries outside the target group? 
The beneﬁt share per quintile shows the percentage of the programme resources is 
ﬂowing to the target group and which percentage of the resources leaks away to richer 
households. Using the higher poverty line, which corresponds better to the income 
threshold used by Russian authorities, we can see that about half of the beneﬁts ﬂow 
to poor households in 2000 but this share declines to about a third in 2004. From the 
decomposition into quintiles we can see that over the observed period about 50% of 
the beneﬁts are going to the poorest 40% of the population. Possible explanations for 
this could be that the means-test is not strictly applied, or alternatively, beneﬁt receipt 
is rather sticky possibly indicating a lack of regular household re-evaluation.22 
  In addition to the descriptive indicators of targeting efﬁciency we also want to 
test if there is statistical evidence for the changes in the targeting efﬁciency of child 
beneﬁts. We estimate a binary model with child beneﬁt receipt as a dependent variable 
and a number of explanatory variables such as the number of eligible children and other 
demographic characteristics, the logarithm of nominal income minus child beneﬁts23, a 
dummy for the poverty status of the household, a dummy taking the value of one if at 
20 We also checked both poverty lines whether there is a difference in the median beneﬁt per child for poor 
and non-poor children. The median beneﬁt per child of a poor household was about 10 ruble higher in 
2000/2001 and 7 ruble higher in 2002. In 2003 and 2004 there was no difference anymore.
21 See Table 4.9 in the appendix.
22 We analysed patterns of beneﬁt receipt for the household panel and found that the majority of households 
continue to receive beneﬁts in subsequent years. Of those households receiving child allowance in 2000, 
53% still received child allowances in 2004. Of those who did not receive beneﬁts anymore, 26% still had 
children in the eligible age category. Households that lost beneﬁts but still had eligible children had higher 
expenditures on average. 
23 Income (provided by RLMS) includes all earnings from (self-) employment and social transfers (cash and 
non-cash). We used income because child beneﬁts in Russia are income-tested. Doing the same analyses 
using the logarithm of household expenditures minus child beneﬁts yields similar results.94
Table 4.5: Probit regressions on cross-sections (Child beneﬁt receipt: yes=1/
no=0, 2000-2004)
2000   2001   2002   2003   2004  
# of households 1,261   1,259   1,223   1,195   1,132  
Model 1
Log income before child 
beneﬁts  -0.017   -0.081   -0.06   -0.1   -0.091  
-0.015   (0.018) 01 (0.017) 01 (0.020) 01 (0.022) 01
Number of children in 
eligible category 0.1   0.175   0.21   0.151   0.101  
(0.019) 01 (0.024) 01 (0.026) 01 (0.025) 01 (0.032) 01
Model 2
Expenditures under poverty 
line -0.016   0.101   0.165   0.172   0.046  
-0.03   (0.042) 01 (0.045) 01 (0.045) 01 -0.048  
Number of children in 
eligible category 0.099   0.169   0.212   0.147   0.103  
(0.018) 01 (0.023) 01 (0.026) 01 (0.024) 01 (0.030) 01
Model 3
Log income before child 
beneﬁts -0.027   -0.052   -0.036   -0.071   -0.059  
-0.018   (0.020) 01 -0.019   (0.023) 01 (0.022) 01
Number of children in 
eligible category 0.101   0.176   0.214   0.145   0.081  
(0.021) 01 (0.025) 01 (0.029) 01 (0.027) 01 (0.033) 01
At least one unemployed 
person  0.072   0.059   -0.017   0.05   0.023  
-0.045   -0.048   -0.05   -0.053   -0.052  
Head of household is female 0.064   0.165   0.146   0.046   0.016  
-0.058   (0.057) 01 (0.055) 01 -0.058   -0.059  
Household living in semi-
urban area 0.16   -0.08   0.023   -0.241   -0.08  
-0.089   -0.086   -0.095   -0.097 05 -0.103  
Household living in rural 
area 0.115   0.163   0.056   0.121   0.059  
-0.067   (0.069) 05 -0.071   -0.075   -0.075  













F-test on joint signiﬁcance 
of primary sampling units, 











Note: Model is estimated with households that have children in eligible age category. Estimates are 
displayed in marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 01signiﬁcant at a 1% level, 05 signiﬁcant 
at a 5% level. Included in all estimations but not reported: variables on demographic composition of 
household
Source: Own calculations based on the RLMS.4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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least one household member is unemployed, a dummy for a female headed household, 
dummies indicating a semi urban and rural dwelling place and dummies for the primary 
sampling units. 24 We only include households that have children in the eligible age 
category i.e. under age 16 or 18 if the child is still in high school.
  Our estimation strategy is rather straightforward; for each cross-section we use 
Probit regressions to estimate a number of models. In our ﬁrst model the main explanatory 
variables are the number of children in the eligible age category and household income. 
The second model replaces household income with a dummy variable on the poverty 
status of the household. The third model includes in addition to the number of children 
in the eligible age category, household income and a number of control variables that 
potentially can be correlated with the dependent variable.25 As we repeat the estimation 
for each year, changes in sign, magnitude and signiﬁcance of the estimated parameters 
can be interpreted as indicators for policy change. The results are reported in Table 
4.5 and displayed as marginal effects indicating the change in the probability for a 
small change in each independent, continuous variable and the discrete change in the 
probability for dummy variables.
  As expected, the number of eligible children in the household is positively 
correlated with beneﬁt receipt for all models and every survey year; households with 
more children are more likely to receive child beneﬁts. Additionally, the likelihood of 
receiving child beneﬁts with an additional child increases from 10% in 2000 to 21% 
in 2002 and then drops to a value of around 10% in 2004.  The estimated marginal 
effects for household income are very small and insigniﬁcant in 2000 but increase in 
magnitude and become signiﬁcant at a 1% level from 2001 on. The negative sign of 
the coefﬁcient conﬁrms the progressiveness of child beneﬁts; as income increases the 
probability of child beneﬁt receipt falls. 
  In our second model, the coefﬁcient for poverty status also becomes signiﬁcant 
at a 1% level in 2001 suggesting that poor households are more likely to receive child 
allowance. This effect, however, disappears in 2004. 
  In the third model, the estimates for the unemployment and most of the estimates 
for rural/semi-urban dummies are insigniﬁcant. The dummy indicating female head of 
the household is signiﬁcant in 2001 and 2002 and points to an increased probability of 
receiving child beneﬁts. There is also an interesting pattern in the explanatory power of 
24 The model can be written as  ) ' ( ] | 1 Pr[ x x Y β λ = = , where Y = dependent variable,  λ =  standard 
normal cumulative distribution function, x = vector of explanatory variables and β  = vector of parameters 
to be estimated (Greene, 2003). The dependent variable takes on Y=1 when the household receives a child 
beneﬁt and Y=0 otherwise.
25 Control variables: labour status of household members, dwelling place (urban, semi-urban or rural), and 
dummies indicating the primary sampling units.96
the primary sampling dummies; the joint explanatory power of these location dummies 
is very high in 2000 (see the results of the F-test in Table 4.5) but decreasing thereafter 
being insigniﬁcant at in 2002 and signiﬁcant on a 5% level in 2003 and 2004. We 
believe that these dummies control for regional differences in the implementation and 
ﬁnancing of child beneﬁts for two reasons. Firstly, these dummies act as a control for 
faster/slower implementation of the reforms in the regions. Secondly, it was only in 
the course of 2001 that child allowances were fully ﬁnanced from the federal budget 
via a compensation fund. The decrease of explanatory power in the coefﬁcients of 
the primary sampling units might indeed reﬂect the harmonization of the child beneﬁt 
programme in the Russian Federation.
4.7 Impact of child allowances on (chronic) poverty
This section evaluates the impact of child beneﬁts in terms of poverty from 2000 to 
2004. So far we have seen that the size of child allowances is rather modest and that 
its real value is decreasing over time. Does this mean that the poverty reduction effect 
of the beneﬁts also decreased? We analyse the impact of child beneﬁts on poverty 
by comparing expenditures before and after child beneﬁts. This is a static analysis; it 
does not take into account any behavioural changes of households in the absence of 
child beneﬁts nor any responses to changes in the beneﬁt level or eligibility criteria. 
We investigate the impact of the beneﬁt on the incidence of poverty, the poverty gap 
and the incidence of chronic poverty, both in terms of the total population as well as 
children. 26 
  Figure 4.1 shows the pre and post beneﬁt poverty rates as well as the absolute 
and relative poverty reduction effects. The reduction in poverty rates is rather small. 
Overall poverty reduction rates are between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points (3.2 to 5.7%) 
while the reduction of child poverty for recipient households varies between 0.6 and 
1.6 percentage points (5.5 to 11.1%). The impact of child allowances on the mean 
proportionate poverty gap among children is declining in an absolute sense; in 2000 
child beneﬁts still reduced the mean poverty gap with 0.6 percentage points compared 
to 0.2 percentage points in 2004. In a relative sense the poverty gap reduction varies 
between 5.4 and 10.3%. Changing the poverty line does not have a different effect; the 
percentage point poverty reductions using the 150% RLMS poverty line, are of similar 
magnitude (not shown here).
26 Households with extreme amounts of reported child beneﬁts were excluded for the calculation of the 
poverty gap. Outliers were identiﬁed using the ‘iqr’ syntax in Stata 9.0. ‘iqr’ indicates an outlier as severe 
when it ‘comprises about .0002% of the normal population. In samples, they lie far out enough to have a 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  Did the introduction of mean-testing inﬂuence the reduction in poverty measured 
by these indicators? When we compare the poverty reduction effects in Figure 4.1 using 
the year 2000 as a benchmark, we see that the reduction in the number of poor children 
is lowest in 2000 and higher in all other years (and this holds for both poverty lines). The 
trend in terms of poverty gap is less clear but 2000 also shows comparably less success 
in reducing the poverty gap. Using the higher poverty line, the poverty gap reduction 
in 2000 is clearly the lowest. It is however not clear to what extent this improvement 
is due to the introduction of a means-test or because of the substantial increase of 
overall beneﬁt coverage. Moreover, what would be the poverty reduction impact of 
a universal scheme? Even though the overall poverty reduction impact is modest for 
all indicators, child beneﬁts in Russia have the greatest poverty reduction effect on 
chronically poor children (a relative reduction of 19.3%). Without child beneﬁts, 9.9% 
of the children would live in chronic poverty, but child beneﬁts reduce chronic poverty 
with 1.6 percentage points to 8.3% (the reduction is similar using the higher poverty 
line). The percentage of children experiencing occasional poverty declines with 0.8 
percentage points for the lower poverty line but rises with 0.3 percentage points for the 
higher poverty line. 
4.8 Simulation alternative child beneﬁt programmes
The previous section showed that there was (some) improvement in terms of poverty 
reduction over time. Taking the means-testing capacities of public authorities as a given; 
what would be the poverty reduction effect when introducing a universal scheme? And 
what impact would a change in the level of beneﬁts have? We investigate the poverty 
impact of a range of alternative child beneﬁt programmes and compare it with the 
current situation. We simulate six alternative scenarios, starting with a budget neutral 
universal beneﬁt (42 ruble), and a universal beneﬁt at the current beneﬁt level. For 
the other four scenarios we increase the beneﬁt level and simulate means-tested and 
universal eligibility rules. The underlying idea for these simulations is that the child 
beneﬁt should cover a substantial share of the costs of a child living at the poverty 
line. We decided to use the child weight of the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scales to 
indicate the cost share of the child (0.3 equivalent adult). 
  The RLMS poverty lines are already speciﬁed at a household level. To obtain 
the ruble value of a child’s share of the poverty line in 2004, we use the average single 
male poverty line to obtain a value for the adult equivalent poverty line level. Then, we 
multiply this poverty line by 0.3. Note that the level of child beneﬁt differs by region. 
  The following scenarios are simulated; both applying means-tested and universal 
eligibility rules:4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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A monthly beneﬁt that covers half of the poverty line child costs 
(0.15 equivalent adult, about 280 rubles)
A beneﬁt that covers the entire poverty line child costs 
(0.3 equivalent adult, about 560 rubles)
We use the 2004 cross-section as our benchmark and analyse the impact of beneﬁts 
on children between 18 months old and 16 years (18 if still in school). For the means-
tested scenarios we assume that the same households receive a beneﬁt as those under 
the current mean-tested scheme. To obtain estimates for the total costs of each beneﬁt 
option we use the 2004 population data as provided in the UNICEF TransMONEE data 
(2005).27 The 2004 GDP and social expenditure data are retrieved from the statistical 
appendix of the IMF country report on Russia (International Monetary Fund, 2005). 
  The  impact  on  child  poverty  and  chronic  child  poverty  under  current  and 
simulated policy options is summarized in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. In comparison to 
the current programme, poverty incidence and poverty gap among children would be 
further reduced by 0.1 percentage point if all children would receive a beneﬁt of 70 
ruble (irrespective of the poverty line used). For the budget neutral scheme, the poverty 
reduction effects are equal or less as compared to the current means-tested scheme. 
The 70 ruble universal scheme achieves slightly higher chronic poverty reduction rates 
while the effects of the budget neutral scheme are less obvious. Table 4.8 summarizes 
the total beneﬁt expenditures per scheme. We estimated current expenditures on child 
beneﬁts by multiplying the number of children in Russian with the child coverage 
rate and the nominal beneﬁt value per child. Expenditures in the current programme 
reported are about 1,300 million ruble, which represents 0.008% of Russia’s nominal 
GDP in 2004 and 0.08% of subsidies and transfers. Beneﬁt expenditures would rise 
with approximately 162% for the 70 ruble universal scheme.28  
  The overall poverty reduction impact of a universal scheme along the current 
lines, either with 70 or budget-neutral 42 ruble is modest. Only a signiﬁcant increase 
of the beneﬁt level results in considerably higher poverty reduction impacts as the 
tables show. Providing a child beneﬁt which is equal to 15% of the male adult poverty 
line (equivalent to 280 ruble) would reduce poverty incidence by 10 to 15 percent, and 
close the poverty gap by 20 percent if the beneﬁt is means-tested and 31 percent if the 
beneﬁt is universally provided. A universal child beneﬁt equal to 30% of the male adult 
27 In 2004, Russia’s population was 144 million of which 20.9% was younger than 18 years. The total 
beneﬁt expenditures are slightly overestimated since all children under 18 years are included.  
28 We assumed 100% take up rates under the universal schemes, possibly overestimating total beneﬁt 
expenditures. However, administration costs are not included. 100
Table 4.6: Simulation: Poverty reduction per programme type (all children)
100% RLMS poverty line 150% RLMS poverty line
Incidence Poverty gap Incidence Poverty gap
Means-tested beneﬁts of 70 ruble per child (current situation) 
Before allowance 12.3 3.9 27.4 9.4
After allowance 12.1 3.7 26.8 9.1
Absolute change -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3
Relative change -1.6 -5.1 -2.2 -3.2
Budget Neutral Universal beneﬁts of 42 ruble per child
After allowance 12.2 3.7 26.8 9.2
Absolute change -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2
Relative change -0.8 -5.1 -2.2 -2.1
Universal beneﬁts of 70 ruble per child 
After allowance 12.0 3.6 26.7 9.0
Absolute change -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4
Relative change -2.4 -7.7 -2.6 -4.3
Universal child beneﬁt of  0.15 eq adult (280 ruble) per child
After allowance 10.4 2.7 24.8 7.7
Absolute change -1.9 -1.2 -2.6 -1.7
Relative change -15.4 -30.8 -9.5 -18.1
Means-tested child beneﬁts of 0.15 eq ad (280 ruble) per child
After allowance 10.9 3.1 25.4 8.2
Absolute change -1.4 -0.8 -2.0 -1.2
Relative change -11.4 -20.5 -7.3 -12.8
Universal child beneﬁt of 0.3 eq ad (560 ruble) per child
After allowance 6.9 1.8 22.5 6.1
Absolute change -5.4 -2.1 -4.9 -3.3
Relative change -43.9 -53.8 -17.9 -35.1
Means-tested child beneﬁts of 0.3 eq ad (560 ruble) per child
After allowance 8.2 2.5 23.6 7.1
Absolute change -4.1 -1.4 -3.8 -2.3
Relative change -33.3 -35.9 -13.9 -24.5
# of children 1,487
# of households 1,079
Note: Chronic poverty groups are based on households in 2000-2004 panel, the table reports chronic 
poverty estimates for the children living in either category in 2004.
Source: Own calculations based on the RLMS.4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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poverty line would reduce the poverty gap by half. The universal scheme outperforms 
the means-tested scheme. The rate of reduction depends on the level of the poverty line. 
When the lowest level is taken, there is a greater impact on the reduction of the poverty 
gap.  Since we assume that only the households currently receiving a means-tested 
child beneﬁt will gain from increased beneﬁts, the poverty reduction effects for the 
simulated means-tested scenarios may be an underestimation, as the beneﬁt increase 
is likely to induce more households to ﬁle an application. The same applies to the total 
beneﬁt expenditures.  The effects are similar for chronic poverty, the chronically poor 
particularly beneﬁt from an increase in the beneﬁt level.29 Naturally, the costs for the 
bold scenarios are considerably higher than for the current programme. However, even 
the boldest scenario requires only one tenth of a percent of GDP, and slightly more than 
one percent of total social expenditures. 
  These simulations illustrate a number of relevant issues. Clearly, total beneﬁt 
expenditures on beneﬁts are higher under universal programmes and, in this respect, 
potentially less efﬁcient. An issue that has received little attention in the universal 
– means-tested debates is that when targeting is not perfect (i.e. there are errors of 
exclusion), universal schemes outperform means-tested schemes in terms of poverty 
reduction. The additional poverty reduction is achieved because those who were by 
error excluded under the means-tested scheme now do receive a beneﬁt. While keeping 
the capacity of means-testing constant, this paper estimated and compared both effects. 
The results also show that the difference in poverty reduction between means-tested 
and universal beneﬁts increases as the beneﬁt level increases. Whether the additional 
beneﬁt expenditures are worth the extra poverty reduction, is a decision to be made by 
society.
  An important limitation of the simulations is that we can only speculate what 
the behavioural effects of these schemes would be on programme’s administration 
costs, targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction. For instance, moving from the current 
scheme to the 70 ruble universal beneﬁt scheme would have two opposing effects; ﬁrstly 
administration costs rise as more households apply under the universal child beneﬁt 
scheme and secondly, decrease as a result of the abolishment of the income-test. With 
current coverage rates (56% of the households), local administration ofﬁces can expect 
an increase in applications of 79% (if every household with children in this category 
would actually apply). It is a priori not clear whether the increment in administration 
costs due to more applications outweighs the decreased costs due to a reduced workload. 
29 For the chronic poverty impact we use the 5-year panel. For 2000-2003 we cannot distinguish between 
child  beneﬁts  received  for  children  under  and  over  18  months  age.  Therefore,  the  chronic  poverty 
simulations also incorporate children less than 18 months. These children receive the same beneﬁt as the 
older children.102
Table 4.7: Simulation: Reduction in chronic poverty (all children, 2004)
100% RLMS poverty line 150% RLMS poverty line
Change Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Means-tested beneﬁts of 70 ruble per child (current situation)
Always poor -0.6 -28.6 -0.1 -1.3
Usually poor -0.6 -7.8 -1.1 -5.8
Occasionally poor 0.3 0.9 0.6 1.5
Never poor 0.9 1.6 0.6 1.8
Budget Neutral Universal beneﬁts of 42 ruble per child 
Always poor 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -5.0
Usually poor -0.9 -11.7 -0.4 -2.1
Occasionally poor -0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.8
Never poor 1.2 2.2 0.5 1.5
Universal beneﬁts of 70 ruble per child 
Always poor -0.6 -28.6 -0.5 -6.3
Usually poor -0.8 -10.4 -1.1 -5.8
Occasionally poor -0.7 -2.0 0.4 1.0
Never poor 2.1 3.8 1.2 3.6
Universal child beneﬁts of 0.15 equivalent adult male
Always poor -0.9 -42.9 -1.2 -15.0
Usually poor -2.4 -31.2 -2.9 -15.3
Occasionally poor -2.8 -8.0 0.9 2.3
Never poor 6.1 11.0 3.3 9.8
Means-tested child beneﬁts of 0.15 equivalent adult male
Always poor -0.9 -42.9 -0.7 -8.8
Usually poor -1.8 -23.4 -2.5 -13.2
Occasionally poor -0.4 -1.1 1.8 4.6
Never poor 3.1 5.6 1.5 4.5
Universal child beneﬁts of 0.3 equivalent adult male
Always poor -1.0 -47.6 -2.4 -30.0
Usually poor -3.8 -49.4 -5.3 -27.9
Occasionally poor -6.3 -18.1 1.5 3.8
Never poor 11.2 20.2 6.2 18.5
Means-tested child beneﬁts of 0.3 equivalent adult male
Always poor -1.0 -47.6 -1.9 -23.8
Usually poor -2.5 -32.5 -4.0 -21.1
Occasionally poor -1.8 -5.2 2.8 7.1
Never poor 5.4 9.7 3.2 9.5
# of children 1,319
# of households 948
Source: Own calculations based on the RLMS.4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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Furthermore, a general increase in the beneﬁt level will increase administrative costs in 
both scenarios compared to current expenditures on administration; comparing to the 
current scheme, higher beneﬁts induce more households to ﬁle an application. Higher 
beneﬁts also affect targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction effects: the non-take up 
of beneﬁts will be reduced because applying for beneﬁts becomes more attractive (i.e. 
fewer errors of exclusion and larger poverty reductions) but inclusion errors will rise 
as well. The effect of current beneﬁt levels on labour supply can be assumed to be 
marginal given the low and ﬂat rate beneﬁt levels. Substantial rises in child beneﬁts, 
particularly in combination with a means-tested scheme, may affect labour supply to 
some degree.30   
4.9 Conclusion 
Using the 2000 introduction of means-tested child beneﬁts in Russia as a case study; 
this paper assessed the impact of a policy change from universal to means-tested child 
allowances in terms of targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction. We focused on the 
core costs of targeting, namely leakage, exclusion errors and total beneﬁt expenditures, 
and related these to the beneﬁts in terms of poverty reduction. Our analysis has been 
comprehensive;  using  both  the  cross-section  and  panel  dimensions  of  the  Russia 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) from 2000 to 2004, we investigated changes 
in  targeting  efﬁciency  and  poverty  reduction  over  time.  We  measured  targeting 











Current means-tested beneﬁts  70 ruble 1,300 100 0.008 0.09
Universal beneﬁts  70 ruble 2,100 162 0.013 0.15
Budget neutral universal beneﬁts  42 ruble 1,300 100 0.008 0.09
Universal beneﬁts 0.15 eqad 8,500 654 0.051 0.58
Means-tested beneﬁts 0.15 eqad 5,100 392 0.030 0.35
Universal beneﬁts 0.3 eqad 16,900 1,300 0.101 1.17
Means-tested beneﬁts 0.3 eqad 10,100 770 0.061 0.70
Note: 1 In million ruble and rounded to 100. 2 GDP in 2004: 16,751 billion ruble; Federal Government 
expenditures on social policy: 154 billion ruble (International Monetary Fund, 2005).
Source: Own calculations based on the RLMS.
30 With a universal beneﬁt scheme there is only an income effect on labour supply while with a means-tested 
scheme both income and substitution effects work toward a reduction of labour supply (for a discussion of 
these effects see for instance Grosh, 1994).104
efﬁciency using coverage and adequacy indicators; by calculating these indicators for 
two poverty lines and the quintiles of the expenditure distribution we gained insight 
into the scope of inclusion and exclusion errors. The poverty reduction impact was 
measured in three dimensions; poverty incidence, poverty gap and chronic poverty. 
Finally, we also simulated various means-tested and universal child beneﬁt schemes 
and analysed differences in poverty reduction and total beneﬁt expenditures. Due to 
limited data availability, the inﬂuences of behavioural effects on targeting efﬁciency 
and poverty reduction have not been taken into account in our simulations.
  The analysis of targeting efﬁciency showed an improvement in overall coverage 
rates (more children receive child beneﬁts) and evidence of improved targeting to children 
living in low income households (poor children or children in lower expenditure deciles 
are more likely to receive beneﬁts). Nevertheless, both inclusion and exclusion errors 
are considerable; in 2004 one third to a quarter of the poor children does not receive 
beneﬁts while the beneﬁt coverage rate of children in the three highest expenditure 
quintiles is still 50%. When is means-testing considered successful in terms of targeting 
efﬁciency? When two-thirds of the target group are reached, one third is missed and 
two thirds of total beneﬁts ﬂow to non-poor children? In our view, that would be a very 
modest assessment of success.
  The impact of child beneﬁts on poverty has been very modest over the whole 
period, but we found some evidence that the poverty reduction effect has increased 
somewhat as compared to the benchmark year (2000). It is not clear to what extent 
this improvement is due to the introduction of a means-test or due to the increase of 
overall beneﬁt coverage. The simulations of universal and means-tested schemes for 
2004 showed that when targeting is not perfect (i.e. there are errors of exclusion), 
universal schemes achieve additional reductions in poverty. And above all, size matters; 
considerably  increasing  beneﬁt  levels  makes  the  poverty  reduction  impact  more 
substantial. Moreover, differences in poverty reduction effect between means-tested 
and universal beneﬁts increase as the beneﬁt level increases, with universal beneﬁts 
outperforming means-tested beneﬁts. 
  To what extent are means-tested child beneﬁts in Russia desirable? We show that 
abolishing means-testing would improve the (chronic) poverty reduction performance 
of child allowances, but increasing the beneﬁt level would have an even stronger effect. 
We ﬁnd it difﬁcult to argue why a programme with beneﬁts as low as current beneﬁt 
levels, should be means-tested. Given the characteristics of the expenditure distribution 
in  a  country  such  as  Russia,  where  inequality  is  rife  and  the  welfare  differences 
between households at the lower end of the distribution are small, many beneﬁts leak 
to ‘near’ poor households. Leakage is also lower because households with children 
are disproportionately more present at the lower part of this distribution. Moreover, 4. Means-tested and universal child beneﬁts in Russia
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the road of economic transition in Russia has been rather bumpy and led to a surge in 
uncertainty, also in terms of living standards. In that respect, even when child beneﬁts 
are modest, they can assist families with children to smooth consumption by providing 
a stable source of cash income (Notten & Crombrugghe de, 2006). 
4.10 Appendix: summary statistics
Table 4.9: Household characteristics in RLMS cross-section
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# of households in cross-section 3,094 3,203 3,206 3,176 3,114
Dwelling place (%):
Urban 65.9 67.2 68.1 65.1 64.7
Rural/Semi-urban 34.2 32.8 31.9 34.9 35.3
Children (<18) in household (%):
0 55.0 57.0 57.1 58.5 61.7
1 28.2 27.5 27.9 27.3 25.7
2 14.2 13.2 12.5 11.8 10.5
3 or more 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.1
Elderly in household (%):
0 52.6 52.8 51.9 51.7 50.6
1 31.5 32.0 32.4 32.9 34.3
2 or more 16.0 15.2 15.7 15.5 15.1
Household type (%):
Single person household 20.3 21.5 21.1 22.1 23.9
Couple no children1 21.5 20.9 20.6 20.9 21.1
Single caretaker and children 4.6 4.4 4.7 4.2 4.2
Parents and children 19.5 18.3 17.4 17.6 16.5
Triple generations and children 8.6 8.0 8.2 8.4 7.7
Other households and children 8.2 8.5 7.9 7.1 5.6
Other households 17.4 18.4 20.1 19.9 20.9
Distribution (mean per capita expenditures per quintile in real 1992 ruble):
I 643 774 805 910 857
II 1,252 1,509 1,577 1,673 1,632
III 1,836 2,180 2,282 2,417 2,385
IV 2,661 3,220 3,306 3,519 3,483
V 7,072 7,718 7,913 9,469 9,170
Note: 1 Children aged between 1.5 and 18.
Source: Own calculations based on RLMS.106
Table 4.10: Household characteristics in RLMS panel 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004




Children (<18) in household (%):
0 51.2 53.6 54.9 55.9 58.9
1 30.0 29.1 29.1 29.1 27.2
2 15.3 14.1 12.8 12.0 11.3
3 or more 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.6
Elderly in household (%):
0 55.6 54.9 52.4 51.8 50.6
1 28.0 29.0 30.6 32.0 33.0
2 or more 16.4 16.9 17.0 16.2 16.4
Household type (%):
Single person household 15.8 16.7 17.8 19.2 20.5
Couple no children1 22.7 23.0 22.6 21.9 22.1
Single caretaker and children 4.7 4.4 4.8 4.3 4.2
Parents & children 22.6 21.6 20.8 20.0 19.2
Triple generations and children 8.9 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.2
Other households and children 8.4 8.3 7.4 7.4 6.0
Other households 17.0 17.5 18.5 18.9 19.8
Distribution (mean per capita expenditures per quintile in real 1992 ruble):
I 614 756 730 852 805
II 1,189 1,436 1,468 1,566 1,529
III 1,759 2,041 2,118 2,242 2,224
IV 2,518 2,954 3,017 3,247 3,184
V 6,364 6,411 6,931 8,203 7,090
Note: 1 Children aged between 1.5 and 18.
Source: Own calculations based on RLMS.Poverty and consumption smoothing in 
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5.1 Introduction1 2
During the last decade, the Russian Federation experienced that the transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a market based economy is full of bumps, potholes and 
off-road experiences. For the Russian people, the transition process involved a surge in 
uncertainty. Unemployment was essentially an unknown phenomenon in pre-transition 
Russia. The closing down or privatization of the large public industrial and agricultural 
companies resulted in mass unemployment and decreased job security. Those still 
having a job faced wage payment arrears and enforced unpaid leave arrangements. 
The cuts in subsidies on food and energy resulted in an increase in the cost of living. 
Additionally, in order to make a living in this new market economy, other skills and 
abilities were required.
  The Russian people needed all their resourcefulness in this transition phase 
simply  to  make  ends  meet.  Participatory  poverty  studies  indicate  that  people  in 
transition economies do indeed associate the transition period with substantial increases 
in  uncertainty  (World  Bank,  May  1999).  Economic  theory  shows  that  uncertainty 
about future income and consumption ﬂows reduces the expected satisfaction that risk 
adverse individuals can derive from it. In this respect, people’s ability to respond to 
uncertainty and to deal with shocks reﬂects an important dimension of well-being. In 
contrast, widely used poverty statistics merely describe the level of welfare enjoyed 
by individuals at a particular point in time. The ability to smooth consumption and 
the level of welfare each reﬂect relevant but different dimension of welfare. Our aim 
is to investigate the extent to which Russian households have been able to protect 
their consumption against income shocks during the transition period and how this 
ability of consumption smoothing is reﬂected in terms of poverty risk. We investigate 
whether the characteristics households with a risk of poverty are the same as those for 
households with low smoothing abilities. This paper contributes to the literature on 
welfare and poverty because it enhances our understanding of the relationship between 
the dynamics of a welfare generating process (ability to smooth consumption) and its 
outcome in terms of welfare at a particular point in time (poverty).  
  We use data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) from 
1994 to 2004. The cross-section component is used to calculate a range of absolute 
poverty indices and a poverty proﬁle. The panel dimension is used to investigate poverty 
1 This chapter is based on: Notten, G. & D. de Crombrugghe (2006). Poverty and Consumption Insurance 
in Russia. MGSoG Working Paper(2006/004), Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht 
University.
2 We thank Chris Elbers, Jan Willem Gunning and Tony Shorrocks for their constructive comments and are 
especially grateful to Sybrand Schim van der Loeff for his suggestions on the model. 5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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dynamics and to estimate the overall ability of households to smooth consumption. This 
study is the ﬁrst to explicitly incorporate short and long run dynamics in consumption 
smoothing processes: households’ income and expenditure ﬂows are modelled using an 
Error Correction Model (ECM) which better exploits the information in the level data. 
The short run income elasticity measures the responsiveness of household expenditures 
to changes in income and is used as a measure for households’ consumption smoothing 
abilities; a high income elasticity reﬂects a low consumption smoothing ability and vice 
versa.  
  The  results  show  that  households  are  only  partially  able  to  protect  their 
consumption from income shocks and that income shocks have a smaller impact on 
food expenditures than on non-food expenditures. Furthermore, we ﬁnd exploratory 
evidence of heterogeneity in consumption smoothing abilities; by estimating the model 
separately for subgroups in the sample we ﬁnd that the consumption smoothing abilities 
vary according to household characteristics. As households’ average (long term) living 
standard increases, they are better able to smooth non-food expenditures. However, low 
consumption smoothing abilities are not always associated with high poverty risk; rural 
households, who have a high poverty risk, manage to smooth food expenditures quite 
well, most likely because such households have more opportunities to produce their 
own food. Households with pensioners, on the other hand, have a low poverty risk and 
high consumption smoothing abilities. These exploratory results indicate that there is a 
potential role for development and social protection policies to inﬂuence households’ 
abilities to deal with risks and that the scope of such policies should be broader than 
the social assistance type of poverty-reduction policies. This may involve an extension 
of the coverage of the social security net but can imply improving the functioning of 
market-based institutions such as increased monitoring and supervision of the ﬁnancial 
sector. 
  This paper is organized as follows; section 5.2 describes the RLMS data and 
the main variables used. Section 5.3 reports the main developments of the Russian 
economy followed by the results from our poverty analysis. In section 0, we discuss the 
relevance and theoretical background of consumption smoothing. Section 5.5 speciﬁes 
the dynamic model of consumption smoothing abilities after which the estimation 
strategy is set out in section 5.6. Section 5.7 reports the results from the exploratory 
analyses and relates the ﬁndings on households’ consumption smoothing abilities to 
those on the duration of poverty and poverty risk. Section 5.8 concludes.110
5.2 Data and methodology
We analyse poverty and consumption smoothing abilities using data from the RLMS 
project for the years 1994-2004.3 These data can be analysed as (repeated) cross-
sections and as a panel. We selected those households that were observed in at least 
one round and had no missing observations on any of the variables used in the analysis. 
For the poverty analysis, we use predominantly the cross-section dimension of the 
RLMS but we also use the panel to compute some indicators of poverty dynamics. 
Measuring consumption smoothing abilities requires panel data. Because of missing 
surveys in 1997 and 1999, the time intervals between surveys are not equally spaced, a 
complicating factor for the dynamic analysis. To solve this problem we selected those 
households that were observed for at least three consecutive two year periods (i.e. 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004). Households that had missing observations on any of 
the variables were dropped. The sample includes so-called offspring households; these 
are households that are created when a household has split up into two households and 
both households remain in the RLMS sample. Whenever this happened, from that round 
on, one household kept the original identiﬁcation code while the offspring household 
received a new identiﬁcation code. However, for the previous rounds both households 
shared an identical past. We treated offspring households as new households.4  
  We  have  included  the  following  variables:  food-,  non-food-,  and  total 
expenditures, total household income, number of household members divided over six 
age categories (children 0-6, children 7-18, male aged 19-60, female aged 19-55, male 
aged 60 and above and female aged 55 and above) and categorical variables providing 
information on the household’s location such as rural, urban, semi-urban, region and 
community.    
  The poverty analysis is performed using the poverty lines constructed by the 
RLMS. These are based on regional age-gender speciﬁc food-baskets that are valued 
at regional prices. The absolute poverty lines were calculated for each household and 
are adjusted for the demographic composition of the household. As a welfare indicator 
we use total household expenditures. Total food consumption is obtained by adding the 
expenditures on dairy, meat, ﬁsh, potatoes, alcohol, bread, eggs, fats and oils, fruits, 
sugar, vegetables, other foodstuffs, the value of food eaten outdoors and the value of 
food consumed and produced at home. Total non-food consumption is obtained by 
3 Detailed information on the RLMS project can be found on the following website:  http://www.cpc.unc.
edu/projects/rlms/home.html.
4 The appendix provides a table comparing household characteristics in the cross-section with those of 
the panel. More information about sample attrition of the RLMS can be found on the RLMS website in a 
document written by Heeringa (1997).5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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summing expenditure items such as tobacco, clothing, fuel, services, durables, luxury 
items, recreation, rent5, utilities and other payments such as tuition and insurance 
(excluding loans).6 The value of total consumption is expressed in June 1992 prices by 
dividing the current price of expenditures by the regional consumer price index. The 
welfare indicator differs slightly from the RLMS total household expenditure variable 
as we excluded savings and expenditures on bonds from the aggregation because these 
ﬂows reﬂect investments in the stock of assets and as such do not contribute to current 
consumption.7 8 
  For the analysis of consumption smoothing we have composed real household 
expenditures in the same way as for the poverty analysis. Household income consists 
of cash income as well as the monetary value of in-kind income. The income variable 
is also expressed in constant prices and is constructed by summing income from salary, 
rent, interest receipts, pension beneﬁts, child allowances, maternity beneﬁts, family 
and other beneﬁts, gross income from farm products and other income. We excluded 
the income from unemployment insurance, insurance beneﬁts, property or jewellery 
sales, transfers received from friends and relatives and money borrowed, because these 
sources of income are likely to reﬂect ex post adjustments to income shocks.9
  Data inspection showed that a small number of households did not have positive 
values for the expenditure variables. We have excluded households for which food or total 
expenditures were not positive. Table 5.1 provides the average per capita values of the 
key variables in each round for the cross-section dimension of the survey. Expenditures 
are systematically above income for two reasons. Firstly, as explained above we have 
excluded a number of income categories because they are likely to reﬂect ex post shock 
5 This expenditure category does not include any imputations for the rent of house owners.
6  Although  income  and  expenditures  are  expressed  in  monthly  values,  the  reference  period  in  the 
questionnaire for the various expenditure and income categories varied from a week for items such as food, 
a quarter of a year for durables to a year for the harvest from home produced foodstuffs.
7 Due to limitations in the data the welfare indicator does not include values for the consumption of public 
goods or for house ownership while consumption of these goods clearly contributes to the level of household 
welfare.
8 From round 9 on, the expenditure section of household questionnaire has been adjusted resulting in more 
detailed questions for expenditures on health and other services. This change lead to an increase in reported 
expenditures in these categories. For time consistency reasons, the poverty rates reported in this paper are 
calculated excluding these new categories. Poverty estimates using the expenditures aggregate including 
these categories yield lower poverty rates but this does not seem to have a large impact on the relative 
poverty risks of groups in the poverty proﬁle.
9 As will be explained further in section 0, we measure the consumption smoothing abilities by analyzing 
the responsiveness of household expenditures to income shocks. When an income shock occurs, households 
may smooth consumption by asking help from friends, selling assets, borrowing money, applying for 
unemployment beneﬁts and the like. These sources of income are the result of post-shock smoothing efforts 
and should not be included in the income indicator as they would underestimate the magnitude of income 
shocks.112
adjustments. However, even when these categories would be included a discrepancy 
would remain. Another reason for this gap between income and expenditures suggested 
is that households have a tendency to underreport income from informal and semi-
formal activities (Atkinson et al., 1995; Deaton, 1997; Ravallion, 1994). Alternative 
explanations  such  as  dissaving  or  memory  failure  cannot  convincingly  explain 
the discrepancy over time. Dissaving can of course explain why some households 
maintain expenditures above their income, but the data suggest that the gap is a general 
phenomenon which would imply that the whole society would be dissaving during the 
transition. Higher levels of dissaving are likely to occur during ﬁnancial crises and 
high inﬂation periods but at the time of the ﬁnancial and economic crisis in 1998, the 
gap between income and expenditures was actually smallest. Similarly, because survey 
methodology often relies on respondents’ memory for the collection of income and 
expenditures (and the RLMS is no exception) such data suffer from underreporting, 
particularly because respondents forget to report sporadic expenses or income. But this 
type of memory failure applies to both income and expenditures.
5.3 Russia in transition
The ﬁrst stage of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy 
was characterized by a sustained fall in production in all sectors of the economy that 
lasted until the mid-nineties. Table 5.2 reports a number of macroeconomic indicators 
which reﬂect this trend. Annual GDP growth was negative during the ﬁrst years of 
transition. Both the GDP deﬂator and the consumer price index show evidence of high 
and increasing inﬂation rates. This trend was accompanied by a development of rising 
Table 5.1: Per capita average of income and expenditures (monthly - 1992 ruble)
Round Year # of households Expenditures Income
Food Non-food Total
5 1994 3,586 2,485 1,263 3,747 2,736
6 1995 3,441 2,124 1,165 3,287 2,159
7 1996 3,234 1,753 1,194 2,946 2,060
8 1998 3,108 1,312 843 2,154 1,596
9 2000 3,015 1,401 1,139 2,539 1,907
10 2001 3,137 1,505 1,355 2,859 2,300
11 2002 3,132 1,514 1,435 2,948 2,582
12 2003 3,102 1,505 1,723 3,227 2,758
13 2004 3,052 1,496 1,766 3,262 2,941
Source: RLMS cross-sections5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
113
inequality and poverty (Commander et al, 1999; Milanovic, 1998; World Bank, 1995, 
1998). In 1997, the Russian economy was showing some hesitant signs of recovery 
that were swiftly followed by the ﬁnancial and economic crisis of 1998; a default on 
domestic and foreign debts was announced followed by a wave of bankruptcies in the 
banking sector, a devaluation of the ruble and a collapse of the stock market (Brown, 
1999; Buchs, 1999; Sapir, 1999; Slay, 1999). Since 1999 there has been a period of 
sustained recovery, reaching positive GDP growth rates with a peak of 10% in 2000. The 
sustained increase of unemployment rates from 1994 to 1999 mainly reﬂects the process 
of structural change in the Russian economy but also the impact of the economic crisis 
in 1998. Other indicators for the structural changes in the economy during the transition 
phase are the employment shares in different sectors of the economy: we can see a large 
decrease in employment in the industrial sector, a somewhat more modest decrease in 
agricultural sector employment and a large increase in service employment.10
  Such dramatic macro-economic developments must have also affected the living 
standards of the people. We analyse the impact of the transition phase on the Russian 
population in terms of absolute poverty. We compute aggregate poverty and a poverty 
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Table 5.2: Macro-economic indicators
1994_                1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP growth (%) -12.6 -4.1 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.4
GDP deﬂator 
(1997=100)
24.4 59.6 86.9 100 119 204 281 328 379 434
CPI (2000=100) 6.9 20.6 30.4 34.9 44.6 82.8 100 121 141 160
Unemployment (%) 8.1 9.5 9.7 11.8 13.3 12.6 9.8 8.9 8.6 -
Employment in:
Agriculture (%) 16.1 15.7 15.3 12.2 11.5 11.8 - - - -
Industry (%) 35.9 34.0 32.5 30.0 29.4 29.4 - - - -
Services (%) 47.7 50.0 52.2 57.8 59.1 58.8 - - - -
Source: World Development Indicators (2005)
10 During the transition many industrial and agricultural state monopolies were privatized, restructured or 
shut down, in all cases leading to a reduction in the employment in these sectors.
11 We have also performed the same poverty analyses using total income. The poverty indices and poverty 
proﬁle decompositions show similar trends and poverty prone groups. Since reported income is structurally 
lower than expenditures in the RLMS data, the estimated poverty levels and poverty gaps are higher 
when using income as a welfare indicator. We interpret this discrepancy to be the result of a tendency of 
households to underreport income.114
where n is the total number of individuals, z is the absolute poverty line and ci is the 
welfare indicator of an individual (measured by expenditures). If α = 0, then equation 
5.1 represents the headcount index which simply displays the percentage of individuals 
living below the poverty line. Taking α = 1 results in the poverty gap index; this index 
measures the mean proportionate expenditure shortfall over the total population. The 
poverty  severity  index  is  calculated  by  squaring  the  expenditure  shortfalls  before 
aggregation (setting α = 2), thus putting a higher weight on larger shortfalls. These 
poverty indices are calculated using household post-stratiﬁcation weights and thus are 
representative for the Russian population.12 
  The 1998 crisis had a severe impact on the level of well-being. All poverty 
indices show an increase from 1994 to a peak in 1998, followed by a sustained fall 
(Table 5.3). The headcount index shows that the percentage of poor individuals nearly 
triples from 11.9% in 1994 to 34.3% in 1998.13 The average expenditure shortfall rose 
to a peak of 12.7% in 1998, decreasing until 3.6% in 2003. The poverty severity index 
reveals that, in addition to an increase in the number of poor individuals and the average 
poverty shortfall, poverty also became more severe in the sense that more individuals 
were experiencing larger shortfalls during the crisis. In 2004 there was a small increase 
in poverty to 12.3%.
  Table  5.4  illustrates  the  headcount  index  for  subgroups  of  the  Russian 
population.14 The trends observed in the aggregate poverty indices are also reﬂected 
for these subgroups; the impact of the crisis was felt by a large proportion of the 
population, irrespective of their characteristics. Individuals living in rural areas are 
disproportionately more often poor than those living in urban areas. However, it is clear 
Table 5.3: Poverty indices
1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Headcount 11.9 19.0 22.2 34.3 23.3 16.7 14.4 11.5 12.3
Poverty gap 3.8 6.3 8.2 12.7 8.0 5.7 4.8 3.6 3.8
Poverty severity 1.9 3.1 4.5 6.7 3.9 2.8 2.5 1.8 1.8
Source: RLMS cross-sections
12 These weights attempt to match certain demographic characteristics of the sample to those observed in the 
1989 census. The household-level weights adjust according to household size and urban-rural residence.
13 The dramatic trend in poverty indicators appears even more exacerbated because there were no RLMS 
surveys in 1997 and 1999 and the 1998 survey was performed in November/December, when the impact of 
the August ﬁnancial crisis was transmitted to the Russian population. 
14 Albeit not reported here, we also calculated poverty gap and poverty severity indices for different 
household characteristics. These indices also show higher values when the poverty headcount rates are 
high.5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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Table 5.4: Poverty proﬁle based on headcount index
1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Overall 11.9 19.0 22.2 34.3 23.3 16.7 14.4 11.5 12.3
Settlement type:
Urban 10.8 17.3 17.8 33.3 20.9 14.3 10.8 7.9 8.0
Semi-urban 13.2 16.0 26.2 34.9 19.4 8.7 16.0 13.6 25.9
Rural 14.7 24.1 32.3 36.4 29.8 24.6 22.6 18.9 18.5
Household size:
1 16.9 19.2 18.4 30.9 16.0 14.3 12.2 11.0 9.9
2 10.5 14.1 18.4 28.8 20.0 14.9 12.9 10.7 10.2
3 11.0 20.5 21.2 35.5 21.6 16.1 15.2 11.9 10.8
4 10.8 18.2 23.7 37.6 25.7 15.4 11.2 10.1 11.9
5 12.4 24.0 24.0 35.9 25.7 19.4 13.6 11.5 16.2
>5 17.7 21.2 29.8 33.1 31.0 26.0 28.8 18.0 20.9
Number of children:
0 11.9 15.5 18.1 31.4 19.6 16.1 14.2 11.0 11.1
1 9.7 19.3 21.3 32.0 21.7 15.5 12.3 10.8 11.3
2 11.2 20.7 26.1 40.4 29.0 18.2 13.0 10.2 12.9
>2 23.9 28.8 34.7 39.8 35.5 23.9 32.0 25.2 27.3
Number of pensioners:
0 11.8 19.9 24.1 36.8 24.1 17.1 14.6 11.2 12.2
1 13.6 21.2 21.3 36.3 26.4 16.5 15.1 13.6 14.9
>1 9.4 11.6 16.6 21.8 15.5 15.7 12.2 9.3 8.5
Household type:
Single adult 16.4 16.8 17.5 33.3 20.0 15.7 14.3 11.3 11.5
Single pensioner 15.1 18.6 15.5 28.4 13.4 11.6 10.2 9.2 7.6
Adult couple no children 7.6 12.7 19.1 32.9 17.8 15.9 13.7 13.5 8.7
Elderly couple (≥1 pensioner) 10.3 11.2 14.4 22.4 16.2 12.7 8.7 8.7 8.6
Single adult and children 15.2 22.6 27.3 42.8 33.2 19.8 20.3 11.3 16.9
Adult couple and children 10.0 18.5 22.7 35.7 22.0 14.5 10.2 8.2 8.1
Triple generations household 10.9 22.2 20.8 33.2 25.8 19.1 17.4 14.9 14.5
Other households with pensioners 13.4 16.2 21.6 34.5 26.2 17.2 15.1 11.7 14.4
Other households 12.8 21.9 23.3 36.7 24.9 18.3 16.3 12.3 14.6
Source: RLMS cross-sections116
that people living in urban and semi-urban areas greatly suffered from the crisis: the 
urban headcount index tripled from 1994 to 1998 while the rural headcount doubled. 
In urban areas, on the other hand, individuals seemed to recover faster from the crisis. 
In an absolute sense poverty is higher in urban areas, as individuals from rural areas 
comprise about 27% of the Russian population. 
  Individuals  living  in  larger  households  typically  have  higher  than  average 
poverty rates than those in smaller sized households. Households with children are 
more likely to live in poverty than households with no children and the higher the 
number of children, the higher the poverty headcount. It seems that this situation 
changes for 2002 and 2003; in these years only individuals living in households with 
more than two children have above average poverty risk. For the households including 
elderly household members (age ≥ 55 for women and age ≥ 60 for men) the results 
are somewhat mixed; individuals living in households with more than one elderly 
household member clearly fall less often into poverty than those in households without 
elderly members, but individuals living in households including one elderly person 
seem to have an above average poverty risk. When decomposing according to speciﬁc 
household types it can be seen that households comprised only of elderly couples and 
elderly singles have lower poverty risk. The household types show that single adults 
(usually women) are also particularly vulnerable to poverty. 
  Insights into longitudinal aspects of poverty in Russia can be gained using 
RLMS panel (Table 5.5).15 An interesting indicator in this respect is the average ratio 










Sometimes poor & average expenditures below poverty line 6.0
Sometimes poor & average expenditures above poverty line 40.6
Never poor 51.1
Source: RLMS panel (measured at two year intervals from 1994 to 2004)
15 The panel comprises those households that were observed for at least three consecutive two year periods 
(i.e. 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004).5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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of household’s total expenditures over its respective poverty line.16 This poverty ratio 
shows the distance of the average living standard of the household relative to the 
poverty line: a value below 1 indicates that a household, on average, lived in poverty 
during the transition period and vice versa for an average above 1. Of the RLMS panel, 
8% of the households had a ratio below 1, 16% a ratio between 1 and 1.5, 17.% between 
1.5 and 2, 17% for the range 2 and 2.5, and 42% of the households had poverty ratios 
well above the poverty line (>2.5). This shows that many households were living close 
to the absolute poverty line during the transition period. From a slightly different 
perspective, 2% of the RLMS households were always poor during the observed period, 
6% was sometimes poor but had average expenditures below the poverty line. 41% of 
the households had on average above poverty line expenditures, but still experienced 
poverty. The ﬁrst two groups are also often labelled as ‘chronic poor’ while the third 
group is called ‘occasional poor’. Only 51% of the households did not experience 
poverty during the transition period. 
5.4 Consumption smoothing: conceptual and theoretical framework
The previous section showed that the period from 1994-2004 has been very volatile in 
a macro-economic sense and this instability is clearly reﬂected in the annual and long 
term absolute poverty indicators as large parts of the Russian population experienced 
poverty and/or had on average a living standard just above the minimum acceptable 
living standard. As much as 49% of the households experienced one or more poverty 
spells in the period although some households have a higher poverty risk than others. 
The economic transition in Russia thus represents an important aggregate source of 
uncertainty for Russian households. Participatory poverty studies indicate that people in 
transition economies indeed associate the transition period with substantial increases in 
uncertainty (World Bank, May 1999). On top of that, households in Russia are exposed 
to a wide range of idiosyncratic risks and shocks such as illness, disability or death of 
a household’s member, job loss, crop failure or loss of assets.  In this section, we ﬁrstly 
discuss why and how households respond to uncertainty and shocks and introduce the 
concept of consumption smoothing. Thereafter, we set out our theoretical approach. 
  Economic theory suggests that uncertainty about future income and consumption 
reduces the expected satisfaction that risk adverse households17 can derive from income 
16 The absolute poverty lines in the RLMS are household-speciﬁc; they take the demographic composition 
and size of the household into account. The poverty ratio can thus also be viewed as equivalent household 
expenditures. 
17 We take households as the units of analysis because the household represents the ﬁrst level at which 
individuals typically share resources. We thus implicitly assume that resources are equally shared within 
the household. In the analysis we control for (changes in) household composition.118
and consumption. At the same time, uncertainty represents a motivation for households 
to respond to the risks threatening their future well-being. When such responses are 
successful, households are able to smooth consumption over time, even when faced 
with  income  shocks.  Consequently,  the  ability  to  smooth  consumption  reﬂects  an 
important dimension of well-being.   
  Households respond to risks and shocks through saving, borrowing, adjusting 
labour  supply,  cultivating  land  and  selling  assets.  Such  strategies  are  sometimes 
classiﬁed as ‘self-insurance’ (Skouﬁas, 2003). Alternatively, households can also rely 
on other people through informal, private or government risk sharing or private market 
insurance schemes offered by ﬁnancial institutions (Deaton, 1997; Fafchamps & Lund, 
2003). The possibilities for coping with shocks are partly determined by households’ 
assets (Neubourg de & Notten, May 2002; Neubourg de & Weigand, 2000). These 
assets can be examined in a broad context: households have assets in the form of human 
capital  (skills,  experience),  physical  capital  (land,  house),  social  capital  (friends, 
family, and acquaintances) and ﬁnancial capital (cash holdings, savings). In addition, 
the household environment partly determines the possibilities of what households can 
do with these assets. For example, if banks do not provide loans to households or the 
household lacks sufﬁcient ﬁnancial collateral to obtain one, households are effectively 
constrained in their access to ﬁnancial services. Households might however, obtain credit 
through other channels, such as social networks (through family members, neighbours 
or acquaintances) or informal money lenders. Given differences in households’ assets 
and environment, it is very likely that households are not able to smooth consumption 
to the same extent. 
  Our aim is to investigate the overall ability of Russian households to smooth 
consumption during the transition period and whether this smoothing ability differs 
between household characteristics. We are further interested in the relationship between 
households’  poverty  risk  and  their  consumption  smoothing  abilities.  We  measure 
consumption smoothing abilities by looking at the extent to which households are able 
to protect their consumption against income shocks. Shocks such as illness, disability or 
the death of a household member have a direct impact on household income when they 
involve a household member that actively participates in household’s income generating 
activities. However, even when such shocks affect non-active family members there 
may be an indirect impact on household’s income through adjustments in the internal 
household task division. Active members can reduce labour supply so that they have 
more time for caring activities or household tasks. Job loss, wage payment arrears 
and involuntary unpaid leave also affect household income. Extremes in climate (i.e. 
drought, ﬂoods) or diseases leading to crop failure also affect household income as 
fewer home produced products can be sold or consumed. Inﬂation or price adjustments 5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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for goods directly impact the real value of consumption that can be attained, particularly 
if income is not or only partly adjusted for price increases.18  
  In the economic literature there are a number of approaches modelling con-
sumption  smoothing  behaviour  (Deaton,  1992;  Deaton  &  Muellbauer,  1980).  One 
approach models households’ insurance decisions using an Arrow-Debreu economy. 
In this economy uncertainty exists because there are different possible states of the 
world that can prevail in the future. The concept ‘state of the world’ is analogous 
to the range of weather types that can occur; just as there can be rain, sunshine or 
snow, the economy can ﬁnd itself in an upturn, slump or crisis. Each state of the world 
yields different opportunities for different consumers resulting in different income 
distributions over states. As a result, opportunities for risk sharing between risk adverse 
consumers arise. Risk sharing can take place through trading state contingent claims on 
a complete ‘Arrow securities’ market. This implies that, for each state of the world and 
time period, there exists an asset that will pay out if that state occurs and does not pay 
in any other state of the world. Under this framework, perfect consumption insurance 
against idiosyncratic risks is possible; for every state of the world consumers can buy 
a different security. Although it is very abstract, this market for state contingent claims 
could be considered as a simple approximation to the wide range of formal and informal 
insurance arrangements across space and over time that households can enter into to 
protect them from risk (Deaton, 1992, 1997). This model has been used in a number of 
empirical studies (Altonji et al, 1992; Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991; Skouﬁas, 2003). 
  Townsend  (1994)  also  developed  a  risk  sharing  model  within  a  general 
equilibrium  framework  which  allows  for  the  evaluation  of  the  joint  impact  of  all 
insurance arrangements within a village economy. In his model uncertainty exists 
but there is no such thing as a market for state contingent claims nor is there any 
modelling of risk-sharing markets or institutions; the assumption that individuals are 
risk averse provides sufﬁcient rationale for risk-pooling but the theory does not take 
into account how this risk-sharing takes place. The solution to this intertemporal choice 
model suggests that in a Pareto optimal allocation all variation in consumption across 
households is related to variation in aggregate, village level, consumption because all 
the impact of all other shocks is shared among the villagers. 
  Finally, there are also models where consumption is smoothed through savings 
and credit markets (Deaton, 1992). The basic model draws upon the work of Friedman’s 
permanent income theory of consumption which predicts that consumption is determined 
by the value of lifetime resources. The main feature of this model is the permanent 
income hypothesis: consumption is the annuity value of the sum of expected human 
18 By using real values for income and expenditures one can measure the impact of such shocks.120
and ﬁnancial resources i.e. the consumer plans to die with no assets. The model implies 
that the rational and risk adverse consumers prefer stable consumption and use ﬁnancial 
markets to achieve this stability. Therefore, anticipated changes in income should not 
affect consumption. Only unanticipated shocks inﬂuence consumption and the impact 
depends on the nature of the shock; if a shock is temporary, consumption will only change 
a little. If the shock is permanent, the change in consumption can be considerable. In the 
basic permanent income model, future income ﬂows are certain implying that the only 
savings motive is consumption smoothing over the life cycle. Deaton (1997) shows that 
when income ﬂows are uncertain, precautionary savings motives exist. Intertemporal 
choice models using utility functions f(x) that are continuously differentiable, where 
f(x)’>0 and f(x)”<0, additionally provide information about ‘prudence’ of the consumer. 
‘Prudence is meant to suggest the propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face 
of uncertainty’ (Kimball, 1990, p.54). The degree of prudence is reﬂected in the third 
derivative of the utility function; if f(x)’’’>0 (i.e. when the marginal utility function 
is convex) a consumer who is confronted with an increase in uncertainty of future 
consumption will reduce current consumption and increase saving. 
  The  theoretical  models  discussed  above  describe  perfectly  functioning 
institutions: whatever the instruments available for consumption smoothing (whether 
through insurance markets, credit and savings markets or informal risk sharing), the 
main idea behind these models is that risk averse consumers prefer, and therefore 
make  arrangements  to  obtain  stable  consumption.  Empirical  tests  of  consumption 
smoothing following from these theoretical models are very similar: in one way or 
another they envisage the estimation of the income elasticity of consumption.19 The 
value of this parameter constitutes a test of the functioning of these markets or the 
presence of uninsurable risks. In the basic life cycle model used by Friedman, positive 
income elasticity implies the presence of unanticipated shocks which induce consumers 
to  make  adjustments  in  their  life-time  consumption  plans.  In  the  Arrow-Debreu 
economy, positive income elasticity implies the incompleteness of the market for state 
contingent assets so that, when a household is confronted with a shock, it must adjust 
its consumption accordingly. For the risk sharing model used by Townsend a positive 
parameter also means that the insurance institutions cannot provide full insurance.20 
This literature is useful in the sense that it provides various models that give a rationale 
for consumption smoothing as well as the ways in which economic agents can smooth 
19 The empirical models are estimated using various estimation strategies and include of course a range 
of control variables for demographic composition of households, regional diversity and time. For more 
information about the models we refer to the references mentioned in this section.
20 For instance, institutions in risk sharing communities are unable to insure against co-variant shocks. 
When the community is hit by such a shock, households will have to adjust their consumption.5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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their consumption. However, as the empirical tests of the models discussed above are 
very similar, it does not make much sense to choose one of these models to be an 
abstract representation for the Russian federation. The empirical test will not provide 
conclusive evidence in favour (or against) the theoretical model. Additionally, in reality 
households use a combination of various market and non market institutions, a point 
that is certainly valid for Russia, where market institutions are being developed. Thus, 
if the test suggests that households cannot fully smooth their consumption, it does not 
help us in ﬁnding out which institution fails. As the focus in this paper is on the overall 
ability of households to deal with income shocks, we decided to follow an exploratory 
approach.
5.5 Theoretical model of consumption smoothing
The innovative aspect of this study is that our model explicitly takes short and long 
run dynamics of the process of consumption smoothing into account; we investigate 
the ability of households to protect their consumption against income shocks using 
a dynamic panel analysis. A dynamic perspective is important because differences in 
the pre-shock level of household resources also inﬂuence the ability of households to 
protect themselves against income risks. Furthermore, short run consumption smoothing 
abilities  may  differ  from  long  term  consumption  smoothing  abilities.  Finally,  the 
economic, social and geographic diversity encountered in the Russian Federation makes 
it is relevant to take (un)observed heterogeneity between households into account. We 
therefore propose the following random effects panel model:
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where, in addition to the change in expenditures and income (∆ci,t and ∆yi,t), the lag 
of income (yi,t-1) and expenditures (ci,t-1) are included. All income and expenditure 
variables are expressed in natural logarithms. Further, x  j,i,t-1 denotes the number of 
household members in the jth  age category21, D k represents a set of binary variables 
specifying each community separately by survey round, v i is a random individual effect 
and ε  i,t is the error term. β  1 is the short-run income elasticity of consumption and 
provides information about the question whether households are able to protect their 
21 The demographic characteristics of household members are summarized in six variables, where each 
variable represents the number of household members in a particular age-gender category. These categories 
are children below age of 6, children aged between 6 and under 18, adult males, adult females, males in a 
pensionable age group (60 and above) and females in a pensionable age group (55 and above). The post-
working categories are in accordance to the legal retirement age in Russia.122
consumption from short term ﬂuctuations in their income. The effect of changes in 
household composition on consumption is assumed to be practically immediate.  
  The model speciﬁed above is an error correction mechanism (ECM). Assuming 
α1 ≠ 0, the error correction representation of the model can also be written as
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This speciﬁcation reﬂects the idea of an intertemporal budget constraint; as the stock of 
wealth is limited, consumption can diverge from income for some time (i.e. due to an 
income shock). However, at some point, resources are depleted and consumption levels 
will have to adjust to (new) income levels. α1 is the so-called equilibrium correction 
coefﬁcient, which compensates for the short term overshooting or undershooting of 
consumption (α1 < 0); in case of a complete correction this parameter will have a 
value of -1. The long term income elasticity of consumption is indicated by -β2/α1; it 
is likely that the value of this parameter is higher than that of its short term counterpart 
because it is more difﬁcult to smooth consumption over a longer period (assets or 
savings can be depleted; friends and family will stop assisting at some point). The 
application of an advanced panel model to measure consumption smoothing, and in 
particular the error correction interpretation of the model, contributes to the literature 
on consumption smoothing in various aspects. First, in comparison to the models used 
in the literature our model explicitly takes the dynamics of consumption and income 
patterns and unobserved heterogeneity into account (Deaton, 1992, 1997; Ravallion 
& Chaudhuri, 1997; Skouﬁas, 2003; Townsend, 1994). Secondly, the error correction 
interpretation of our model is innovative in this application because it incorporates the 
idea that households are able to smooth consumption but on the condition that income 
and expenditures should balance in the long term. As such it provides a more realistic 
representation of the determinants of consumption smoothing abilities. 
  The model thus allows us to assess the joint effect of short term consumption 
smoothing activities of households. Note, however, that the impact of income shocks 
such as shocks in labour supply need not be fully reﬂected in changes in income 
because other household members may take up extra income generating activities as a 
response to the job loss of another member. Morduch (1995) classiﬁes such responses 
as income smoothing. In the RLMS data it is difﬁcult to distinguish between such 
income smoothing responses and ‘normal’ income generating activities. There is also 
evidence that low wealth households in developing and transition economies smooth 
their consumption by means of other income smoothing strategies such as choosing 
crops with low variance yields or low risk-low return entrepreneurial activities. Our 
indicator  of  consumption  smoothing  ability  does  not  capture  the  impact  of  such 5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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income smoothing channels. Another limitation of the analysis is that the model does 
not indicate at which cost consumption is smoothed. For example, households may 
accumulate non-productive assets that they can sell in times of trouble but this capital 
could have been used for investments (for example in human capital) with a higher 
expected return. 
5.6 Estimation and speciﬁcation
In the model outlined above, ci,t-k for any k is correlated with the unobserved household 
ﬁxed effect, vi. In order to obtain consistent estimates for this model a number of 
subsequent steps need to be taken. If we rewrite equation 5.2 in levels. 
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This  model  can  be  estimated  using  the  Generalized  Method  of  Moments  (GMM) 
estimator. The GMM estimator yields consistent and more efﬁcient estimators than 
other linear method of moments estimators (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Greene, 2003; 
Wooldridge,  2001).22  The  efﬁciency  increase  results  from  the  use  of  additional 
instruments (i.e. more instruments than needed for model identiﬁcation) which become 
available when using the orthogonality conditions that exist between lagged values of 
the dependent variable, consumption, and the disturbances ε i,t. Taking differences of 
equation 5.4 removes the household unobserved effects, vi:
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The disturbance ∆ε  i,t follows an MA(1) meaning that the model is subject to ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation, though presumably not to any higher order of autocorrelation. 
In this model, ∆ci,t-1 is still correlated with ∆ε i,t. However, ci,t-2 is a valid instrument 
for ∆ci,t-1, for it is in principle not correlated with ∆ε i,t, and negatively correlated with 
∆ci,t-1. As the number of time periods in the panel increases, more lags can be added as 
instruments.23 
  It is also important to consider the inﬂuence of possible measurement error in 
the income and expenditure variables on the model estimation. As with all household 
22 Using a 2SLS estimator is also a consistent, albeit less efﬁcient method.
23 We have estimated this empirical model for the overall panel as well as for a number of sub-samples 
using the Stata 9.0 software package. For the GMM estimator (level GMM) we have used the user-
written programme ‘xtabond2’ instead of Stata’s ‘xtabond’ because ‘xtabond2’ provides more possibilities 
for the deﬁnition of the instrument matrix. ‘xtabond2’ is written by David Roodman, Center for Global 
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surveys, measurement error is inevitably present in the RLMS data. Different types 
of measurement error arise because of inconsistencies in the respondents’ memories, 
deliberate underreporting of income but also errors in, for instance, imputations in home 
production. The dependent variable, household per capita expenditures, includes the 
value of home production consumed and the explanatory income variable includes the 
total value of home production. Deaton (1997) explains that in this type of speciﬁcation, 
measurement error caused by imputations in home production can generate an upward 
bias when the coefﬁcient is positive. To deal with this problem, Deaton suggests using 
instruments for the income and lagged expenditures variables; income is instrumented 
by the value of income minus the revenues from home production while the lagged 
expenditure  variable  is  instrumented  with  expenditures  minus  the  value  of  home 
production consumed. We found evidence for this type of measurement error in the 
RLMS data and therefore used these instruments in our estimations.24 
  The aim of our analysis is exploratory; we estimate equation 5.5 not only for 
the  overall  sample  but  also  for  a  selection  of  socio-economic  groups  in  Russia.25 
These partial analyses allow us to gain insights into whether there are differences in 
consumption  smoothing  abilities  between  these  subgroups.  Furthermore  in  section 
5.7 we use these results to study the relation between the degree of poverty risk for 
these socio-economic groups and their abilities to smooth consumption. We estimate 
equation  5.5  for  the  following  decompositions:  settlement  type;  household  size; 
number of children; number of pensioners; household type and according to poverty 
characteristics (chronic poverty and average poverty ratio).
  Table  5.6  reports  the  results  for  the  main  parameters  (in  reduced  form), 
the speciﬁcation tests and the number of observations for the full sample, and the 
decomposition by settlement area. The demographic variables and time-community 
dummies  that  have  been  included  as  control  variables  in  the  estimations  are  not 
reported in the tables. β1 is the short run income elasticity of expenditures; a 10% 
decrease in income will only result in a 1.6% decrease in overall expenditures.26 This 
24 To test whether this type of measurement error is present in the RLMS data we estimated a simpliﬁed 
version of our model (excluding the lagged levels) using a 2SLS estimator with and without the instruments 
for income and expenditures. The estimated coefﬁcients of the model using the instruments are indeed 
lower than those in the other model.
25 We use the two step GMM estimator which includes a ﬁnite-sample correction to the two-step covariance 
matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005). This can make the two step robust estimator more efﬁcient than the 
one step robust estimator. However, for some partial estimations this correction could not be estimated 
(‘matrix not positive deﬁnite’). In these cases we have used the results from the robust one step GMM 
estimator.
26 Note that the size of the estimated parameters is sensitive to the choice of time period; including more or 
fewer survey rounds will change the estimates. It also cannot be excluded that these results may, to some 
degree, suffer from attenuation bias caused by uncontrolled heterogeneity or other measurement error.5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
125
parameter can also be interpreted as an indicator for the short run ability of smoothing 
consumption: when it is close to zero, households are able to protect themselves against 
income shocks; when it is close to one, households do not smooth consumption or are 
not capable. A value between zero and one indicates partial consumption smoothing. β1 
is signiﬁcant on a 1% level for the overall sample and the decompositions by settlement 
area; we can thus reject the null-hypothesis of perfect consumption smoothing. As 
the short term elasticities also differ signiﬁcantly from one (not shown here), our 
results therefore provide evidence of partial consumption smoothing (Skouﬁas, 2003; 
Townsend, 1994). The other parameters of the error correction model are not estimated 
directly but are reported in the appendix (Table  5.10). Although the parameters for 
lagged consumption (1+α1) and lagged income (β2-β1) are only signiﬁcant for some 
sub-samples, the parameters of interest (α1 and -β2/α1) differ signiﬁcantly from zero.27 
The value of α1, the error-correction coefﬁcient, is expected to be negative because 
of the need to compensate for under-consumption and over-consumption in previous 
periods. A value of α1 = -1 indicates immediate adjustment to disequilibrium. Table 
5.10 shows that the estimated error correction parameters are close to minus one. -β2/α1 
represents the long term income elasticity of consumption; in line with our expectations 
we ﬁnd that the estimated long term income elasticities are higher than their short term 
counterparts indicating that it is harder to smooth consumption over a longer period. 
  We also performed a number of tests to evaluate the validity of the model 
speciﬁcation. First, a consistent GMM estimator requires that there is no second-order 
Table 5.6: Results overall and partial estimations for total expenditures
  1+α1  β1  β2-β1 Hansen AR(1) AR(2) Obs.
(P-value) (P-value) (P-value)
Overall   0.059 01 0.160 01 0.014 0.647 0.000 0.101 9,187
Settlement type:
Urban   0.080 01 0.159 01 0.014 0.321 0.000 0.043 5,742
Semi-urban   0.151  0.179 05 -0.423 0.000 0.150 0.505 576
Rural –0.004  0.150 01 0.019 0.355 0.000 0.844 2,869
Note: 10 10%,  05 5% and  01 1% signiﬁcance level. Two step GMM estimator including standard errors 
estimated with Windmeijer’s Finite Sample Correction (Windmeijer, 2005). Control variables included 
in estimation: changes in demographic composition and time-community dummies (at level of primary 
sampling unit).
Source: RLMS panel (measured at two year intervals from 1994 to 2004)
27 The standard error of the long term elasticity (-β2/α1) is estimated using the delta method. The standard 
error of the error correction term (α1) can easily be obtained by testing the hypothesis that (1+ α1) = 1 which 
is mathematically equivalent to testing that α1 = 0.126
autocorrelation.28 It is also important to check whether the residuals actually display 
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation or whether they follow a random walk. The test statistics 
for the estimated sub samples reported in Table 5.6 and Table 5.10 conﬁrm that these 
assumptions of the model are acceptable in most cases.29 The Hansen test evaluates 
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions used in the GMM estimator. A failure 
to reject the null-hypothesis indicates that there is no violation of the zero correlation 
assumption between additional instruments and the error term. The null-hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for the overall sample as well as for most of partial estimations.30 31
5.7 Consumption smoothing abilities and poverty risk
The results in the previous section show that a dynamic speciﬁcation of households’ 
consumption  smoothing  behaviour  is  appropriate.  The  other  key  result  is  that 
households are indeed able to protect their consumption partially from income shocks. 
We now focus on the short-term ability of households to smooth consumption. This 
ability reﬂects an important dimension of welfare, namely the capacity of households 
to maintain their standard of living in an uncertain environment. It is important to keep 
in mind that β1 represents the outcome of a mix of consumption smoothing strategies; it 
does not only reﬂect self-insurance strategies such as borrowing and selling assets, but 
also all formal and informal risk sharing arrangements that spread the effects of income 
shocks across households at any point in time. We are further interested in the manner 
in which consumption smoothing abilities are related to poverty risk; do households 
with a higher poverty risk also have more difﬁculties with consumption smoothing? 
From the development literature we know that poor households have fewer assets and 
are more likely to face borrowing constraints (Bardhan & Udry, 1999; Deaton, 1997). 
But such households might alternatively make use of other consumption smoothing 
strategies such as risk sharing arrangements. By comparing the results of the poverty 
analysis with the short run smoothing abilities of households from the partial analyses, 
we aim to get some preliminary insights into the relationship between poverty risk, 
28 Testing this condition requires a number of time periods T≥5 (Baltagi, 2001).
29 The AR(1) test only ﬁnds no evidence of ﬁrst order autocorrelation for the two household types (Single 
adult and kids and the triple generations household). The AR(2) test fails to reject the zero second order 
correlation at a 1% level for the Adult couple with no kids and at a 5% level for the urban sub sample.
30 Only for the semi-urban sub sample and for households with two or more pensioners the null hypothesis 
can be rejected.
31 Not reported here are the results of the Hausman model speciﬁcation test that provides information 
on how the income variables should be treated, i.e., as predetermined or endogenous (Hausman, 1978). 
The Hausman test is a test of endogeneity based upon a direct comparison of coefﬁcient values. The test 
indicated that income can be treated as exogenous.5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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poverty duration and consumption smoothing ability. At the end of this section we also 
compare our results those of Skouﬁas (2003) who estimated households’ consumption 
smoothing abilities with the RLMS data but using a differenced model instead of a 
dynamic speciﬁcation. 
  Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 summarize the consumption smoothing abilities for the 
overall sample and the decomposition by household’s social-economic characteristics 
(the β1’s of the partial analyses); a high consumption smoothing ability is reﬂected by 
low income elasticity (β1). We also estimated the model separately using either food 
expenditures or non-food expenditures as independent variable.32 The reason for making 
this distinction between expenditure categories is that the previous section showed that 
households only partially smooth consumption. Partial smoothing thereby also implies 
a choice about which expenditures to smooth and which not. The results show that the 
short term income elasticity of food expenditures is considerably lower than that of 
non-food expenditures and that this is the case for all partial estimations; households 
smooth their food consumption better than their non-food consumption. Intuitively, 
when households are unable to fully protect their consumption from an income shock, 
Table 5.7: Short-run consumption smoothing abilities by poverty characteristics
Total expenditures  Food expenditures  Non-food expenditures 
Overall 0.160 01 0.120 01 0.366 01
Average poverty ratio:
≤ PL1 0.160 01 0.182 01 0.248 
> PL≤1.5PL1 0.134 01 0.091 05 0.561 01
>1.5PL≤2PL1 0.160 01 0.086 05 0.415 01
>2 PL ≤2.5PL1 0.211 01 0.179 01 0.307 05
≥2.5PL1 0.154 01 0.114 01 0.266 01
Chronic poverty groups:
Chronic poor1 0.160 01 0.182 01 0.248 
Occasionally poor 0.188 01 0.150 01 0.436 01
Never poor 0.115 01 0.068 01 0.255 01
Note: 1 One step GMM. 10 10%,  05 5% and  01 1% signiﬁcance level.
Source: RLMS panel (measured at two year intervals from 1994 to 2004)
32 From an econometric perspective this actually implies that the model with total expenditures is not 
adequate  when  the  estimated  parameters  of  food  and  non-food  expenditures  are  different.  Given  the 
exploratory character of this analysis we decided to report the short term elasticities for total, food and 
non-food expenditures. The speciﬁcation tests using food and non-food expenditures do not vary much with 
those obtained using total expenditures.128
they prefer to cut expenditures of less essential items instead of cutting on food items. 
The motivation for such choice is explained by Maslow’s theory of needs (1987), which 
distinguishes between basic needs and higher needs such as love/belonging, esteem and 
self actualisation. Once basic needs are satisﬁed, individuals will seek to fulﬁl their 
higher needs. However, when basic needs are not met, individuals will prioritize the 
satisfaction of those needs. If resources are even more limited, it may be necessary to 
choose which basic needs are most important.33 In this respect, households’ expenditures 
are a reﬂection of their efforts to satisfy their needs. Expenditures on items such as 
food, shelter and clothing can be associated with basic needs. The difference between 
food and non-food smoothing abilities may thus reﬂect a prioritization of households’ 
basic needs with food expenditures receiving priority above non-food expenditures.
  At the same time, the tables also show that consumption smoothing abilities vary 
according to households’ long-term living standard and socio-economic characteristics. 
We proceed by discussing the smoothing results by decomposition and discuss to what 
way the smoothing abilities of particular characteristics of households may be related 
to our ﬁndings in terms of poverty risk and long term poverty (Table 5.4 and Table 5.5). 
We start with the long term welfare indicators and decompose the sample according 
to the average poverty ratio and our indicator of chronic poverty. The average poverty 
ratio shows the distance of the average living standard of the household relative to its 
household speciﬁc poverty line while the chronic poverty groups are a combination 
of the frequency of poverty spells experienced and the average living standard with 
respect to the poverty line (the ﬁrst average poverty ratio group (≤ PL) is the same as 
the chronic poor). The decompositions of the average poverty ratio groups indicate how 
consumption smoothing abilities vary as the average living standard of a household 
increases (i.e. whether the average level of well-being plays a role). Patterns in smoothing 
abilities by chronic poverty groups are interesting because smoothing abilities may also 
be related to the experience of poverty or not (i.e. whether the occasional or chronic 
experience of absolute poverty plays a role).  
  The results show that non-food expenditure smoothing abilities increase (i.e. β1 
decreases) as household’s average living standard rises. However, the income elasticity 
of the group with the lowest living standard (i.e. the chronically poor) does not differ 
signiﬁcantly from zero suggesting that this group has the highest non-food smoothing 
ability.  When  faced  with  an  income  shock,  this  group  cuts  predominantly  food 
expenditures (chronically poor have the lowest food smoothing ability of all groups). 
Food smoothing abilities follow a wave pattern, with chronically poor having the lowest 
33 Maslow postulated that there is a particular hierarchy in these needs. What is of relevance for our 
discussion is the notion that individuals prioritize needs and distinguish between more and less essential 
needs (essential in terms of survival).5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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smoothing abilities, households just above the poverty line having the highest food 
smoothing ability, followed by lower food smoothing abilities for the next group (>2 
PL ≤2.5PL) and higher abilities for the wealthiest group (≥2.5PL). Again Maslow’s 
theory provides clues for a possible interpretation for these patterns. The chronically 
poor face a continuous struggle to meet basic needs. They spend all available resources 
on the satisfaction of those basic needs; of which a large share is spent on food.34 
Remaining expenditures on non-food items also reﬂect essential expenditures to satisfy 
the bare minimum of other basic needs (shelter, heating/utilities, clothing/shoes and 
transport). When resources are so low, cutting non-food expenditures further after an 
income shock would mean not having a roof above your head, not being able to cook 
your food or not going to work anymore. Cutting expenditures on food further may 
then be the only feasible alternative. Groups with a higher average living standard 
can choose to cut expenditures in other categories if they cannot fully smooth the 
income shock; those households just above the poverty line cut expenditures on less 
essential non-food items while better off households may prefer to cut less essential 
food expenditures (cheaper products, fewer luxury food stuffs) and/or other items (buy 
fewer (designer) clothes, one holiday less). 
  The  decomposition  by  chronic  poverty  groups  additionally  suggests  that 
household who experienced a temporary drop of living standard below the absolute 
poverty line make the largest expenditure adjustments, both in terms of food and non-food 
items. Households that never experienced poverty are better able to protect themselves 
against income shocks. Especially food expenditures are well protected. It is not clear 
to what extent these differences in smoothing abilities are the result of differences in 
the available means to smooth consumption (i.e. chronic and occasionally poor groups 
have fewer smoothing possibilities) and/or differences in the magnitude of income 
shocks (i.e. the occasionally poor experiencing more severe shocks). In conclusion, 
both longitudinal decompositions show that consumption smoothing abilities improve 
as the living standard increases. Furthermore, ﬁnding that chronically poor households 
also seem to be able to partially smooth consumption is not reassuring; the uninsured 
part of the shock affects expenditures on food, with potentially long-term consequences 
on health. Moreover, the cost of the smoothed part of the income shock may be very 
high and further limit the opportunities for future improvements in living standards.   
  The decomposition of the full sample into rural and (semi-)urban settlement 
areas for total household expenditures suggests that rural households are somewhat 
34 Indeed, the proportion of income spent on food (per capita) is highest for chronically poor households 
and lowest for households that did not experience poverty in the observed period. In 2004, the average food 
share was 61% for chronically poor households, 58% for occasional poor households and 55% for the other 
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more  capable  of  protecting  their  overall  consumption  against  income  shocks  than 
urban households (Table 5.8). When decomposing expenditures into food and non-food 
expenditures, rural households appear to be quite able to smooth food expenditures but 
have a much lower ability to protect their non-food expenditures. The poverty proﬁle 
shows that households in rural areas have a higher poverty risk. A likely explanation 
Table 5.8: Short-run consumption smoothing abilities by household characteristics
Total expenditures Food expenditures Non-food expenditures
Overall 0.160 01 0.120 01 0.366 01
Settlement type:
Urban 0.159 01 0.127 01 0.304 01
Semi urban 0.179 05 0.074  0.327 10
Rural 0.150 01 0.100 01 0.519 01
Household size:
1 0.086 10 0.065  0.456 01
2 0.203 01 0.141 01 0.409 01
3 0.158 01 0.122 01 0.289 01
≥4 0.191 01 0.141 01 0.370 01
# of children:
0 0.141 01 0.110 01 0.361 01
1 0.191 01 0.155 01 0.300 01
≥2 0.200 01 0.112 01 0.526 01
# of pensioners:
0 0.204 01 0.140 01 0.400 01
1 0.107 01 0.102 01 0.440 01
≥2 0.111 10 0.077  0.283 01
Household type:
Single adult1  0.264 05 0.131  -0.145 
Single pensioner1 0.052  0.018  0.538 01
Adult couple no children1 0.276 01 0.178 01 0.457 01
Elderly couple2  0.198 01 0.157 01 0.408 01
Single adult and children (<18)1 0.207 01 0.048  0.449 01
Adult couple and children (<18) 0.199 01 0.087 01 0.430 01
Triple generations household 0.200  0.128  0.244 10
Other households with pensioners 0.120 00 0.172 05 0.229 
Other households 0.185 01 0.159 01 0.306 01
Note: 1 One step GMM. 2 Household with at least 1 pensioner.  10 10%,  05 5% and  01 1% signiﬁcance level.
Source: RLMS panel (measured at two year intervals from 1994 to 2004)5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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for  this  difference  is  that  rural  households  have  higher  food  smoothing  abilities 
because they have more opportunities to produce their own food and make use of these 
opportunities.35 In Notten (2007) it is shown that rural households are more likely to 
produce their own food and that home produced food constitutes a large share of total 
household income. It is also shown that households themselves consume a large part of 
home produced food. Households in urban areas are more dependent on the proceeds 
from cash income generating activities than rural households, which renders them more 
vulnerable to income shocks in general; the poverty analysis showed that during the 
1998 crisis the number of poor urban households roughly tripled while the number of 
poor rural households doubled. At the same time, it seems that the urban environment 
provides more opportunities for making a decent living (above the poverty line) and to 
accumulate savings or other assets that can be used in difﬁcult times. 
  The  decomposition  of  the  sample  according  to  the  number  of  household 
members shows that ‘single person’ households have a higher smoothing ability in 
terms of food expenditures but the lowest ability in terms of non-food expenditures as 
compared to larger households. There is no clear pattern in smoothing abilities as the 
number of household members rises; the decompositions of the overall sample with 
respect to children, elderly and household types suggest that the observed pattern may 
be related to the structure of the household (dependency ratios) and eligibility to old 
age pensions.  
  Firstly,  having  an  elderly  household  member  increases  the  households’ 
consumption  smoothing  ability  in  terms  of  total  and  food  expenditures  but  only 
enhances smoothing abilities for non-food expenditures if there is more than one elderly 
living in the household. According to the poverty proﬁle, households comprised of only 
elderly persons or at least including two elderly persons have lower poverty rates of this 
category. In the Russian Federation, every elderly citizen is entitled to a pension (the 
eligible age is 55 for women and 60 for men). This pension consists of a basic amount 
plus increments depending on the employment record but in reality the amounts of 
pension received did not differ widely during the transition period (International Social 
Security Association, 2002; Zurabov, July 2002).36 In this respect, one hypothesis is 
that pensions in Russia are typically sufﬁcient to lift the elderly out of poverty and even 
allow them to accumulate some assets (savings) which can be used as a consumption 
smoothing strategy. However, this is only partially true as the high inﬂation during the 
35 The value of home produced food is included in the income variable and the value of consumption of 
home produced goods is included in the expenditure variables.
36 As a result of the pension reform in 2001 it can be expected that this discrepancy will increase in the 
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economic crisis of 1998 eroded the real value of pensions. The poverty proﬁle shows 
a clear jump in elderly poverty rates during this time. The old age pension might be 
sufﬁcient for maintaining a welfare level above the poverty line, but when the real value 
of pension declines (as it did in 1998) expenditures have to be cut. Additionally, the 
decomposition by household type shows that the demographic structure of pensioner 
households is relevant; single elderly households and triple generation households have 
high abilities of smoothing food expenditures while the other pensioner household 
types smooth predominantly through non-food expenditures. 
  Looking  at  the  decomposition  by  household  types  we  can  further  see  that 
households with children and single person households have higher than average food 
smoothing abilities while households without children and consisting of two or more 
members have lower than average food smoothing abilities. However, the correspondence 
between poverty risk and the food/non-food smoothing abilities of these household 
characteristics is not so clear. Generally, we observe that as the number of children in 
a household increases, the poverty risk also increases while the overall consumption 
smoothing ability is lower than that of households with no children. However, the 
decomposition by household types shows that the demographic structure of households 
with children matters a lot for poverty risk as well as non-food smoothing abilities; 
single parent households have a high poverty risk and well below average non-food 
smoothing abilities, extended households also have a somewhat higher poverty risk but 
below average non-food smoothing abilities while households consisting of two adults 
and children have a below average poverty risk and above average non-food smoothing 
ability. These differences are likely to be the result of a combination of factors we 
already discussed (the typical living standard of such household types, eligibility to 
an old pension and perhaps also rural/urban settlement area) and varying dependency 
ratios. Households with children in general, but especially single parent households, 
extended  family  households  and  households  with  several  children  have  higher 
dependency ratios because there are fewer economically active adults who have to 
make a living for themselves and their dependent family members. A higher dependency 
ratio thus increases the risk of poverty. However, inactive (adult) household members 
may facilitate labour participation of other household members and can also contribute 
to household (food) production or households’ income by receiving a pension. These 
effects are likely to contribute to the poverty risk and consumption smoothing abilities 
of households consisting of several adults while they are out of reach for single parent 
households. 
  Finally, we brieﬂy compare our results with a paper that has been an important 
source of inspiration for this research. In his paper titled ‘Consumption Smoothing in 
Russia’, Emmanuel Skouﬁas (2003) also estimated households’ responses to income 5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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shocks. Skouﬁas used a differenced model which related changes in income to changes 
in consumption. The model was estimated by pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
using RLMS 1994 to 2000.37 In broad lines the results of both studies are comparable; 
Skouﬁas ﬁnds that households are only partially insured against income shocks and 
that  food  expenditure  is  better  protected  than  non-food  expenditures.  We  argued, 
however, that a dynamic speciﬁcation is more appropriate in a theoretical sense because 
households’ abilities to smooth consumption in the short run are also determined by 
a long term relation between income levels and consumption levels. The empirical 
results further support the appropriateness of a dynamic speciﬁcation. Unfortunately, 
the short run income elasticities in both studies are not directly comparable due to other 
methodological differences.38 A comparison of determinants of smoothing abilities 
suggests further differences: Skouﬁas ﬁnds that rural households and households with 
children have higher consumption smoothing abilities whereas we ﬁnd the opposite 
result. It is likely that these differences arise due to measurement error caused by 
imputations in home production; estimates of our model without instrumenting the home 
production component resulted in similar outcomes for rural households and households 
with children as Skouﬁas’ results. As mentioned before, this type of measurement error 
can generate an upward bias when the coefﬁcient is positive. It is not surprising that 
this type of measurement error has a large impact on rural households (rural household 
tend to have more children as well). 
5.8 Conclusion
In this paper we examined the extent to which Russian households have been able 
to protect their consumption against income shocks during the transition period and 
how households’ consumption smoothing abilities are related to the risk of poverty. We 
used cross-section data to estimate the absolute poverty proﬁle in transition Russia and 
panel data to describe the longitudinal characteristics of poverty. An innovative aspect 
of the study is that we modelled households’ consumption smoothing behaviour by an 
37 Skouﬁas estimated the following model  ∑ ∑
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represents the change in natural logarithm of total consumption for household i, in period t, ∆yi,t represents 
the change in natural logarithm of total household income, xj,i,t is a particular household characteristic, such 
as family size and demographic composition, Dk,t is a binary variable specifying each community separately 
by survey round, and εi,t is a random error term.
38 Skouﬁas uses a shorter time period (1994-2000), uneven time intervals (because of missing surveys 
in 1997 and 1999) and does not correct for measurement errors in home production. We estimated our 
model for a shorter time period which resulted in higher short run income elasticities (compared to our 
current results). Taking unevenly spaced time intervals also increases the short run income elasticities. Not 
instrumenting home production also results in higher elasticities.134
Error Correction Mechanism (ECM), distinguishing between short term and long term 
smoothing dynamics. We estimated a reduced form of this model using Generalized 
Method  of  Moments  (GMM)  techniques.  To  study  heterogeneity  in  consumption 
smoothing abilities and its relation to poverty risk, we followed an exploratory approach 
and estimated the model not only for the complete sample but also for various socio-
economic subgroups. Empirical analyses of consumption smoothing behaviour have 
often been based on differenced data in order to eliminate individual household effects. 
However, such speciﬁcation fails to incorporate long term effects, which are also likely 
to inﬂuence short run smoothing abilities. The error correction mechanism underlines 
the special relationship of income and expenditures; expenditures can deviate from 
income in the short term but, in the long term, income and expenditures should balance. 
The results from the speciﬁcation tests indicate that our model does not violate the 
assumptions required for estimation.  
  We ﬁnd that Russian households are partially able to smooth expenditures in the 
short run and that food expenditures are better protected than non-food expenditures. 
The partial estimations according to various levels of average living standards and 
chronic poverty groups show that consumption smoothing abilities improve as the 
living  standard  increases. Although  chronically  poor  households  are  partially  able 
to protect their consumption from income shocks, at the same time, they respond by 
further reducing already low levels food expenditures. Occasionally poor households 
are found to have the lowest consumption smoothing abilities. However, low abilities of 
consumption smoothing are not always associated with high poverty risk. For instance, 
we ﬁnd that rural households, who have a high poverty risk, manage to smooth food 
expenditures quite well, most likely because they have more opportunities to produce 
their own food. But households with pensioners, who have a lower poverty risk, have 
higher consumption smoothing abilities. 
  These  results  support  the  arguments  of  scholars  such  as  De  Neubourg  and 
Holzman who propose a new orientation for social protection policies; such policies 
should not only focus on basic poverty relief but there is also an important role for the 
government in terms of assisting households manage risks (Holzman & Jorgensen, 
February 2000; Neubourg de & Weigand, 2000). Social insurance programmes can 
play an important role in this respect; our ﬁndings suggest that in Russia pensions 
received  by  elderly  household  members  reduce  the  risk  of  poverty  and  enhance 
consumption smoothing abilities. However, the scope of policies to improve household 
consumption smoothing abilities extends beyond that of social protection policies. 
Rural development policies such as investments in infrastructure may simultaneously 
reduce the poverty risk of rural households and improve their (non-food) consumption 
smoothing abilities because of improved possibilities to generate (cash) income (i.e. 5. Poverty and consumption smoothing in Russia
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through selling home produced produce in regional towns). Furthermore, governments 
play an important role in market economies and can exercise a positive or negative 
inﬂuence on macroeconomic stability and on the labour market (thus affecting the 
sources  of  uncertainty  in  households’  environment).  Governments  can  reduce  the 
likelihood of aggregate shocks by means of legislation, monitoring and evaluation. At 
the same time, better functioning ﬁnancial markets allow households to use markets to 
protect themselves against risks through lending, saving and insurance products.  
  We have provided a number of intuitively appealing explanations for our results 
but further research is required to understand the underlying determinants of poverty 
risk and consumption smoothing abilities. Firstly, the partial analyses are only of an 
exploratory nature; it is preferable that the inﬂuence of household characteristics is 
directly incorporated in a model of consumption smoothing. Secondly, research into 
the speciﬁc smoothing strategies followed by households and the institutions which 
assist them with smoothing is needed. Such analysis would also yield more concrete 
policy recommendations. In Notten (2007), we follow up on this issue and develop 
a conceptual framework to analyse such consumption smoothing arrangements. We 
also apply this framework to the RLMS data and explore how Russian households 
may smooth consumption. Finally, it should be noted that we have thus far analysed 
the impact of income shocks on consumption. Households may also pursue income 
smoothing strategies instead of consumption smoothing (Morduch, 1994, 1995). 
5.9 Appendix
5.9.1 Comparison cross-section and panel dimensions RLMS
The RLMS is a sample of dwelling places, which means that when a household moves, 
it is removed from the cross-section dimension. However, once moved, the RLMS tried 
to locate these households and remained interviewing them for the panel dimension 
(this strategy has been implemented since round 7). This explains why the size of panel 
increases over time. New households that moved into a sampled dwelling place were 
added to the cross-section. Also note that each sampled dwelling place was visited 
every survey year; even if a household refused to cooperate or was not present in 
one round, the household was visited again in the subsequent survey round. Thus in 
1994, all households in the panel are also part of the cross-section. We have included 
households in the panel once they have been observed for at least three consecutive 
periods (two-year periods in this case). For example, a household is part of the panel 
when it is observed in 1994, 1996 and 1998 but also when it is observed in 1996, 1998, 
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  Comparison  of  the  characteristics  of  the  weighted  cross-sections  with 
the  unbalanced  panel  reveals  a  number  of  differences.39  Rural  households  are 
overrepresented in the panel in comparison to the cross-section. An important factor for 
this difference is the higher attrition rate of households in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. 
For this reason the RLMS included a new sample of households from these areas in 
2001. Single households and childless households are somewhat underrepresented in 
the panel. Median income and expenditures are slightly lower in the panel while the 
differences for the averages are somewhat larger, albeit in the same direction.
5.9.2 Estimations error correction coefﬁcients and speciﬁcation tests
39 Note that we have used the yearly adjusted household post-stratiﬁcation weights computed by the RLMS 
for the cross-sections. These weights attempt to match certain demographic characteristics of the sample to 
those observed in the 1989 census. The household-level weights adjust for household size and urban-rural 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































139Managing risks: what do Russian 
households do to smooth consumption? 6142
6.1 Introduction1 
Households face the risk that they may not be able to fulﬁl the basic needs of their 
members,  today  as  well  as  tomorrow.  To  prevent  this  risk  from  materializing, 
households set aside part of their current resources to ﬁnance future consumption in the 
form of savings or insurance. Additionally, when it becomes clear that income will not 
sufﬁce, households can seek alternative funding. When these measures are effective, 
households are able to maintain a particular welfare level, even when expected income 
falls short. The ability of households to smooth consumption over time thus reﬂects a key 
dimension of well-being. Although the underlying smoothing mechanisms are similar, 
the ways in which households smooth consumption are highly context dependent, i.e. 
on the particular institutional, social and economic context they live in. 
  Households in transition economies face a wide range of risks and shocks similar 
to those experienced by households all over the world.2 At the same time, the drastic 
structural changes taking place in transition economies form an additional source of risk; 
the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy has been accompanied by 
macro-economic instability such as high inﬂation, declining real wages, unemployment 
and ﬁnancial crises, thereby shaping a highly uncertain environment for households in 
transition economies. In spite of this, Russian households are able to partially smooth 
consumption when they are hit by such shocks (Notten & Crombrugghe de, 2006; 
Skouﬁas, 2003).3 But how do these households smooth consumption? Strategies that 
were successful during Soviet times may or may not work anymore while the changing 
structures  in  the  economy  may  provide  new,  perhaps  market-based,  smoothing 
opportunities.  In  this  paper,  we  want  to  explore  how  Russian  households  smooth 
consumption.  
  To guide our analysis we propose a conceptual framework to analyse households’ 
consumption smoothing strategies. Central in this framework is a classiﬁcation of 
consumption smoothing strategies which is based on what actions households may 
take to smooth consumption. Then, we relate these smoothing strategies to possible 
institutional smoothing partners and the assets that may be required to follow a particular 
smoothing strategy. We apply this framework to Russia and empirically explore the 
rich survey data to ﬁnd out what Russian household do at a given point in time and 
1 This chapter is based on: Notten, G. (2007). Managing risks: what Russian households do to smooth 
consumption. MGSoG Working Paper, 2007/004, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht 
University, Maastricht.
2 These are for instance shocks such as natural disasters, crime, illness, disability or death of a household 
member and job loss.
3 The paper of Notten and de Crombrugghe (2007) is included as chapter 5 in this dissertation.6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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how these actions may contribute to consumption smoothing. We focus on the 2003 
survey to analyse a broad range of indicators on smoothing actions. We also investigate 
whether the observed patterns differ according to levels of wealth and across rural or 
urban areas.  
  By focusing on the household as the central institution to manage risks, our 
conceptual framework offers an alternative way to analyse and interpret existing survey 
data without a priori restricting the scope of the analysis to a particular smoothing 
mechanism or smoothing channel. The results can be used to formulate hypotheses on 
household smoothing behaviour and to delineate the features of an analysis beyond 
the exploration offered in this paper; it provides information about which smoothing 
channels are worth further investigation and which linkages have to be taken into 
account in a country/community. Moreover, the conceptual framework guides thinking 
about the role, scope and type of government interventions and possible feedback 
effects to other smoothing channels.  
  This paper is structured as follows; in section 6.2 we set out our conceptual 
framework  and  in  section  6.3  we  explain  the  selection  and  characteristics  of  the 
household sample from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and point 
out in what way the range of selected smoothing indicators are linked to the conceptual 
framework. Section 6.4 analyses the smoothing indicators; it sketches a picture of how 
Russian households smooth consumption, using which smoothing channels. Section 
6.5 concludes with a summary of the main ﬁndings and hypotheses and discusses the 
relevance of followed research approach. 
6.2 Conceptual framework
Being able to smooth consumption reﬂects an important dimension of well-being as it 
reﬂects people’s capacity to satisfy their basic needs tomorrow as well as today, despite 
the existence of risks and the occurrence of shocks. Studies analyzing the relation 
between income and consumption show that, over time, household consumption is 
considerably smoother than income; a reduction (or increase) in household income 
is  not  accompanied  by  a  similarly  large  decline  (or  increase)  in  consumption. 
Although there is considerable evidence that consumption smoothing takes place in 
both  developed  and  developing  countries,  the  economic  literature  also  shows  that 
the actual smoothing mechanisms employed can be very context speciﬁc, especially 144
in developing economies.4 Mechanisms that work for one group, country or region 
may not work for others or are not accessible. Moreover, households may use various 
smoothing mechanisms that complement each other. It is important to better understand 
how households smooth consumption, not only for academic purposes but also for 
governments that wish to improve the capacities of their citizens to manage risks.  
  In this section we develop a conceptual framework which guides the exploration 
of potential smoothing mechanisms but that does not restrict the particular forms they 
may take in various environments. Central to the framework is a typology of consumption 
smoothing strategies, with each strategy depicting a different smoothing mechanism. 
Subsequently, we deﬁne a range of institutional counterparts and assets that can be used 
to follow a particular smoothing strategy. The combination of a smoothing strategy, 
institutional counterpart and required assets reﬂects a speciﬁc smoothing channel. We 
take the perspective of the household as point of departure as the household reﬂects 
the ﬁrst risk sharing level for individuals in many societies, including our case-study 
Russia. 
  The analysis assumes a one generation – one period world. In this world, wealth 
is not accumulated across generations; any existing wealth has been accumulated by the 
household itself. Each household has to be self-sufﬁcient, exchange its home production 
for goods (or money) or sell its labour on a labour market (or a combination of all of 
this). In this world, households face the risk of not being able to cover their basic needs. 
In order to reduce the impact of this risk, households may follow a combination of 
different consumption smoothing strategies (Table 6.1). We distinguish six strategies 
or actions that can be grouped under two broader categories; ex ante strategies and ex 
post strategies. Each strategy reﬂects a distinct smoothing mechanism. The ex ante or 
mitigating strategies create alternative funding sources in case future income falls short 
of what is expected. These strategies imply that part of current income is reserved for 
future contingencies. We distinguish between ﬁnancial and physical capital accumulation 
because  physical  capital  may  additionally  contribute  to  current  consumption  (if 
durable) and can also function as collateral for using other smoothing mechanisms (i.e. 
getting a loan). Insurance, on the other hand, only provides funding when a particular 
contingency materializes. The ex post or coping strategies are employed to create 
4 The economic literature typically analyses consumption smoothing behaviour following two approaches; 
the ﬁrst approach models household behaviour using a permanent income model or risk-sharing model 
and focuses on the overall smoothness of consumption vis-à-vis income ﬂows (see (Deaton, 1992) for 
an overview). The second approach models and tests particular consumption smoothing mechanisms for 
speciﬁc groups of households or regions (Alessi & Lusardi, 1997; Dercon, 1998; Dubois et al, December 
2006; Hoogeveen, 2001; Kochar, 2004; Ligon, 1998; Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993; 
Udry, 1994, 1995).6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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alternative funding sources after it becomes clear that current income is not sufﬁcient 
to satisfy basic needs. We distinguish three different mechanisms: generate additional 
income (i.e. increase labour supply, home production or the selling of home produced 
goods), seek credit/loans and seek transfers.  
  To  follow  a  particular  consumption  smoothing  strategy,  households  may 
use different institutions. Take for instance the borrowing strategy; households can 
borrow funds from ﬁnancials institutions, informal money lenders, family and friends 
or  by  buying  products  on  credit. A  particularly  useful  concept  for  thinking  about 
consumption smoothing strategies and the possible smoothing partners of households 
is the Welfare Pentagon (Neubourg de, 2002). The Welfare Pentagon represents the 
ﬁve core institutions that households may use to satisfy current and future needs in a 
given society: family, markets, social networks, membership institutions and public 
authorities (Figure 6.1).5 Even though historical and geographical appearances differ, 
Table 6.1: Typology of consumption smoothing strategies
Strategies Consumption smoothing mechanism
Ex ante – create alternative funding sources in case future income falls short
(mitigating strategies):
Accumulation of ﬁnancial 
capital
Financial savings ﬁnance future consumption.
Accumulation of physical 
capital
Physical assets can be sold to ﬁnance consumption, they can 
be used as physical collateral for a loan or credit but they also 
contribute to current consumption.
Seek insurance  Insurance mitigates the impact of shocks by providing resources to 
ﬁnance consumption when a speciﬁc contingency occurs.
Ex post – create alternative funding sources when current income is insufﬁcient
(coping strategies):
Adjust income generating 
activities
Generate additional income to ﬁnance consumption
Seek loans or credit  Loans or credits ﬁnance consumption.
Seek transfers  Transfers ﬁnance consumption.
5 The Welfare Pentagon is a central and distinctive element in the ‘Social Risk Management’ approach as 
developed by Chris de Neubourg (Neubourg de, 2002; Neubourg de & Weigand, 2000). The Social Risk 
Management framework is formulated to analyse the role and scope of public interventions and foremost, 
but not exclusively, that of public social protection policies. Although there are some differences, the Social 
Protection Unit of the World Bank uses a similar framework (Holzman & Jorgensen, February 2000). The 
innovative aspect of both approaches is that it provides both a rationale for, as well as a tool to think about 
ex post and ex ante public measures to deal with risks in society.146
these institutions are found in all societies across time and locations. The relevance of 
each institution and the exchange relations between households and these institutions 
may differ by society.
  Households  use  these  institutions  to  generate  income  but  also  to  smooth 
consumption: labour markets, product markets and capital markets allow households 
to trade and exchange in order to secure resources to satisfy the main needs at a 
certain moment. In the labour market households exchange effort for a (future) wage; 
in product markets households trade effort for a (future) proﬁt; on the capital market 
households trade income against future income by investments, savings, insurances, 
borrowings and the like. Families, social networks and membership institutions address 
the risk of not being able to satisfy basic needs by means of various and different 
mechanisms of solidarity. Membership institutions are institutions of which individuals 
can become a member and from which they can resign. Examples of such institutions 
are unions, mutual insurance companies, co-operatives, neighbourhood associations or 
saving and credit societies. Public authorities can assist households directly by means 
of public social protection (pension schemes, child beneﬁts, unemployment insurance) 
but  also  indirectly  by  enforcing  contracts  through  a  judicial  system,  introducing 
legislation aimed at correcting market failures (such as minimum reserve requirements 
Figure 6.1: Welfare Pentagon
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for banks). However, the household can also internalize income generating activities 
and consumption smoothing by self-sufﬁcient home production, accumulating physical 
assets or holding cash savings.  
  In  addition  to  time  or  effort,  following  a  speciﬁc  consumption  smoothing 
strategy typically also requires some kind of asset. Assets can be ﬁnancial (cash, money 
in a bank account, stocks and shares), physical (land, house, machines, jewellery), 
human (education, skills), social (family ties, acquaintances) or collective (citizenship, 
contribution record). Combining the classiﬁcation of consumption smoothing strategies 
in Table 6.1 with the institutions in the Welfare pentagon and the notion that each 
consumption-smoothing channel requires some kind of input or investment, we obtain 
the possible consumption smoothing channels as shown in Table 6.2. For instance, 
households can buy private insurance against certain risks using part of their ﬁnancial 
assets to pay the insurance premium. Alternatively, households can be insured for 
certain risks by public authorities through paying taxes or social insurance contributions 
or simply because they are a citizen. They may also rely on social networks or family 
to compensate them after a shock occurs. Depending on the characteristics of these 
arrangements a social input is required (promise of reciprocity, ‘good’ reputation or 
family relation). Alternatively, households can also adjust their income generating 
activities i.e. supply more labour, sell more home produced goods and increase home 
production. 
  We further assume that households differ in their capacities to produce wealth, 
in their exposure to risks which endanger the production of wealth and in their degree 
of  risk  aversion.  Together  with  the  initial  wealth  distribution,  these  factors  result 
in  households  adopting  different  income  generating  and  consumption  smoothing 
strategies. The differences in the economic activities of households result in an income 
distribution and a corresponding consumption distribution. In that distribution, some 
households are poor in the sense that they do not have enough resources to satisfy their 
basic needs (according to a pre-set poverty deﬁnition). More importantly, the position 
of households within the income distribution will affect their consumption smoothing 
behaviour. This will alter their position in the income distribution, or alternatively, 
reinforce it.    
  Depending on the community or country, some smoothing channels may be more 
prevalent than others. It is also possible that several institutions are active in providing 
assistance with the same type of consumption smoothing. This may be because a 
part of the population does not have access to a particular consumption smoothing 
channel because it lacks the required assets to establish an exchange relationship with 
an institutional counterpart. For instance, for poor entrepreneurs it is often difﬁcult to 
get credit from formal ﬁnancial markets because they do not have physical assets that 148
Table 6.2: Consumption smoothing channels
Strategies/Actions Institutional counterpart Assets needed by household
Ex ante – create alternative source of funding in case future income falls short
(mitigating strategies):





Financial assets (liquid assets)




Financial assets (liquid assets) 
Seek insurance  Market (ﬁnancial)
Social networks / Family
Public authorities  
(social protection policies)
Membership institution
Financial assets (insurance policy), 
social assets (reputation, relations), 
collective assets (citizenship, 
contribution history / rights) or 
membership (i.e. trade union)
Ex post – create alternative funding sources when current income is insufﬁcient
(coping strategies):
Adjust income generating 
activities
Market (goods – labour)
Household
Labour, productive assets, 
ﬁnancial assets (working capital)
Seek loans or credit  Market (ﬁnancial)
Social networks / Family
Market (goods)
Membership institution
Physical assets (collateral), social 
assets (reputation, relations)
Seek transfers Social networks / Family
Public authorities  
(social protection policies)
Social assets (reputation, relations), 
collective assets (citizenship, 
rights)
can serve as collateral for the credit. Instead, such persons may obtain a loan through 
their social network where reputation, kinship or social pressure may function as some 
kind of ‘social’ collateral. This framework helps to analyse consumption smoothing 
behaviour because it provides a general framework of thought which encompasses 6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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most, if not all, potential consumption smoothing strategies of households in a society. 
In the next sections, we use this framework to formulate and classify a wide range 
of indicators of consumption smoothing channels in Russia. There are, however, a 
number of aspects that the conceptual framework does not directly address. By taking 
the household level as the unit of analysis, we abstract from household formation as 
the ultimate consumption smoothing strategy of individuals.6 Furthermore, focusing 
on a one period analysis also implies that we do not analyse the role of human capital 
investment.  
  Secondly, the framework categorizes a range of actions as potential consumption 
smoothing strategies but it does not indicate which strategy would be preferable on 
what grounds. One concern in the development literature is that some households 
smooth consumption using inefﬁcient and ineffective channels and are thereby unable 
to improve their lives (Dercon, 1998; Eswaran & Kotwal, 1989; Rosenzweig, 1988; 
Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993; Zimmerman & Carter, 2003). Due to a combination of 
risk aversion and few resources, households do not follow strategies that increase the 
probability that their consumption will fall below a certain minimum level. This ‘disaster 
management’ is characterized by different asset accumulation strategies for low and 
high wealth households, where the latter group is more successful in improving their 
welfare in the long term. Lack of access or failure of certain consumption smoothing 
channels, are additional reasons for the existence of a poverty trap. Whether a particular 
smoothing channel is welfare improving or not, is highly context dependent. In Western 
Tanzania high wealth farmers accumulate cattle while low wealth farmers engage in 
low risk-return non-agricultural activities (Dercon, 1998) while in Georgia activities 
not involved with farming are seen as a way out of poverty (Kobaladze, November 
2002). Alternatively, in Burkina Faso low wealth individuals invest relatively more in 
buffer assets (i.e. grain) than in productive assets (land)(Zimmerman & Carter, 2003). 
While the farmers in Tanzania and Burkina Faso can choose to follow either strategy, 
the rural inhabitants of Georgia indicate that there is no opportunity to engage in non-
farm activities. Given this context speciﬁcity, we do not attempt to specify a priori a 
preference ranking of smoothing strategies or channels.7   
  Finally, certain smoothing channels may be more suited to help manage particular 
types of shocks or risks than other channels. Some consumption smoothing channels 
are relatively successful to deal with shocks arising from idiosyncratic risks, but fail 
6 The occurrence of shocks, a rise in uncertainty or the availability of consumption smoothing channels may 
affect households’ living arrangements or fertility decisions.
7 In the empirical analysis we also decompose the indicators according to permanent consumption quintiles 
and test whether there are signiﬁcant differences in the use of particular channels between these quintiles.150
when there is an aggregate or covariant shock such as an economic crisis or a natural 
disaster (Hoogeveen, 2001; McKenzie, 2003; Skouﬁas, 2003; Udry, 1994). Moreover, 
if a household perceives that it is vulnerable to a particular kind of risk, it will adjust 
its consumption smoothing strategies accordingly. For instance, Indian households 
with a higher risk of illness or bad health choose to accumulate more liquid and fewer 
productive assets (Kochar, 2004) and wage arrears induce Russian households who 
are more vulnerable to that risk to save more (Guariglia & Kim, 2003). A possible 
extension of the framework could encompass the inclusion of various types of risks.  
6.3 Data and methodology
Previous research has shown that Russian households have been capable of partially 
smoothing their consumption despite suffering from many income shocks during the 
transition period (Notten & Crombrugghe de, 2006; Skouﬁas, 2003). The objective of 
our empirical analysis is to get an impression of how Russian households currently 
smooth  consumption  after  more  than  a  decade  of  structural  change.  We  use  the 
conceptual framework developed in the previous section to select indicators of possible 
smoothing channels from rich survey data. Subsequently, we explore the prevalence and 
differential use of consumption smoothing channels by Russian households at a given 
point in time (2003).8 We restrict our focus to a single year because we want to study 
indicators for a wide range of smoothing channels. The resulting analysis is interesting 
because the conceptual framework guides the use of typical household survey data to 
create a broad and novel household perspective on the use of consumption smoothing 
channels. This broad perspective is important because a household most likely uses a 
range of smoothing channels at the same time and the use of smoothing channels can 
differ with household characteristics. The results can be used to formulate hypotheses 
about consumption smoothing behaviour and to indicate areas (or institutions) in which 
government intervention is needed to enhance households’ risk management. However, 
more rigorous analysis is needed to prove whether the identiﬁed channels do actually 
have a smoothing function, to what extent and how they help households to smooth 
consumption, and how government intervention can enhance the functioning of a given 
channel.9   
8 After the 1998 ﬁnancial and economic crisis Russia experienced a period of sustained economic recovery 
combined with ongoing structural reforms. The smoothing behaviour of households in times of large 
aggregate shocks  (and the outcome in terms of consumption smoothness)  can be very different from 
behaviour in more stable periods (Hoogeveen, 2001; McKenzie, 2003; Skouﬁas, 2003; Udry, 1994). 
9 Such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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  We use the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) to analyse the 
prevalence of consumption smoothing channels used by Russian households.10 The 
sample includes all households that have been observed annually in the RLMS from 
2000 to 2003; this balanced panel consists of about 2,700 households. We selected 
a panel because we also want to study differences in the use of smoothing channels 
for different levels of wealth.11  12 As explained before, depending on the level of 
wealth, households may follow different smoothing strategies using different channels. 
To approximate the wealth of a household we average annual equivalent household 
expenditures over the period 2000 to 2003 and divide the resulting distribution in 
quintiles. Equivalent expenditures are obtained by dividing household’s expenditures 
by its household speciﬁc poverty line.13  The resulting values thus reﬂect the average 
distance of a household’s living standard relative to its absolute poverty line; a value 
below one indicates that a household, on average, lived in poverty during the period 
2000-2003 and vice versa for an average above 1. 
  Table 6.3 lists some characteristics of this distribution. Clearly, the distribution 
is  very  dense  at  low  expenditure  levels;  only  the  ﬁfth  quintile  has  considerably 
higher expenditures (on average more than six times the value of the poverty line). 
Quite a number of households were living in the vicinity of the absolute poverty line 
from 2000-2003; average expenditures in the lowest quintile are about 1 and that of 
the second quintile is 1.7.14 The group of households in the lowest quintile can be 
considered as chronically poor according to a common deﬁnition of chronic poverty 
(having average expenditures below the poverty line over a given period). But if a 
10 Detailed information on the RLMS project is provided on the following website:  http://www.cpc.unc.
edu/projects/rlms/home.html.
11 The RLMS does not have post-stratiﬁcation weights for its panel dimension. In Gassmann and Notten 
(2006) we compare the characteristics of the cross-sections with the ﬁve year balanced panel (2000-2004) 
and ﬁnd a number of differences. Urban households (especially from Moscow and St Petersburg), are 
underrepresented in the panel. Households with children are somewhat overrepresented while there are 
fewer single person households in the panel sample. Average income and expenditures are somewhat lower 
in the panel. Despite the level effects (i.e. poverty rates are somewhat higher in the panel) we ﬁnd that both 
samples reﬂect the same trends (time) and similar differences between subgroups of the population (rural-
urban and by expenditures). This is in line with the ﬁndings of an earlier attrition study of the RLMS by 
Heeringa (1997).
12 Differences in means between urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles are statistically tested using 
a Wald test in which we control for clusters in the sampling design of the RLMS.  
13 We use the absolute poverty lines provided in the RLMS data. These household speciﬁc poverty lines 
are adjusted for the size and composition of the household and valued at regional price levels. We further 
use the expenditure and income variables as constructed by the RLMS which include the value of home 
produced (and consumed) goods (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/home.html).
14 Especially in countries with high (expenditure) inequality such as Russia, poverty statistics are very 
sensitive to the level of the poverty line. The RLMS poverty line is on average about 2/3 of the value of the 
(ofﬁcial) Minimum Subsistence Level of the Russian Federation (Notten & Gassmann, 2006). 152
somewhat less stringent subsistence level is taken, that label could even be applied to 
many households in the second quintile. Table 6.4 further summarizes characteristics 
of the households for the whole sample, by rural15 and urban settlement area and by 
average expenditure quintiles.  A large part of Russian households live in urban areas 
(62%) and those households are more likely to be found in the higher regions of the 
average expenditure distribution.
  Even though the multi-purpose RLMS survey contains a wealth of information, it 
is not designed or structured speciﬁcally to analyse consumption smoothing behaviour 
and thus only allows us to analyse a limited part of the puzzle. On the other hand, it 
also allows us to identify which pieces of the puzzle are missing. Using the conceptual 
framework as a guide, we selected a range of smoothing indicators from the 2003 RLMS 
questionnaires (Table 6.5). Some of the selected variables function as indicators for a 
particular consumption smoothing strategy, but do not provide sufﬁcient information 
about the institutional counterpart or the required assets. For instance, as indicators 
for the ‘seek loans or credit’ strategy we use a set of variables indicating whether a 
Table 6.3: Average equivalent expenditure distribution (2000-2003) 
Characteristics  Equivalent expenditures 
(relative to poverty line)
Average 2.93
Median 2.35
Ratio at 5% of distribution  0.83
Ratio at 95% of distribution 6.80
Standard deviation 2.44






Note: We obtained the distribution as follows: ﬁrst, we divided households’ annual expenditures by its 
household speciﬁc poverty line to adjust for demographic differences between households and differences 
between regional price levels. Subsequently, we averaged households’ equivalent annual expenditures 
over the period 2000-2003. Finally, we divided the resulting household distribution in ﬁve equally sized 
quantiles.
Source: Own calculations RLMS
15 We included households living in semi-urban settlement areas in the rural group because this group is too 
small too analyse separately and appears to be more similar to rural households. 6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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household has debt and whether it made loan repayments but we do not know which 
institution provided the loan. Similarly, we know about a range of physical assets 
owned by a household but we do not know whether any of these were used as collateral 
for obtaining the loan. However, for many indicators we can identify the institutions 
that households exchange with or we argue which institution is the most likely to be 
involved. When a household mentions it provided a loan or reported having received 
repayments from loans, we know that this household is involved in the provision of 
loans, most likely to other households. Or alternatively, if a household reported having 
saved money with interest it is likely to have saved using a ﬁnancial market institution. 
Finally, the RLMS contains quite a lot of information on the giving and receiving of 
Table 6.4: Characteristics of household panel (2000-2003 panel, in 2003) 
Average expenditure quintiles 
Total Urban Rural 1 2 3 4 5
# of observations  2,718 1,690  1,028  544 544 543 544 544
Share population (%) 100 62.3 37.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Urban area (%) 62.3 100 0 51.1 57.4 64.8 69.7 67.8
Household size (%):
1 19.9 21.3 17.5 15.6 18.0 16.9 23.4 25.4
2 28.7 30.2 26.2 24.8 22.1 30.9 32.0 33.7
3 24.3 26.0 21.5 26.8 26.1 24.5 21.7 22.5
4 16.7 15.8 18.2 16.5 22.1 17.3 14.9 12.7
>4 10.4 6.4 16.6 16.2 11.7 10.3 8.1 5.7
Household type (%):
Single adult  3.6 4.1 2.8 5.0 2.9 2.0 3.5 4.8
Single elderly  16.2 17.1 14.7 10.7 14.9 14.9 19.9 20.6
Adult couple  7.8 8.2 7.0 8.5 5.0 9.6 6.4 9.4
Elderly couple  9.9 10.0 9.8 4.4 7.2 9.0 14.2 14.9
Single caretaker  4.6 5.4 3.4 6.6 4.0 5.3 3.5 3.7
Adults with children 21.1 22.0 19.7 20.8 24.1 19.7 20.0 20.8
Extended family  9.0 7.3 11.9 10.7 12.1 9.0 7.2 6.1
Elderly and adults only 11.7 10.9 13.0 12.9 12.0 12.9 12.5 8.3
Other households 16.0 15.0 17.7 20.6 17.8 17.5 12.9 11.4
Average income1 7,465 7,868 6,801 4,406 5,920 7,425 7,900 11,682
Average expenditures1  8,711 9,098 8,074 3,390 5,383 7,188 8,981 18,626
Note: 1 Expressed in June 1992 ruble and household averages
Source: Own calculations RLMS154
Table 6.5: Indicators of consumption smoothing channels in the RLMS 
Institution Indicator
Strategy: accumulation of ﬁnancial capital
  - Has accumulated savings last month
Financial market  - Has savings on interest bearing account
- Has bought (or derived income from) stocks and/or bonds (last 
month)
Strategy: accumulation of physical capital
Household - Asset ownership: owns house, land, durables
- Income from (sale of) assets: rents, sold property,  sold jewellery, 
currency or depleting savings (last month)
Strategy: seek insurance
Financial market - Income from insurance payments (last month) 
- Expenditures on premiums (last month)
Public authorities (social 
security)
- Incidence of social security type and income share of beneﬁts such 
as pensions and unemployment beneﬁts
- Pension rights (private and/or federal fund)
Social networks / family1 - Gift giving/receiving (yes/no, amounts, income share and to/from 
who(m)) (last month)
Strategy: adjust income generating activities
Labour market / goods 
market
- Has a 2nd or 3rd job 
- Has an informal job
Strategy: seek loans or credit 
- Has debt (yes/no, expenditure share)
- Made loan repayments (last month)
Social networks / family - Loans provided by households (last month) 
- Net lending (last month)
Labour market - Access to loans from employer (yes/no)
Goods market - Has unpaid utility bills (yes/no, real value)
Strategy: seek transfers
Public authorities (social 
assistance)
- Incidence of social assistance type and income share of beneﬁts such 
as child beneﬁts and housing beneﬁts
Social networks / family1 - Gift giving/receiving (yes/no, amounts, income share and to/from 
who(m)) (last month)
Overall ability of consumption smoothing
Household - Self-reported survival time in case a household loses all income 
generating sources
Note: All indicators are analysed at a household level. Those indicators originating from individual 
questionnaires have been summarized at the household level. For instance, if an adult mentioned he/she 
had a second job, a household level variable was created indicating that at least one household member 
had a second job. 1 Gift giving and receiving can be seen as an insurance or transfer seeking strategy.6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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gifts but the information is insufﬁcient to classify particular gifts either as insurance or 
transfer seeking strategies. As can be seen in Table 6.5, there are indicators for every 
smoothing strategy and in many cases part of the consumption smoothing channel can 
also be identiﬁed. We also included an indicator for the consumption smoothing ability 
of households indicating the self-estimated survival period of the household in case it 
would lose all sources of income. 
  In  our  conceptual  framework  we  distinguish  between  income  generating 
activities and consumption smoothing activities but we also include the adjustment 
of income generating activities as one of the ex post coping strategies. The 2003 
RLMS questionnaires did not include any speciﬁc shock response questions, which 
makes  it  difﬁcult  to  distinguish  between  normal  income  generating  activities  and 
post  shock  adjustments  in  those  activities.  Given  this  difﬁculty,  we  also  included 
a range of indicators on income generating activities (Table 6.6) in addition to the 
shock  adjustment  indicators  (Table  6.5). As  indicators  for  post-shock  adjustments 
we constructed a variable indicating whether at least one household member has a 
second or third job and similarly for having an informal job. These variables can be 
interpreted as second-best responses to unemployment, underemployment and other 
problems with income generating activities (wage arrears, forced leave, non-cash wage 
Table 6.6: Indicators of income generating activities in the RLMS 
Institution Indicator
Household production - Required asset: ownership land / other land use arrangements 
- Land use / growing crops / having livestock / gathered nut/mushrooms, 
ﬁshed etc (last year)
- Monetary value of home production (total, by activity, 
amount consumed) (monthly value)
Labour market - Employment (last month), having wage income and share of
 wage income (last month)
- Having wage earnings (yes/no, share of total income)  
- Problems: unemployment, payment arrears, non-cash wage, concern 
for loss of job and certainty of ﬁnding a new one
Goods market - Having an ‘entrepreneurial job’  
- Ever started a business (yes/no, success/failure) 
- Monetary value of home production sold (total, by activity, 
(monthly value)
Note: All indicators are analysed at a household level. Those indicators originating from individual 
questionnaires have been summarized at the household level. For instance, if an adult mentioned he/she 
had a second job, a household level variable was created indicating that at least one household member 
had a second job.156
payments, unsuccessful home production etc.). As these activities also include informal 
entrepreneurial activities (providing services, selling home produced foodstuffs) the 
institutional counterparts can be labour and goods markets. Table 6.6 displays a range 
of income generating activities distinguishing between home production, labour supply 
and entrepreneurial activities. We further discuss the interpretation and limitations of 
the indicators in the next section.
6.4 Consumption smoothing in Russia: what do Russian households 
do?
What do households in Russia do to ensure that they have sufﬁcient resources to ﬁnance 
their (basic) needs today as well as tomorrow? The conceptual framework developed 
in this paper identiﬁes a wide range of possible strategies, institutional counterparts 
and required assets and we have selected a considerable group of indicators for some 
of these possibilities. We now analyse and interpret the descriptive results and simple 
signiﬁcance tests in order to gain an idea of which consumption smoothing channels 
Russian households may use or not. We also brieﬂy analyse indicators of household’s 
income smoothing activities because we the adjustment of income generating activities 
is also included as a consumption smoothing strategy. This resulting picture is not 
complete (by any means) and alternative interpretations that are also consistent with 
the observed results can certainly be formulated. Despite these limitations, this exercise 
is valuable because it gives an indication of the prevalence of certain consumption 
smoothing channels as well as the differential use of these channels by various groups 
of households (we distinguish between wealth quintiles and rural/urban settlement 
area). In the context of Russia’s ongoing structural reforms, it is of particular interest to 
explore the extent to which households use markets to smooth consumption. Thus, the 
aim of this paper is not to prove the existence, functioning and motivations for these 
consumption smoothing channels but to formulate interesting and relevant hypotheses 
on how households may smooth consumption in Russia. Testing these hypotheses 
requires more theoretical and empirical work and we discuss some of these options for 
further research.  
  This section ﬁrst discusses households’ perceptions on their smoothing abilities, 
followed by the analysis of the indicators for ex ante and ex post consumption smoothing 
strategies,  and  is  concluded  by  viewing  some  indicators  on  income  generating 
activities. 6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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6.4.1 Perceived ability of consumption smoothing
We start with an impression of households’ self-estimated consumption smoothing 
abilities (Table 6.7). The respondent of the household questionnaire was asked to 
estimate the period that the household could survive without income; 83% of the 
Russian households expect they could survive less than a month if they would lose all 
income sources. The results of the Wald test suggest that households in rural areas and 
households in higher average expenditure quintiles estimate having longer periods of 
survival without income. We will discuss below how these two groups of households 
are likely to use different smoothing mechanisms and channels. The case that was 
suggested to the respondents is extreme but it nevertheless shows that, unless alternative 
income sources are found, the time horizon of consumption smoothing opportunities 
for Russian households is limited to months rather than years.16 
Table 6.7: Self-perceived ability of consumption smoothing
% of households Obs.2 All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles  Test
1 2 3 4 5
How long can the household survive if all income is lost?





2.0 2.7 2.5 4.4 9.4
.01
A few months 13.2 11.7 15.7 8.5 10.4 14.9 15.3 16.9
Less than a 
month
27.2 25.6 29.9 21.3 30.5 28.4 27.1 28.4
Less than 2 
weeks
12.8 13.7 11.3 11.9 11.3 15.4 13.0 12.5
Less than 1 
week
26.5 28.8 22.5 31.4 29.9 24.9 24.4 21.9
Not even 1 day 16.1 17.6 13.6 24.9 15.2 13.9 15.8 10.9
Note:  1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for 
clustering effects): not signiﬁcant (ns), signiﬁcant at 10% (.1), signiﬁcant at 5% (.05) and signiﬁcant 
at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column 
can be different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only 
applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 
Source: Own calculations RLMS
16 In Notten and de Combrugghe (2006) we incorporate this temporary ability of consumption smoothing 
into a model of consumption smoothing by distinguishing between short and long term relationships; while 
allowing for short term deviations between income and consumption, the model stipulated a balanced long 
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6.4.2  Ex  ante  consumption  smoothing  strategies:  asset  accumulation  and 
insurance
After a decade of severe macro-economic instability, the new millennium brought Russia 
a period of stable growth which was also transmitted into sustained improvements in 
living standards. The poverty rate, peaking at 34% in 1998, has declined substantially 
to 12% in 2003 (Notten & Crombrugghe de, 2006). As noted in Table 6.4, household 
income and consumption increased considerably during this period. In such good times, 
it makes sense to use part of this extra income to re-build stocks of capital or to arrange 
insurance. We look for evidence of these strategies and their corresponding channels 
using a snapshot of this period (4th quarter 2003). Table 6.8 to Table 6.12 display the 
results for the indicators of ex ante smoothing channels.  
  Surprisingly  however,  only  13%  of  Russian  households  reported  having 
saved any money in the month prior to the survey (Table 6.8). There is virtually no 
investment in more sophisticated ﬁnancial products such as stocks and shares: few 
households report buying such products or receive income from them. The percentage 
of households saving is higher in urban areas and increases as average expenditures 
increase; 4% of the households in the lowest quintile save as compared to 18% in the 
4th and 5th quintiles. Unfortunately, the information on savings does not unambiguously 
reveal whether households save using ﬁnancial markets or store cash in their homes. 
However, few households get interest payments for their savings (less than 3%) which 
suggests that a large part of household savings are in cash and may be deposited ‘under 
the mattress’ instead of in a bank account. Buying an insurance product from a ﬁnancial 
Table 6.8: Accumulation of ﬁnancial capital – ﬁnancial market / household
% of households Obs.2 All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles  Test
1 2 3 4 5
Has savings  2,718 12.6 14.1 10.1 .1 4.2 9.6 12.9 18.2 18.2 .01
Saves with interest 1,914 2.8 3.5 1.9 ns 0.7 3.1 3.0 2.3 3.3 ns
Bought bonds/
shares 
2,718 0.1 0.2 0 ns 0 0 0 0.6 0 ns
Received payments 
from bonds/shares 
2,718 1.1 1.4 0.6 ns 0.6 0.7 0.4 1.5 2.2 .1
Note:  1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for 
clustering effects): not signiﬁcant (ns), signiﬁcant at 10% (.1), signiﬁcant at 5% (.05) and signiﬁcant 
at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column 
can be different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only 
applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































market institute is also not very popular; less than 5% of the households report to 
having spent money on insurance premiums (Table 6.10).17 These ﬁndings suggest that 
ﬁnancial markets play only a very limited role in households’ smoothing strategies. 
One explanatory factor for this may be that households’ conﬁdence in Russia’s ﬁnancial 
institutions has not yet been restored, despite the reforms in this sector after the 1998 
banking crisis.18 During this crisis, many households lost their savings as a result of the 
bankruptcies.19 
  If this explanation holds true than it would make sense that households prefer 
to accumulate physical assets by, for instance, buying durables.20 In 2003 expenditures 
on durables were restored to their mid-nineties but Mroz et al (April 2004) report 
that such expenditures are mainly made by higher income groups. Table 6.9 shows 
that many households own durable goods such as a television, fridge and washing 
machine but that poorer households and rural households own fewer durables.21 We 
have little information on whether these assets are sold when other income sources 
fall short. Using a set of questions only asked in the 1998 RLMS survey, Lokshin and 
Yemtsov (February 2001) report that only 4% of Russian households reported having 
Table 6.10: Seek insurance – ﬁnancial market
% of households Obs.2 All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles  Test
1 2 3 4 5
Insurance payout  2,718 0.2 0.2 0 .05 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 ns
Premium paid 2,718 4.6 4.3 5.3 ns 2.0 3.1 3.3 5.2 9.6 .01
Note:  1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for 
clustering effects): not signiﬁcant (ns), signiﬁcant at 10% (.1), signiﬁcant at 5% (.05) and signiﬁcant 
at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column 
can be different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only 
applicable to a sub-sample of the households.
Source: Own calculations RLMS
17 There is no information available on the type of insurance products bought.
18 Although reforms have been taking place since 1998, a series of World Bank and OECD reports from 
2001 and 2002 indicates that reforms have been very slow and insufﬁcient (Fuchs, 2002; OECD, 2001a, 
2001b, 2002; World Bank, 2003). Comparison with other countries shows that the Russian banking system 
is small by regional standards and underdeveloped compared to countries with similar per capita income. 
The lack of credit and deposit insurance has the consequence that banks are hesitant to provide credits to a 
wide variety of enterprises while households do not trust banks to manage their savings appropriately. 
19 Using the cross-section of round 8 (1998) of RLMS we ﬁnd that about 10% of the household reported to 
have lost a large part (on average 82%) of their savings.
20 Guariglia and Kim (2003) and Foley and Pyle (September 2005) analyse household savings in Russia 
incorporating expenditures on durable goods as savings.
21 These durable goods are typically rather old; the average age of a car, fridge, freezer, washing machine 
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sold belongings in order to cope with the impact of the 1998 crisis. The only indicator 
available is a grouping of strategies including that of selling jewellery; about 5% of the 
households report having sold jewellery, currency or having depleted savings in 2003.22 
This tendency was higher among the wealthier households were 12% sold such assets 
or depleted their savings. 
  Physical assets such as a house or land may be used as physical collateral or as a 
source of income (rent). The majority of households own their residence but low wealth 
households are somewhat more likely to rent a residence rather than own it (Table 6.9). 
However, even when real estate is privately owned it may be difﬁcult to use a house or 
apartment as ﬁnancial collateral for a loan. A World Bank study (October 2003) on the 
mortgage and the housing market in Russia reports that there are information problems 
regarding the assessment of the market value of housing and that it is extremely difﬁcult 
to expropriate a house from its defaulting owner. Land ownership is also high; three 
quarters of the households own a piece of land. As we will see below, most households 
use land to produce foodstuffs (including those living in urban areas). 
  To sum up, most households own a stock of physical assets and expenditures 
on durable goods have picked up again signalling increased accumulation. However, 
few  households  report  income  from  the  sale  or  renting  of  assets  and  information 
problems severely restrict the selling of property or the use of it as physical collateral. 
The information discussed above suggests that there is little evidence that these assets 
are used as buffer-stock strategy or as a means to generate (cash) income. It seems 
that Russian households use their stock of assets mainly for consumption and (home) 
production purposes. 
  In their role as a provider (or legislator) of social security programmes, public 
authorities provide insurance against the impact of risks such as insufﬁcient income 
in  old  age,  unemployment  or  disability. The  eligibility  and  beneﬁt  levels  of  such 
programmes are contingent on citizenship and/or contributions history. Social security 
in Russia means ﬁrst and foremost pensions: 59% of the households receive some kind 
of pension and, in recipient households, pensions make up on average half of total 
household income (Table 6.11).23 Receipt of an old age pension24 is most prevalent, 
followed by a disability pension. Interestingly, the incidence of pensions does not 
22  Unfortunately  this  question  includes  both  physical  (jewellery)  and  ﬁnancial  assets  (currency  and 
savings).
23 The share of pension income may be overestimated because other income sources are more likely to be 
underreported (MGSoG, 2006).
24 In Russia, men above the age of 60 are entitled to an old age pension (for women above age 55). In 
addition in certain professions (military, mining) workers can retire at the age of 45 or after had a particular 
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differ much across the population, except for the lowest wealth quintile; this group of 
households is less likely to receive an old age pension but considerably more likely to 
receive a disability pension (24% as compared to a population average of 17%). The 
receipt of unemployment beneﬁts and its contribution to total income is very low. 
  Coverage of the (old age) pension system is very high; nearly every household 
has adults reporting that they are building up (or have built up) pension rights from the 
Federal fund. About 17% of the households have adult members that are also contributing 
to a private pension fund25. However, these percentages are much lower for households 
in rural areas and in lower wealth quintiles. Thus, the old age pension system in Russia 
plays an important role in terms of beneﬁt incidence (many households beneﬁt), size of 
beneﬁt (beneﬁt is high share of income) and coverage (virtually all citizens are insured). 
As for the adequacy of pensions, the beneﬁt does not guarantee a living standard above 
the poverty line26 but pensioners and households with pensioners are considerably less 
likely to be poor as compared to the rest of the population (MGSoG, 2006). Together 
with the results discussed in Table 6.12 and Table 6.13, we hypothesize that these 
relatively generous old age pensions induce a speciﬁc inter-generational consumption 
smoothing channel whereby elderly family members assist their offspring.
6.4.3 Ex post consumption smoothing strategies: transfers, credit and adjustment 
in income generating activities
In  times  of  trouble  households  can  also  rely  on  their  family  and  (broader)  social 
networks such as relatives, friends or others. Depending on the motives and nature of 
such exchanges, they could be labelled as insurance or transfer smoothing mechanisms. 
When arrangements are reciprocal or involve risk-sharing they can be classiﬁed as 
insurance. Arrangements based on altruistic motives may be characterized as transfers. 
The RLMS does not provide much insight into the nature of such arrangements but 
it includes a range of variables on gifts received and given by households. We use 
these indicators to explore the existence of such solidarity based networks, including 
indicators for the direction of gift giving/receiving and its relative importance (Table 
6.12).27  
25 Since 1998, workers can also contribute to a Private Fund by means of a notional individual account 
system (Kazianga, 2006). 
26 High risk (old age) pension beneﬁciaries are single pensioners and pensioners living in large (extended) 
families.
27 Households were asked to indicate if they have been involved in gift giving (money or goods) with people 
that are not part of their household in the past month. If yes, the respondent estimated the monetary value 
of the gift. It is not clear what share has been given / received in cash and what in kind. Only for home 
produced food it would be possible to construct an estimate for the value of goods given to others.164
Table 6.12: Seek insurance / seek transfers – family / social network 
% of households Obs.2 All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles  Test
1 2 3 4 5
Gives and/or 
receives gifts
2,717 47.1 50.2 41.9 .05 36.6 39.9 47.3 54.2 57.3
Net giving/receiving: 
Giver only 535 41.8 40.2 45.0
ns
23.6 35.9 44.0 47.5 50.5
ns
Net gift giver 95 7.4 7.3 7.7 5.5 6.5 9.3 7.5 7.7
Net gift receiver 123 9.6 10.0 8.8 9.1 9.2 9.3 10.9 9.3
Receiver only 526 41.1 42.5 38.5 61.8 48.4 37.4 34.2 32.5
Given gifts 2,717 28.3 29.5 26.4 ns 14.3 21.0 30.3 36.4 39.8 .01
Income share of gifts 
given
769 0.24 0.19 0.35 .05 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.31 0.29 .01
Given to: 
Parents 768 15.8 16.5 14.4 ns 7.8 11.4 19.5 14.1 19.5 .01
Children 769 49.9 45.4 58.3 .05 57.7 50.9 50.6 50.5 45.6 ns
Grandparents 767 1.3 1.8 0.4 .1 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.9 ns
Grandchildren 768 31.1 29.4 34.3 ns 28.2 30.7 32.3 36.9 26.2 ns
Other people 768 31.0 35. 23.3 .05 24.4 28.1 30.1 28.3 38.1 .1
Gifts received  2,714 28.0 30.7 23.7 .05 28.3 26.0 27.1 29.2 29.5 ns
Income share of gifts 
received
761 0.22 0.22 0.22 ns 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.25 ns
Received from: 
Parents 756 47.4 46.0 50.2 ns 49.7 55.0 46.3 46.2 40.5 ns
Children 759 27.3 25.0 32.1 ns 23.4 22.1 26.5 29.8 33.8 ns
Grandparents 757 5.0 5.1 4.9 ns 7.8 3.6 4.1 5.7 3.8 ns
Grandchildren 756 1.7 2.0 1.2 ns 1.3 2.9 2.1 1.3 1.3 ns
Other relatives 758 19.3 20.4 16.9 ns 18.8 22.1 22.5 14.6 18.9 ns
Friends 759 12.5 13.2 11.1 ns 13.0 10.6 12.2 8.2 18.2 .1
Former employer  759 6.9 8.3 3.7 .1 5.2 7.8 7.5 6.3 7.6 ns
Social state organs 759 4.6 4.8 4.1 ns 5.8 3.6 3.4 5.1 5.0 ns
Other  759 3.3 4.3 1.2 .05 4.6 2.1 2.0 4.4 3.1 ns
Note: 1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for clustering 
effects): not signiﬁcant (ns), signiﬁcant at 10% (.1), signiﬁcant at 5% (.05) and signiﬁcant at 1% (.01). 2 The 
full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can be different due to 
missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only applicable to a sub-sample 
of the households. 
Source: Own calculations RLMS6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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  A ﬁrst observation is that the exchange of gifts is rather popular in Russia: 47% 
of the households give or receive gifts and households generally receive gifts or give 
them to others. This observation supports the interpretation of gifts as a consumption 
smoothing  mechanism  between  households.28 Also  in  favour  of  this  hypothesis  is 
the proportionality in incidence rates of giving / receiving as well as in the relative 
magnitude of the gifts; 28% of the households reported giving gifts while 28% reported 
receiving them. The average value of the given gifts is 24% of total household income 
while the income share of a received gift represents on average 22%. Thus, at a given 
point in time, Russian households are either giving or receiving considerable gifts on a 
regular basis. Furthermore, most gifts occur within family relations and the direction of 
ﬂows goes from older generations to younger ones. Additionally, 31% of the gifts are 
given to people outside the family while 13% of the received gifts come from friends 
and 7% from former employers. The exchange of gifts seems to be a relevant and 
popular smoothing strategy in Russia, especially within families. 
  There  are  however  some  differences  between  population  groups  suggesting 
that not everyone is equally likely to make use of this smoothing mechanism. Urban 
households  are  more  likely  to  be  involved  in  exchanging  gifts  (both  giving  and 
receiving), suggesting that this smoothing channel is more important for urban areas. 
Nevertheless, when rural households give, the value of this gift constitutes a higher 
share of income. Higher wealth households give more often and are equally likely 
to receive gifts. But, even though lower wealth households give less often, those in 
the lowest wealth quintile are not more likely to receive gifts. Moreover, the income 
shares of received gifts are similar for all subgroups implying that the absolute value 
of the gift increases with wealth. Gifts do not go more often towards those who are 
(supposedly) more in need. 29 Explanations could be that lower wealth households have 
fewer social assets, which prevents them from using family and social networks to 
smooth consumption. Or, alternatively, the smoothing counterparts of such households 
themselves have fewer means to assist them.  
  These ﬁndings suggest that gift exchange as a means to smooth consumption is 
a promising area for further research. Moreover, the prevalence and direction of inter-
generational gifts combined with the importance of (old age) pensions yields another 
interesting hypothesis: the relatively generous old age pensions give rise to an inter-
generational risk-sharing in which the elderly ﬁnancially assist their children and grand 
28 Alternatively, a high reciprocity of gifts within the cross-section dimension would have pointed at another 
explanation in which gift exchange functions as a means to build up, maintain or strengthen family relations 
or social networks.
29 As discussed in section 6.3, households in the lowest quintile had average equivalent expenditures around 
the absolute poverty line (average of 2000 - 2003). 166
Table 6.13: Households with old-age pensioners









Number of observations  2,718 1,399 440 270 609
Income:
- Receive pension  2,718 20.7 100 100 97.2 .01
- Mean pension share of income 1,588 0.26 0.75 0.75 0.41 .01
- Has wage income  2,713 87.0 12.1 24.8 68.0 .01
- Income share of wage earnings  1,768 0.72 0.49 0.38 0.52 .01
Poor (expenditures) 2,718 12.0 8.2 5.6 14.6 .01
Involved in borrowing or lending 2,708 37.5 13.4 20.4 24.5 .01
- Net lender 284 30.3 67.9 67.9 37.1
.01
- Net borrower 485 69.4 32.1 32.1 62.9
Has debt 2,712 28.6 5.2 6.3 16.6 .01
Has unpaid utility bills 2,707 29.5 7.5 6.7 14.6 .01
Given gifts to: 2,717 24.2 28.9 48.5 28.6 .01
- Parents 768 31.4 0 2.3 6.9 .01
- Children 769 41.7 52.4 61.8 55.2 .01
- Grandparents 767 2.4 0.8 0 0.6 ns
- Grandchildren 768 13.7 46.8 57.3 33.9 .01
Gifts received from: 2,714 32.5 30.2 24.5 17.8 .01
- Parents 756 73.8 0 1.5 21.0 .01
- Children 759 6.0 68.9 74.2 37.4 .01
- Grandparents 757 6.8 0 0 6.5 .01
- Grandchildren 756 0 8.4 3.1 0 .05
Net giving: Gift giver only  535 32.5 41.7 60.8 55.5
.01
Net giving: Net gift giver 95 6.3 7.3 11.4 8.0
Net giving: Net gift receiver 123 11.3 6.4 8.2 8.8
Net giving: Gift receiving only 526 49.9 44.5 19.6 27.7
Note: 1 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column can 
be different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only 
applicable to a sub-sample of the households.  2An elderly household member is a person whose age 
is above the ofﬁcial retirement age (55 for women and 60 for men).  3 Wald test on difference means 
household types (controlling for clustering effects): not signiﬁcant (ns), signiﬁcant at 10% (.1), signiﬁcant 
at 5% (.05) and signiﬁcant at 1% (.01). 
Source: Own calculations RLMS6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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children. In other words, there is a re-redistribution of wealth taking place from public 
authorities via elderly citizens to their younger family members. 
  We explore the potential relevance of this hypothesis by decomposing the panel 
into four (mutually exclusive) household types; single elderly households (16%), elderly 
couples (10%), other households with elderly members (22.4%) and households with 
no elderly members (51.5%).30 In the ﬁrst part of Table 6.13 we can see that pension 
income forms the most important source of income for single pensioners and pensioner 
couples. These groups are also considerably less likely to be poor.31 Other households 
with elderly members form an ‘in between case’ where both pensions as well as wage 
income form important shares of total income. Such households have an above average 
poverty risk. We expect that intergenerational redistribution may occur either by lending 
and borrowing or through gifts. However, the incidence of borrowing/lending activities 
for elderly households is signiﬁcantly lower than that of non-elderly households. But 
once elderly households are involved, single elderly and elderly couple households 
are more likely to be net lenders.32 Furthermore, elderly households give gifts more 
often but there are large differences between elderly households. Only elderly couples 
give gifts more often than the average population. Elderly couple households and other 
elderly households are less likely to get gifts. The results in Table 6.13 are consistent 
with the hypothesis that some kind of intergenerational risk sharing or income pooling 
takes place, particularly through gift giving. Possibly, such risk-sharing occurs either 
between related households (from elderly single / elderly couple to other non-elderly 
households) or within the household (other elderly households). In more profound 
research such hypotheses on the direction of intergenerational gifts could be tested 
using inter and intra-household decision models.
  When income is low, or falls short of what is expected, households can also 
seek transfers from the government. Many countries have a range of beneﬁts that are 
targeted at low income groups (social assistance). Households are eligible for such 
beneﬁts if they can prove their income falls below a certain threshold and / or if their 
characteristics fall within a pre-deﬁned category of eligibility criteria. Alternatively, 
households may seek other beneﬁts that are not speciﬁcally targeted at low income 
households as income shocks change the opportunity costs of seeking transfers; when 
income  is  suddenly  reduced,  the  expected  beneﬁt  (receiving  a  transfer)  may  now 
30 A household member is considered to be elderly once it has reached the legal retirement age; 55 for 
women and 60 for men.
31 We also calculated household poverty rates using household expenditures as a welfare indicator and the 
RLMS household speciﬁc poverty lines (2003) as thresholds.
32 In studying household budget data from Latvia, Gassmann (2000) also ﬁnds that elderly individuals are 
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outweigh the costs of applying for a beneﬁt (time, travel, costs of obtaining required 
documents) while this was not the case before. Table 6.14 summarizes the incidence 
rates and income shares of a range of beneﬁts; the child and housing beneﬁts are income-
tested. The incidence of these beneﬁts is considerable and progressive. Child beneﬁts 
supplement on average 6% of the household income of the lowest wealth quintile. 
For housing beneﬁts this number is 20%. While urban households are more likely to 
receive housing beneﬁts, rural households more often receive child beneﬁts. While 
these beneﬁts provide an additional source of income, Notten and Gassmann (2006) 
show that the poverty reduction effect of child beneﬁts in terms of poverty and chronic 
poverty is rather low indicating that beneﬁt levels are not adequate in this respect. The 
incidence rates and income shares of fuel subsidies and stipends are low. Stipends are 
somewhat progressive and contribute 8% of household income in the lowest wealth 
quintile. So, even though these beneﬁts may help households to smooth consumption, 
they are typically not sufﬁcient to cover basic needs. 
  Instead of, or in addition to, relying on transfers, households can also take up a loan 
or use credit. Table 6.16 shows that about 20% of the households have been borrowing 
funds and a similar share of the households report having debt. Even though we do not 
know if funds are borrowed from a ﬁnancial market or from other institutions, it can 
also be seen that households themselves are active providers of loans; 13% of Russian 
households lend money to others. Thus, even though ﬁnancial markets may play a role, 
other smoothing channels for credits and loans co-exist in Russia. Household lending 
activities may be one channel but Table 6.16 identiﬁes two other channels; the goods 
market and the labour market. Not paying bills can be considered as an alternative 
consumption smoothing strategy closely related to (consumer) credit. If late payments 
Table 6.15: Adjustment of income generating activities – labour and goods market
% of households Obs.2 All Urban Rural Test1 Average expenditure quintiles  Test
1 2 3 4 5
At least 1 member 
reports to have 2nd  
and/or 3rd job
1,955 26.2 23.9 30.2 ns 29.9 25.1 24.3 27.1 24.4 ns
At least 1 member 
has informal job
1,955 24.3 22.4 27.7 ns 30.7 24.6 24.1 24.0 17.8 .01
Note:  1 Wald test on difference means urban-rural and average expenditure quintiles (controlling for 
clustering effects): not signiﬁcant (ns), signiﬁcant at 10% (.1), signiﬁcant at 5% (.05) and signiﬁcant 
at 1% (.01). 2 The full sample consists of 2,718 households. The number of observations in this column 
can be different due to missing information in the questionnaire and / or because the information is only 
applicable to a sub-sample of the households. 
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on purchased goods and services do not automatically lead to a discontinuation of the 
service provided, not paying bills is one strategy that households in need can follow; 
20% of the households reports to have unpaid utility bills. Moreover, it seems that 
employers are also willing to provide loans to their employees. Working household 
members were asked whether they could obtain a loan or credit from their employer: 
one ﬁfth of Russian households have access to such loans. 
  Taking up credit or a loan seems to be a popular smoothing strategy in Russia. As 
with gift exchange, low wealth households are less likely to provide loans but equally 
likely to receive them. The percentage of such households reporting having debt and 
the mean share of debt in monthly expenditures does not differ signiﬁcantly across our 
sample of the Russian population. The information also suggests that, depending on 
their characteristics, households use other smoothing channels. Urban and high wealth 
households are more likely to have access to loans from employers while especially one 
third of the households in the lowest wealth quintile have unpaid utility bills. 
  Finally, when it becomes clear that current income generating activities will 
yield insufﬁcient income, adjustments in such activities can be made. We have only 
two indicators for such adjustments; the percentage of households in which at least 
one household member reports having an informal job the percentage of households 
in which members have a second or third job. We selected these indicators because we 
expect them to be related to situations of unemployment and under-employment.33 A 
quarter of the households reports having household members with an informal job or 
second/third job.34 While the incidence of informal jobs is signiﬁcantly higher for low 
wealth and rural households, this appears not to be the case for second/third jobs. Given 
the prevalence of informal and additional jobs, it may be an interesting alley for further 
research but from these results it is not clear to what extent these indicators indeed 
represent post shock smoothing strategies. 
33 Thus, using these variables as indicators for smoothing mechanisms assumes that these income generating 
activities are second best options. Having an informal job implies that such workers are less likely to be 
protected by labour legislation and are also less likely to build up a contributions history in public social 
security programs. This on the one hand, increases the risk of income shocks and at the same time also affects 
the use of alternative consumption smoothing channels (such as a public social security). Furthermore, 
having an extra job reﬂects a situation where a person would want to work more in his/her ﬁrst job but is not 
able to, or, the ﬁrst job pays an inadequate salary. Of course, it is also possible that a person has more than 
one job because he/she prefers this.
34 This percentage is based on a question in the individual questionnaire in the work section in which the 
respondent was asked whether his job was formal. Given the fact that respondents have a tendency not to 
answer such questions or to report that their job is formal even when it is not, the 24% should be interpreted 
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6.4.4 Income generating activities
Because it is difﬁcult to distinguish between normal income generating activities and 
post shock adjustments in such activities in the RLMS, we ﬁnally discuss a number 
of  indicators  for  the  type  of  income  generating  activities  of  Russian  households. 
Additionally, we are interested in differences in income generating activities between 
groups  of  households  because  such  differences  may  also  inﬂuence  the  choice, 
availability and success of particular smoothing strategies. For instance, not having a 
job also implies that one cannot get a loan through your employer but it also restricts 
the possibilities to pursue ex ante smoothing strategies. We selected indicators on wage 
generation, entrepreneurial activities, home production and indicators for problems in 
the processes of income generation. The latter group is interesting because such problems 
provide insights into (some) sources of income risk and which groups of households are 
more likely to be confronted with such risks. A higher exposure to shocks is likely to be 
associated with a higher incidence of ex post smoothing strategies. Taking a long-term 
perspective, an elevated exposure to shocks may also affect consumption smoothing 
abilities in general. 
  Table 6.17 shows that households in the lowest wealth quintile are more likely to 
have job than higher wealth quintiles. At the same time, low wealth and rural households 
clearly experience more problems with wage generating activities. Unemployment 
rates are higher, irrespective of the deﬁnition used.35 The incidence of irregular wage 
payments, wage arrears and non-cash wages (mainly rural areas) is signiﬁcantly higher 
for these households. Working members in such households are not more concerned 
about losing their job but are, at the same time, more pessimistic about ﬁnding another 
job when the current job is lost. Starting up a business does not seem to be a realistic 
alternative; and even if it is tried, the likelihood that the start up of a business fails is 
much higher among low wealth households. The higher vulnerability of low wealth 
households to wage shocks may be consistent with post shock adjustments in income 
generating activities such as taking additional and informal jobs. However, the reverse 
may also be the case; wage arrears, non-cash and irregular payments are characteristics 
of informal and additional jobs. 
  In any case, if wage generating activities are difﬁcult to obtain or if the income 
from such activities is perceived as risky, households could decide to produce (part of 
35 We use two deﬁnitions of unemployment; ﬁrstly a ‘standard’ deﬁnition according to which a person is 
unemployed if he/she wants to ﬁnd a job and applied for a job in the last month and secondly a ‘self-deﬁned’ 
unemployed if the respondent indicates that he/she is unemployed. The latter deﬁnition is more likely to 
include discouraged jobseekers or underemployed persons and may thus better reﬂect structural problems 
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their) needs themselves or, alternatively, sell those goods in return for cash or other 
goods. In Russia, home production is very popular: 64% of the households used land to 
grow their own crops, 26% held livestock and 34% ﬁshed or gathered foodstuffs such 
as mushrooms, nuts and berries (Table 6.18). Although rural households are more often 
engaged in such activities, home food production is certainly not limited to households 
living in rural settlement areas; about half of urban households used land to grow their 
own crops and 33% of urban households reported gathering/ﬁshing activities. The value 
of home produced foods is rather high for rural households (28% of income) but still 
considerable for urban households (8% of income).36 Table 6.18 also shows that most 
of the proceeds from home production are destined for home consumption.  
  Interestingly,  there  are  no  differences  in  household  food  production  across 
wealth quintiles; low wealth households do not use this income generating activity 
more frequently than other households, even though they appear to have more problems 
with wage-generating activities. If anything, low wealth households are more likely to 
consume crops as opposed to selling them. What explains this popularity of home food 
production in Russia and why do low wealth households not produce more than others? 
A ﬁrst reason may simply be that many households have access to land, either in the 
place they live or by owning a datcha (cottage) with some land in the rural areas (Table 
6.9). Cultural aspects such as preferences on leisure activities may also contribute 
to the popularity of gardening, gathering and ﬁshing activities.37 However, another 
(perhaps complementary) explanation can be that, by producing (part of) their own 
food, households ensure they have some of their basic needs covered even if when their 
other income generating activities fail. Morduch (1995) argues that households can also 
smooth consumption by choosing low risk –low return income activities or by holding 
a portfolio of income generating activities. He calls such activities ‘income smoothing’ 
behaviour. The experience of a multitude of shocks (both covariant and idiosyncratic) 
that has so far characterized the transition process in Russia can be hypothesized as 
a strong rationale for home food production by Russian households.38 Whereas in 
communist times producing your own food provided an insurance against food supply 
problems it may now function as an insurance against (wage) income risk.  
  So far, few studies have analysed the role of household food production in 
Russia and the evidence from those existing studies is ambiguous. Skouﬁas (2003) 
36 The value of home produced food is also included in the estimate of total household income.
37 Unfortunately not much can be learnt from the RLMS data in this respect. Gassmann (2000) discusses 
how such activities also form an important component of leisure.
38 During the nineties, the Russian population experienced a range of large aggregate shocks that inﬂuenced 
their level of well-being but also their perception of risk/uncertainty (Lokshin & Ravallion, 2000; World 
Bank, May 1999).176
ﬁnds little evidence that home food production is used as a response to wage arrears 
and unemployment while Gronau (June 2006) reports a signiﬁcantly negative relation 
between the change in labour status and the hours spent on gardening. Notten and de 
Crombrugghe (2006) on the other hand ﬁnd that rural households have higher food 
consumption smoothing abilities; their food expenditures are less responsive to income 
shocks than those of urban households. One way of reconciling these ﬁndings would be 
that food production in Russia is used as an income smoothing strategy as opposed to a 
speciﬁc risk/shock response strategy.  
  This hypothesis can be tested in a number of ways. Firstly, the RLMS data can 
be used to empirically analyse dynamics between other income sources and ‘income’ 
from food production.39 Secondly, as home food production may be a typical smoothing 
strategy in transition economies it would be very interesting to study the main conditions 
under which such a smoothing strategy is preferred by economic agents and whether 
this could explain such a high prevalence of this strategy in Russia. For instance, one 
could think of a basic model in which a household has to decide how much time to 
invest in home food production versus another (wage) income generating activity. 
The decision could be modelled using a production model or a portfolio investment 
model. Everything else being equal, a household will spend more time on home food 
production in case a) it is more risk averse b) the higher the variance of the wage 
income generating activity and c) the lower the (expected) return of the wage income 
generating activity. Moreover, one could introduce an aggregate source of risk that 
inﬂuences the variability of wage earnings but not that of home food production. If the 
aggregate risk is high, it can be predicted that a large share of households invest more 
time in food production. From a dynamic perspective, one would expect to see this 
share decline as the (perceived) aggregate source of risk would decline. The RLMS 
provides a lot of information to empirically test the predictions of such models but it 
would also be interesting to apply those models to other (transition) economies. As 
such this is an area that certainly merits more research.
6.5 Further research and concluding remarks
In this paper we developed a conceptual framework representing a portfolio of potential 
consumption smoothing channels and explored empiric evidence of typical smoothing 
channels used by Russian households in 2003. The picture that emerged is one in which 
ﬁnancial markets play a limited role as a smoothing channel, regardless of the smoothing 
39 Information on quantities and the monetary value (valued at local market prices) of home production, 
proceeds from sales are collected in a consistent way during the second wave (1994-currently). For the years 
1994-1996 even (noisy) information on the hours spent on work/gardening is available.6. What do Russian households do to smooth consumption?
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mechanism used (saving, lending, insurance). Instead, households seem to use internal 
strategies, their family, social networks and the state to smooth consumption through 
capital accumulation, gift giving, the provision of loans and (pension) beneﬁts. We 
also ﬁnd evidence for differential use of smoothing channels of low wealth and rural 
households and other households. Compared to other groups, low wealth and rural 
households are less likely to use ﬁnancial markets as part of their smoothing strategies. 
Moreover, irrespective of the institution used, these households are less likely to save 
money, accumulate assets or be involved in borrowing and/or lending activities. They 
also  have  less  access  to  loans  through  employers.  ‘Consumer  credit’  through  not 
paying utility bills seems to be an important credit smoothing channel for low wealth 
households. 
  The broad scope of the analysis also enabled the formulation of hypotheses on 
two a-typical smoothing channels. Firstly, the relatively generous old age pensions 
give rise to an inter-generational risk-sharing in which elderly assist their children and 
grand children. Important channels for the re-redistribution of old age pensions are 
gifts to younger family members in other households and the contribution of pensions 
to the income of extended/multiple generation households. Secondly, many Russian 
households in rural and urban areas produce part of the food they consume and we ﬁnd 
no appreciable differences in the prevalence of this activity across wealth quintiles. 
We  hypothesize  that,  as  opposed  to  a  speciﬁc  risk/shock  response  strategy,  home 
food production in Russia may be used as an (in kind) income smoothing strategy; it 
represents a strategy that safeguards food consumption in a region where households 
have  experienced  a  high  degree  of  (aggregate)  shocks  in  the  recent  past.  Further 
investigations into the role of pensions and home food production therefore represent 
particularly interesting alleys of further research.  
  Albeit exploratory, this type of research is relevant for academic and policy 
purposes. The way households in transition economies smooth consumption may be 
different from that of households in developed and developing countries. In the economic 
literature, the village economy model is often used to analyse household and individual 
risk sharing activities in rural developing communities but its applicability to a transition 
economy has not been tested. On the other hand, the ongoing structural development of 
market institutions in transition economies may warrant the use of permanent income 
or life cycle models that are often used to study smoothing behaviour in developed 
economies. These models may not be appropriate or may have to be adjusted so they can 
be used for studying consumption smoothing behaviour in transition economies. The 
conceptual framework and empirical exploratory strategy can be used as tools to obtain 
an inventory of consumption smoothing channels in a given country or community. The 
analysis does not prove the existence of smoothing relationships/channels or whether 178
certain actions are ‘smoothing motivated’. Nevertheless, the information it provides 
indicates which channels are worth further investigating and which linkages have to be 
taken into account. 
  In terms of policy relevance, our research offers an alternative way to use existing 
survey data to obtain a household perspective on consumption smoothing, with the 
household being the basic institution within which risk and resources are shared. The 
environment of households simultaneously is a source of uncertainty as well as a partner 
in dealing with risks. Households use multiple strategies/channels which may or may 
not be country/community speciﬁc. The conceptual framework guides thinking about 
the role, scope and type of government interventions and possible feedback effects to 
other smoothing channels. Public authorities can improve or disturb the functioning of 
particular smoothing channels or directly assist households in managing (speciﬁc) risks 
by means of social protection programmes. Conclusion 7180
This dissertation investigates ﬁve speciﬁc issues in understanding poverty and designing 
sound social protection systems. While chapter 2 investigates the implications of using 
an absolute or a relative poverty indicator on estimating the number of poor, chapter 3 
studies the implications of such indicators on social policy. In chapter 4 we compare 
the effectiveness of means-tested and universal provision of social transfers as poverty 
alleviating instruments. The relation between poverty risk and the ability of households 
to smooth consumption when faced with income shocks is studied in chapter 5. In 
chapter 6 we focus on the ways in which households smooth consumption and the role 
that social protection policies play in such smoothing arrangements. In this concluding 
chapter we discuss each study by providing a discussion of its main results, limitations, 
conclusions and policy relevance.
7.1 Absolute and relative poverty: what’s in a number?
Financial poverty indicators play an important role in policymaking and the evaluation 
of economic development. Countries such as the USA and the EU member states use 
one or several ‘ofﬁcial’ poverty indicators on which progress is regularly monitored; 
whereas the US poverty indicator is based on an absolute concept of poverty, the EU 
poverty indicator is based on a relative concept. In chapters 2 and 3 we investigate the 
implications of using either an absolute or a relative poverty indicator on estimating 
poverty as well as on designing and evaluating poverty alleviating policies.  
  In chapter 2 we apply the ofﬁcial EU (relative) and the US (absolute) poverty 
measures  on  survey  data  for  16  countries  and  analyse  to  what  extent  technical 
differences in these poverty measures affect the estimates of the number of poor. This 
study improves our understanding of how poverty statistics are inﬂuenced by often 
hidden and forgotten methodological and technical decisions. A main contribution of 
our study is that it provides comparable estimates of both absolute and relative poverty 
for a large group of countries over a range of consecutive years (1993-2000). There 
is also an added value to using the ofﬁcial poverty measures of the EU and the US as 
these are inﬂuential indicators in the countries where they are used. Another important 
result is that the conceptual difference between ‘not enough to satisfy basic needs’ and 
‘much less than what is normal’ may not only result in sizeable differences between 
absolute and relative poverty levels but it also implies another evaluation of what 
constitutes economic progress over time. An absolute poverty indicator values any real 
income increase of low income groups as an improvement while a relative indicator 
only detects a more than proportional improvement of low income groups. This is a 
main factor driving differences between absolute and relative poverty rates over time. 
Furthermore, our analysis shows that equivalence scales can have a very large impact 7. Conclusion
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on the estimates of poverty and on the poverty risk of population groups, and that 
this impact differs considerably between absolute and relative indicators. Equivalence 
scales determine the shape of the income distribution and thereby also the relative 
poverty line. This has a stabilizing effect on the overall poverty rates, i.e. the net impact 
of using different equivalence scales is small. However, the underlying changes in 
poverty risk of various population groups are very sizeable and much more difﬁcult to 
understand and predict than for absolute poverty indicators.  
  In chapter 3 we focus on the relation between absolute and relative poverty 
headcounts and their policy uses: we study whether using only one of these indicators 
results in the selection of different priority groups for social policies and if the use of 
an absolute or relative poverty indicator leads to a different evaluation of the success 
of social transfers. Although we use the same poverty measures as in chapter 2, we 
additionally estimate long term poverty headcounts because the chronic poor constitute 
a priority group in itself. We ﬁnd similar differences in long term poverty between 
and within countries. We also show that in ‘rich’ countries, i.e. were absolute poverty 
is lower than relative poverty; the group of chronic poor (using a relative indicator) 
does not have much overlap with the group of absolute poor. Thus, long term relative 
poverty rates can not be used as a proxy for absolute poverty. We further ﬁnd signiﬁcant 
differences between the absolute and relative poverty proﬁles. Thus, depending on the 
poverty concept used, some groups will receive more or less attention. When such 
proﬁles are used to target social policies this may also affect decisions regarding the 
design and evaluation of policies. Finally, the distributional patterns of beneﬁt incidence 
and  average  beneﬁts  show  that  pensions,  family  allowances  and  social  assistance 
are evaluated differently when using absolute or relative poverty measures. In some 
countries for instance, pensions clearly lift people out of poverty (whether absolute 
or relative) while in other countries, pensions are successful in lifting people out of 
absolute poverty but not out of relative poverty.  
  The cross-national poverty comparisons in chapters 2 and 3 are limited in two 
ways.1 As discussed in chapter 2, the use of PPP rates to convert the absolute US poverty 
lines to the national price levels of the other countries may yield poverty lines that are not 
comparable to poverty lines that would be constructed on the basis of actual living costs 
in each country. The latter method would be preferable as it is more likely to conform 
to national views on minimum costs of living. Establishing such thresholds, however, 
is an ambitious research project in itself. Although this limitation may thus inﬂuence 
1 We refer to the literature on poverty measurement which discusses the shortcomings of ﬁnancial poverty 
indicators in general, such as the use of income as a welfare indicator, the presence of (semi) public goods 
such as education and health systems and differences between individual needs (Atkinson et al., 2002; Citro 
et al., 1995; Ravallion, 1994).182
the estimated absolute poverty levels, it does not interfere with the key arguments and 
conclusions of the research. Secondly, based on detailed comparisons of the income 
components in the ECHP and the CNEF-PSID, we ﬁnd that the net income variables 
in both datasets are very similar and can thus be used for cross-national comparative 
poverty analyses. Nevertheless, we identify two key points that should be kept in mind 
in the cross-national poverty comparison. Firstly, the use of register data for Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark may yield higher poverty estimates than if survey data were 
used. Secondly, the assumption of 100% take up of low income tax credits (EITC) may 
underestimate the US poverty rates.  
  The results of our analysis point out that using a single ﬁgure is often misleading. 
Absolute and relative poverty indicators show related but distinct conceptual dimensions 
of ill being; a relative poverty concept evaluates whether someone is better (or worse) 
off as compared to the typical resident in that society, while an absolute poverty concept 
evaluates whether one has enough purchasing power to afford some minimum living 
standard. Especially over time, diverging patterns between both poverty indicators arise 
because each concept evaluates economic development from a different perspective. 
Using either a relative or an absolute poverty indicator thus implies that one ignores 
what happens to the welfare situation of another vulnerable group in society. Moreover, 
in terms of policy it not only affects the setting of priority groups but also the design 
and evaluation of policy responses and, last but not least, the budgetary implications 
and feasibility of efforts to reduce poverty. We therefore conclude that it would make 
sense to use both relative and absolute poverty indicators.  
  We  argue  that  using  absolute  and  relative  poverty  indicators  is  particularly 
relevant in an enlarged EU context because the new Member States are still in the 
process of restructuring their economies and it is expected that there will be strong 
economic growth; all reasons for expecting divergence between absolute and relative 
poverty levels and trends in these countries. For the reasons indicated above, we do not 
recommend the use of PPP rates to obtain comparable absolute poverty lines across 
EU member states. There are a range of methods that could be used instead and we 
discussed one of them in chapter 2 (poverty PPP rates), but further research is needed 
to ﬁnd out which method would be most appropriate in an EU context.
7.2 Universal versus means-tested provision of social transfers: a cost-
beneﬁt analysis
In  chapter  4  we  compare  the  costs  and  beneﬁts  of  means-tested  versus  universal 
provision  of  social  transfers  as  effective  poverty  alleviating  instruments.  Using  a 
reform in the provision of child beneﬁts in Russia as a case study, we assesses the 7. Conclusion
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impact of a policy change from universal to means-tested child allowances in terms 
of targeting efﬁciency and poverty reduction. We thereby focus on the core costs of 
targeting including leakage, exclusion errors and total beneﬁt expenditures, and relate 
these costs to the beneﬁts in terms of poverty reduction. We use the cross-section and 
panel dimensions of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) from 2000 to 
2004 to analyse the impact of the reforms and to simulate the effects of various means-
tested and universal child beneﬁt schemes.  
  We ﬁnd that, since the reforms, more children receive beneﬁts and that there is 
improved targeting of beneﬁts to children living in low income households. Nevertheless, 
in 2004 one third to a quarter of the poor children does not receive beneﬁts while 
about 50% of the beneﬁts leaks to the three highest expenditure quintiles. The poverty 
reduction  impact  is  modest  and  improved  only  marginally  since  the  reforms. The 
simulations show that universal schemes achieve additional poverty reductions in all 
indicators because children who were by error excluded under the means-tested scheme 
now receive a beneﬁt. Furthermore, the simulations point out that more substantial 
poverty reduction can only be achieved by increasing beneﬁt size. Both scenarios, 
making beneﬁts universal and increasing beneﬁts, will increase programme costs. Our 
calculations indicate that, in comparison to other social expenditures, the costs of child 
beneﬁts are rather low in Russia.  
  Due to limitations in the data, we could not take into account the administrative 
costs as well as the inﬂuences of behavioural effects on targeting efﬁciency and poverty 
reduction. Firstly, the administrative infrastructure needed to screen and disburse beneﬁts 
is costly. Screening costs of universal targeting are expected to be lower as compared 
to means-tested schemes because less information is needed to determine eligibility. 
However, the number of beneﬁts disbursed is higher under a universal scheme and 
perhaps requires additional capacity. Ceteris paribus, when screening costs outweigh 
the extra costs associated with an increased scale of operations, a universal targeting 
mechanism becomes more attractive. In general, little information on administrative 
costs is available. The collection of such information is not only relevant for academic 
purposes but governments should also be held accountable for efﬁcient spending of 
tax funds. Secondly, as the size of beneﬁts increases, more parents will apply for child 
beneﬁts affecting administrative costs and programme costs. The static simulations do 
not take such incentive effects into account. It is therefore likely that the programme 
costs and poverty reduction effects under means-tested schemes using higher beneﬁt 
levels are underestimated. Thirdly, social transfers also affect the amount of labour 
supplied by households. The effect of current beneﬁt levels on labour supply in our 
case study can be assumed to be marginal given the low and ﬂat rate beneﬁt levels. 
Substantial rises in child beneﬁts, particularly in combination with a means-tested 184
scheme, may affect labour supply. It is not clear whether such labour supply effects 
would be substantial in the higher beneﬁt scenarios that we simulated.   
  Our results question the relevance of using a means-test when child beneﬁts are 
so low. The impact of current beneﬁts on poverty is limited and a substantial number 
of poor children are still excluded. Moreover, the distributional inequality in Russia 
is high and families with children are disproportionately present at the lower parts of 
the income distribution. Consequently, a universal beneﬁt scheme would automatically 
assist these families and leakage of beneﬁts to high income families would be relatively 
low.
7.3 Poverty risk and its relation to consumption smoothing abilities
In chapter 5 we examine the extent to which Russian households have been able to 
protect their consumption against income shocks during the transition period and how 
the consumption smoothing abilities of various population groups are related to their 
relative poverty risk. This study is the ﬁrst to explicitly incorporate short and long 
term smoothing dynamics by using an error correction mechanism. This model better 
reﬂects smoothing behaviour and its long term constraints: when faced with an income 
shock, households may use alternative resources to protect their consumption. At some 
point in time, however, such resources are depleted and consumption and income have 
to be in balance again. The tests indicate that the use of this model is appropriate.
  We ﬁnd that Russian households can only partially smooth consumption in 
the short and the long term while food expenditures are better protected than non-
food expenditures. The partial estimations according to various living standards and 
chronic poverty groups show that consumption smoothing abilities improve as the 
living  standard  increases. Although  chronically  poor  households  are  partially  able 
to protect their consumption from income shocks, at the same time, they respond by 
further reducing already low levels of food and non-food expenditures. However, low 
abilities of consumption smoothing are not always associated with high poverty risk. 
For instance, we ﬁnd that rural households, who have a high poverty risk, manage to 
smooth food expenditures quite well, most likely because they have more opportunities 
to produce their own food. On the other hand, households with pensioners have a low 
poverty risk and high smoothing abilities. 
  A limitation in this research is that the consumption smoothing abilities for 
various population groups are obtained by estimating the model for a selection of socio-
economic  groups  separately.  Preferably,  the  inﬂuence  of  household  characteristics 
should be directly incorporated in a single model of consumption smoothing. The 
inclusion of additional variables was not feasible due to insufﬁcient degrees of freedom 7. Conclusion
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and because some relevant characteristics are constant and would thus be dropped in 
the (differenced) GMM estimations.  
  Our results support the arguments of those who propose a new orientation of 
social protection policies; in addition to policies aimed at poverty relief there is also 
an important role for the government in terms of assisting households managing risks 
(Holzman & Jorgensen, February 2000; Neubourg de, 2002; Neubourg de & Weigand, 
2000). Although we provide a number of intuitively appealing explanations for our 
results, more in depth research is required to understand the underlying determinants of 
poverty risk and consumption smoothing abilities in speciﬁc contexts. 
 
7.4  Managing  risks:  what  do  (Russian)  households  do  to  smooth 
consumption?
In chapter 6 we develop a conceptual framework to study how households smooth 
consumption  and  apply  this  framework  to  Russian  household  survey  data.  The 
conceptual  framework  of  possible  smoothing  arrangements  distinguishes  between 
various  smoothing  strategies,  institutional  smoothing  partners  and  required  assets. 
Subsequently, we use this framework to select and analyse a broad set of indicators from 
household survey data to study what actions Russian households take and how this may 
help them smooth consumption. This framework enables us to analyse and interpret 
existing survey data from a different perspective, thereby generating information about 
which smoothing channels are worth further investigating and which linkages have to 
be taken into account. The analysis shows that households may smooth consumption 
through saving and borrowing but that ﬁnancial markets play a very limited role. 
Instead, providers of credit are households themselves, the employers of household 
members or ‘credit’ is provided in the goods market in the form of unpaid utility bills. 
The evidence on home food production suggests that this activity is not so much a post-
shock smoothing response but constitutes a comprehensive part of (in kind) income 
generating activities in Russia. The results yield another interesting hypothesis which is 
that the relatively generous pension system induces a re-redistribution of pensions from 
the elderly to their younger family members through gift giving. 
  The analysis in chapter 6 does not prove that the observed actions do have 
smoothing motivations; it only provides a ﬁrst step in the sense that it helps to formulate 
hypotheses and provides information about important features of a formal model. The 
subsequent development and testing of such models is a challenging task. Important 
topics for further research are the development and testing of models that disentangle 
the welfare effects of risk response and shock response behaviour, and the analysis of 
interrelationships between several smoothing arrangements. 186
  The ability of a household to ensure that it has sufﬁcient means to fulﬁl the 
basic needs of its members, today as well as tomorrow, is a key aspect of economic 
well-being and thereby also an important explanatory factor explaining their behaviour. 
Individuals manage the risk of not being able to satisfy their needs, by making a complex 
set of arrangements using various institutional counterparts, the household being the 
principal risk management institution. It is important, both for academic and policy 
purposes, to better understand the success or failure of smoothing arrangements and 
how arrangements complement or substitute each other. The increasing availability of 
panel data, also in developing and transition economies, provides many opportunities 
to test theories on consumption smoothing behaviour. At the same time, testing these 
theories requires a ﬁltering of essential explanatory ingredients from large databases. 
This chapter shows how conceptual and exploratory empirical analyses can contribute 
to  this  ﬁltering  process.  Moreover,  the  analysis  suggests  that  the  scope  of  public 
actions to assist individuals and households to smooth consumption extends beyond 
the scope of public social protection policies. But before governments can adequately 
assist households with managing risks, they need to understand how groups in their 
population currently manage such risks. The conceptual framework in chapter 6 of this 
dissertation enables one to explore these complex relationships without limiting the 
scope of potential policy responses to social policies.References 8188
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9.1 Introduction1 2 3 4 
Ofﬁcial poverty rates differ from other poverty rates in the sense that the ofﬁcial ones 
are more often used as a benchmark to develop new policies as well as to evaluate the 
performance of existing programs. Europe has the tradition and the practice to use 
relative poverty (Laeken indicators); the USA use an objective method to estimate ofﬁcial 
poverty. Although related, each approach portrays different dimensions of poverty. In 
chapters 2 and 3 we use the ofﬁcial poverty measurement methods of the EU and the 
United States and apply both methods to USA and EU data. We use the harmonized 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the EU-15 and the USA section of 
the Cross National Equivalent Files (CNEF-PSID) for the USA (1994-2001). Chapter 
2 shows how some poverty differences are inherent to choosing either an absolute or a 
relative approach to poverty while other differences are related to more general aspects 
of poverty measurement. Chapter 3 discusses the relation between policy and the use of 
absolute and relative poverty indicators as tools to evaluate, monitor and design (social) 
policies. This appendix explains how we obtained these poverty ﬁgures. We ﬁrstly 
explain the origin and main characteristics of each poverty measurement methods and 
what information is required for a cross-country comparison of both methods. Then, we 
explain which data are used, how they were prepared for the cross-national comparative 
analysis and we discuss a number of comparability issues.5 Subsequently, we provide a 
ﬁrst discussion of the results in which we focus on differences and similarities between 
both indicators. We compare annual poverty levels and trends between countries and 
for speciﬁc population groups in each country. Moreover, we also compare the USA 
and EU using absolute and relative indicators of long-term poverty. 
1 This appendix is based on: Notten, G. & C. de Neubourg (2007). Poverty in Europe and the USA:
Exchanging ofﬁcial measurement methods. MGSoG Working Paper, 2007/006, Maastricht Graduate
School of Governance, Maastricht University, Maastricht.
2 In this appendix we use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The results and 
conclusions of this appendix are ours and not those of Eurostat, the European Commission or any of the 
national authorities whose data have been used.
3 This research beneﬁted from a grant provided by the EuroPanel Users’ Network (EPUNet) that ﬁnanced a 
research visit to CEPS/INSTEAD (Differdange, Luxembourg) as well as from a travel grant provided by the 
Dutch Scientiﬁc Organization (NWO) which funded a research visit to the Kennedy School of Government 
(Cambridge, USA).
4 We thank our colleagues at CEPS/INSTEAD (Differdange, Luxembourg), Kennedy School of Government 
(Cambridge,  USA),  National  Poverty  Institute  (Ann Arbor,  USA),  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics 
(Ann Arbor, USA) and the participants in the conference on ‘New Directions in the Study of Inequality’ 
(Princeton, April 2006, USA) who have contributed to the progress of this research.  We are especially 
grateful for the constructive suggestions of Emil Tesliuc, Christopher Jencks, Mary Jo Bane, Erzo Luttmer 
and Gary Sandefur. 
5 If you have further questions please contact Geranda Notten (geranda.notten@governance.unimaas.nl). 9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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9.2 Ofﬁcial poverty measurement methods in the USA and EU
The EU methodology, the so-called Laeken At-Risk-of-Poverty indicator, is based on 
a relative concept of poverty. In this method, the poverty line is set at 60% of median 
income, thus relative to the income level in the population. The USA methodology is 
based on an absolute concept of poverty. The USA poverty line is based on an assessment 
of the basic cost of living. We named the USA poverty indicator the ‘Orshansky’ 
indicator (after the economist who developed the method). 
9.2.1 Poverty measurement in the EU: the Laeken indicators
During the Nice summit in 2001, the EU Member States decided to combat poverty and 
social exclusion by means of the open method of coordination. This method ‘involves 
ﬁxing guidelines for the Union, establishing quantitative and qualitative indicators to 
be applied in each member state, and periodic monitoring’ (Atkinson et al., 2002). 
The  design  and  implementation  of  policies  to  ﬁght  poverty  and  social  exclusion, 
however, remained predominantly the responsibility of the Member States. To monitor 
progress in these areas, a set of common statistical indicators was developed. Named 
after the Laeken European Council who endorsed the indicators in 2001, these ‘Laeken 
indicators’ cover four dimensions of social inclusion; ﬁnancial poverty, employment, 
health and education. In this research, we use the subset of the Laeken indicators that is 
concerned with ﬁnancial poverty.  
  Most of the so-called Laeken ‘At-risk-of-poverty’ indicators are based on a 
relative poverty line that is set at 60% of national median adult equivalent income 
(Eurostat, 2003b). The welfare indicator is based on annual net household income 
and includes the earnings and transfers received by the household. To control for the 
demographic composition of the household and economies of scale, household income 
is  adjusted  using  the  modiﬁed  OECD  equivalence  scales.6 When  adult  equivalent 
household income falls below 60% of national median adult equivalent income, all of 
the household members are poor. The statistics bureau of the European Union, Eurostat, 
publishes  the  Laeken  indicators.  During  the  nineties,  Eurostat  used  the  European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the ﬁnancial poverty estimates.  
6 The modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale gives a weight of 1 to the ﬁrst adult in the household, a weight of 
0.5 to other members aged over 14 years and a weight of 0.3 for children under age 14.200
9.2.2 Poverty measurement in the USA: the Orshansky poverty lines 
The USA poverty lines were developed in the 1960s by Molly Orshansky, an economist 
working for the Social Security Administration.7 In that time there was no generally 
accepted standard of basic needs that could be used to determine a minimum consumption 
basket. The Agriculture Department, however, had deﬁned food plans which measured 
the costs of food for various budgets ranging from ‘liberal’, ‘moderate’, ‘low-cost’ to 
‘economy’. Orshansky used the lowest food plans ‘low-cost’ and ‘economy’, where the 
costs of ‘economy’ were about 75-80% of the ‘low-cost’ plan, to develop two sets of 
food poverty lines. The current ofﬁcial poverty estimates are based on the thresholds of 
the ‘economy’ food plan which was designed for families under economic stress. 
  To obtain a poverty line that also included the costs of non-food consumption, 
Orshansky used the 1955 Household Food Consumption Survey to estimate the average 
share of food expenditures in total income for families of three or more persons.8 
To obtain the overall poverty line the cost of the food budget was multiplied by the 
reciprocal of the food share (i.e. the food-ratio method). The poverty line varies with 
demographic composition of families. Although there have been some minor changes 
in the methodology over time, the poverty lines currently used are essentially the same 
as those developed in the 1960s. Currently, there are 48 poverty lines depending on 
family size and the age of household members. These thresholds are annually adjusted 
for inﬂation.9 Every year, an inﬂation adjustment is made using the consumer price 
index for urban consumers (CPI-U), which is the same for the whole USA.  
  The ofﬁcial poverty rates are annually estimated by the Bureau of Census using 
the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The poverty status of 
a family is obtained by comparing its gross annual income to the poverty line of that 
family type. The welfare indicator only includes ‘money’ income (i.e. earnings and 
money transfers). In-kind transfers such as food stamps or the consumption of public 
goods are not included. Housing allowances and capital gains (or losses) are also not 
included in the income aggregate. The demographic characteristics determining the 
poverty line are based on the current household situation while the welfare indicator 
reﬂects total family income of the previous (tax) year.
7 This description of the Orshansky methodology is largely based on the information provided on the website 
of the Bureau of Census (http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/poverty.html). Especially helpful was 
the online paper of G. Fisher on the Development of the Orshansky poverty thresholds (Fischer, 1992).
8 Orshansky found that the average share of food expenditures was about one third of family income. Also 
note that this is the average food share of the total population of families and not low-income families.
9 The thresholds are available for each year on the website of the Bureau of Census on www.census.gov/
hhes/www/poverty/threshld.9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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9.2.3 Application of both poverty measurement methods 
The above discussion reveals a number of information requirements which need to be 
satisﬁed in each dataset to enable an application of both poverty measurement methods 
to European countries and the USA. Firstly, to obtain Orshansky poverty estimates for 
the European countries we need a welfare indicator that is comparable to the one used 
in the USA and we need to convert the absolute Orshansky poverty lines to comparable 
values in each of the European countries. Secondly, in order to obtain Laeken poverty 
estimates for the USA we need a welfare indicator that is comparable to that being used 
in Europe. Thirdly, the deﬁnition of total household income used in the Orshansky 
indicator differs from that used in the Laeken poverty rates. The main difference is 
that the Orshansky poverty rates are calculated using gross income while the Laeken 
poverty rates are calculated using net household income. Fourthly, the Laeken and 
Orshansky methods use different equivalence scales to adjust for household size and 
household composition and thus require different identiﬁcation variables. In the Laeken 
methodology household income is adjusted using the modiﬁed OECD equivalence 
scales while the Orshansky methodology uses a different set of equivalence scales by 
distinguishing a speciﬁc poverty line for each of the 48 household types.  
  The ideal approach for comparing both poverty methods on Europe and the USA 
would require that household data are collected in the same way in both regions (using 
the same sampling design, questionnaires, data cleaning, methods for constructing 
variables  etc.).  Moreover,  these  data  would  have  to  provide  all  relevant  variables 
needed to compute the poverty rates according to both methodologies (gross income, 
net income, basic cost of living in each European country etc.). Given time and budget 
restrictions, we followed a more pragmatic approach. We selected household budget 
surveys for both regions that are reasonably comparable in terms of collection and 
variables (see section 9.3). Secondly, we used purchasing power parity (PPP) rates to 
convert the Orshansky thresholds to the price levels in each of the European countries. 
The main rationale for this choice is that the current USA thresholds are based on the 
cost of living in the 1960s and that the construction of up to date thresholds reﬂecting 
the cost of living in each country (including the US) would constitute an ambitious 
research project in itself. Our method is further explained in section 9.3 while the 
limitations and alternatives are discussed in chapter 2. Furthermore, we decided to 
use net household income as the principal welfare indicator for the calculation of both 
Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates. The main reason for using net income is that it 
better reﬂects disposable income i.e. the income that a household has at its disposition 202
to ﬁnance household expenditures.10 For the rest, we followed the methodologies as 
explained above. This implies that the Orshansky poverty rates have been calculated 
using different equivalence scales than those used for the Laeken poverty rates. The 
impact of equivalence scales on absolute and relative poverty rates is further studied in 
chapter 2. 
  We  compare  the  Orshansky  and  Laeken  indicators  using  various  poverty 
measures such as the percentage of poor individuals (poverty incidence), the percentage 
of individuals living in long term poverty (chronic or long term poverty incidence) and 
the mean proportionate income shortfall in the population (poverty gap). We decompose 
the poverty incidence of various groups in the population by gender, age, household 
type and main source of income. We also study the impact of various transfers on 
Orshansky and Laeken poverty rates.
9.3 Making poverty rates between Europe and the USA comparable
The Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates are mainly based on two household surveys: 
the  European  Community  Household  Panel  (ECHP)  and  the  USA  section  of  the 
Cross-National Equivalent Files (CNEF-PSID). We complemented these datasets with 
information from other sources such as the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), 
Bureau of Census, Federal Reserve, Eurostat and the OECD. In sections 9.3.1 and 9.3.2 
we describe the main datasets (ECHP and the CNEF), explain how we supplemented 
these datasets with information from the above mentioned sources and how we further 
prepared the data for the comparative poverty analysis. In section 9.4 we discuss a 
number of issues related to the cross-national comparability of both datasets.
9.3.1 European Union – ECHP 
The ECHP is a harmonized household budget survey for 15 European Union (EU-
15) member states collected over eight waves from 1994 to 2001. The ECHP contains 
information for the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
France,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Austria  (1995-2001),  Portugal, 
Finland (1996-2001), Sweden (1997-2001) and the United Kingdom. The data provide 
cross-section and longitudinal information on household and individual level on topics 
such as income, education, housing, health and social relations. Comparability of the 
ECHP data is achieved through common survey structure and procedures, common 
10 This implies that our US Orshansky poverty rates will differ from the ofﬁcial poverty rates as published 
by the Bureau of Census.9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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standards  on  sampling  requirements  and  where  possible  on  data  processing  and 
statistical analysis as well as the use of a ‘blue-print’ questionnaire used as point of 
departure for all national surveys. For most of the countries the surveys were collected 
using a harmonized questionnaire. For Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and United 
Kingdom the national surveys of these countries were converted into ECHP format.  
  We base our analysis on the User Data Base (UDB) of the ECHP which consists 
of a series of separate ﬁles.11 For each wave, there is a household and an individual ﬁle. 
These ﬁles hold the variables that have been derived from the household and individual 
questionnaires. The register ﬁle includes information on every household and individual 
that has been interviewed over time.12 The longitudinal link ﬁle contains some time-
ﬁxed and wave speciﬁc variables on every individual. This information needed for 
constructing a panel. Finally, there is a country ﬁle which includes some country level 
variables such as exchange rates, consumer price indices, purchasing power parities 
and population size.  
  We ﬁrst extracted all relevant information from these ﬁles and constructed a 
single database.13  This household level database holds information on the demographic 
characteristics of the household and its income (for each country and wave). We also 
created a number of household variables indicating the total number of males and 
females in the household as well as the number of household members by age category 
(age 0-15, age 16-24, age 25-49, age 50-64 and above age 65). These variables were 
ﬁrst created in the register ﬁle and then merged to the household level ﬁle using the 
appropriate identiﬁcation variables (country, wave, household identiﬁcation number).14 
We did not need to generate an income variable for the Laeken indicators because the 
total income variable in the ECHP has been constructed following the income deﬁnition 
used in the Laeken indicators. This income variable represents total net household 
income in the year previous to the survey. We also generated a variable indicating 
11 For more detailed information on the UDB, we refer to the ECHP UDB manual (Eurostat, 2003a) and the 
EPUNet ECHP user guide (Euro Panel Users Network, July 2004).
12  Individuals  that  were  present  in  the  ﬁrst  wave  (1994  for  most  countries)  were  re-contacted  every 
subsequent  year.  These  ‘sample’  persons  and  the  households  they  were  living  in  were  interviewed.   
We compared the number of ‘sample’ persons for each country in the ﬁrst (available) wave with those in 
wave 8. In Ireland, only 43% of the ‘sample’ persons were interviewed in wave 8. In Belgium and Denmark 
retention rates were about 65% while in the other countries retention rates were above 70% (5 countries) or 
80% (7countries). Low retention rates are of concern because they may reduce the representativeness of the 
sample (as compared to the countries’ population). To counteract this potential problem the cross-section 
and longitudinal weights are adjusted in every wave.
13 We used the ‘ECHP extract’ Stata ado-ﬁle written by Philippe van Kerm (CEPS/INSTEAD, Differdange, 
Luxembourg) and available on http://www.Vankerm.net/stata (retrieved February 2006). 
14 Because there was no household interview date we could not calculate the exact age. Instead we subtracted 
the age from the year of the wave from the person’s birth year. 204
total gross income using the net/gross factor (hi020) provided in the ECHP as well 
as income variables indicating pre-transfer income (one excluding all social transfer 
income and another excluding all non-pension transfers). We further converted the 48 
poverty lines15 from 1993 to the national living standards of the member states. Finally, 
we generated a variable that identiﬁed each household in a particular wave with one of 
the 48 USA household level poverty thresholds. Other required variables were already 
present in the User Database. 
  Although the data are on a household level, and we determine the poverty status 
also at this level, we establish the relative poverty line and calculate the aggregate 
poverty measures by counting each individual. We use the household cross-section 
sample weights multiplied by household size to get representative estimates for the 
national population.  
  To analyse long term poverty, we determined the poverty status at a household 
level  and  thereafter  continued  the  analysis  at  an  individual  level.  We  therefore 
expanded the household level ﬁle to an individual level by merging the individual level 
identiﬁcation variable and some other variables (gender, age, whether individual is 
present in household in a particular wave) from the longitudinal ﬁle into the household 
ﬁle. To get representative population estimates, we used the longitudinal weights from 
the ECHP for the analysis of poverty dynamics.
9.3.2 United States – CNEF-PSID
Although the ofﬁcial USA poverty estimates are calculated using the March supplement 
of the Current Population Survey (CPS), we use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). The PSID data are available in two formats; the original ones that can be 
downloaded from the website of the PSID and the so-called Cross-National Equivalent 
Files (CNEF). The CNEF contains equivalently deﬁned variables for the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID), the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the British 
Household Panel Study (BHPS), and the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income 
Dynamics (SLID). The most interesting feature of the equivalent ﬁles is that they provide 
a set of constructed variables that are can be used for cross-national comparisons while 
these variables are not directly available in the original surveys. This is particularly 
relevant  for  household  income,  the  welfare  indicator  for  both  the  Orshansky  and 
Laeken poverty rates. The CNEF data include imputed variables for the tax burden and 
thereby allow the construction of pre tax and post tax income. This information is not 
15 The equivalence scales are included in the poverty lines instead of being applied to household income. 
There are 48 different household types speciﬁed and each household type has its own poverty line.  9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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readily available in the PSID or in the CPS. Moreover, using the CNEF also means that 
the CNEF-PSID variables are harmonized with two datasets that are also the basis for 
the ECHP data of these countries (GSOEP and BHPS).16 A ﬁnal reason for preferring 
the PSID-CNEF above the CPS is that the PSID is a panel and thereby also allows the 
estimation of long term poverty rates.17
  The PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal dataset containing infor-
mation  on  individual and  family  level  on  economic and  demographic topics  such 
as income, employment, family composition and residential location. Started as an 
annual survey in 1968, the PSID became a biennial survey since 1997.18 We use the 
CNEF-PSID data from 1994 to 2001 with gaps for 1998 and 2000. Next to a range of 
demographic and labour variables, the CNEF includes pre tax income variables such 
as labour income, asset income, transfer income (private and public), social security 
income and private retirement income (income from the year previous to the survey). It 
also includes variables on income taxes and social security contributions.  
  The CNEF data are stored by wave in individual level ﬁles which also include 
household level variables. We merged all waves into one ﬁle using the unique person 
identiﬁer (x11101ll). We created a number of household level variables indicating the 
total number of household members by age category and gender. We also supplemented 
the  CNEF  data  with  some  additional  variables  from  the  PSID.19  This  is  possible 
because the CNEF includes the relevant identiﬁers to match individuals and households 
in the CNEF with those in the PSID. We obtained the following variables from the 
PSID: whether a household received food stamps last year and how much, whether a 
household received heating subsidies from the government and how much and whether 
the household’s dwelling place was owned, rented, or neither of both. 
We generated the following variables:
-  A variable specifying 48 household types that are needed to match the household 
with the ofﬁcial United States thresholds.
16 For more information we refer to the PSID website (http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/) and the CNEF 
website (http://www.human.cornell.edu/che/PAM/Research/Centers-Programs/German-Panel/Cross-Natio-
nal-Equivalent-File_CNEF.cfm).
17 Another alternative would have been to use data from the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS). However, 
the LIS data are not available for a subsequent range of years nor, do they allow for longitudinal analysis. 
18 In 1997, the original sample was reduced from about 8,500 families to 6,168 and the sample was refreshed 
by adding a sample of 441 post 1968 immigrant families (the latter are not included in CNEF). The weights 
are adjusted in every wave to account for sample attrition.
19 The PSID variables can be downloaded electronically using PSID’s Datacenter (http://psidonline.isr.
umich.edu/, retrieved October 2006).206
-  A  variable  that  indicated  the  household  weight  using  the  modiﬁed  OECD 
equivalence scales. The modiﬁed OECD scales give a weight of 1 to the ﬁrst adult 
in the household, 0.5 to every additional adult and 0.3 to every child aged below 
14. 
-  Two total income variables; one that is consistent with the Laeken deﬁnition and 
one largely consistent with the ofﬁcial USA poverty methodology:
-  A variable using the Laeken household typology. 
-  Variables indicating pre-transfer income; one excluding all social transfer income 
and another excluding all non-pension transfers.
-  A variable indicating the Dollar-ECU/Euro exchange rate.20 
9.4 Comparability of main variables used in poverty analysis
We discuss three elements of our poverty analysis that have a key inﬂuence on the cross-
national comparability of the results; deﬁnition of the household, the measurement and 
construction of household income and the conversion of Orshansky poverty lines to 
the price level of the countries in the ECHP. With respect to the household deﬁnition 
and household income we focus on the extent to which there are differences in these 
elements as they are measured in the ECHP and the CNEF-PSID data. For the Orshansky 
poverty lines we describe the followed methodology.
9.4.1 Deﬁnition of the household
In poverty analyses the household is often used as the unit of analysis as this is the level 
at which resources are typically shared. To obtain an indicator of household income 
(or another monetary welfare indicator) the income of all household members are 
added. If the joint household income falls below the poverty line, everyone living in 
that household is considered poor. Both Laeken and Orshansky indicators are using the 
household as the unit of analysis. For our purposes it is important to ﬁnd out whether 
there are any differences in the deﬁnition of what constitutes a household in the ECHP 
and the CNEF-PSID as these differences may inﬂuence the poverty measures.  
  There is no formal deﬁnition provided in the codebook of the ECHP. Nevertheless, 
the  codebook  describes  the  possible  relationships  between  members  of  household 
(Eurostat, 2003a). Next to family relationships, cohabitants, foster parents there was 
also a code for ‘other’ relationship. This suggests that the ECHP uses the common 
20 Obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5a/, retrieved 
October 2006).9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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household deﬁnition ‘individuals living together and sharing resources’. Sweden is an 
exception. The Swedish data come from the Swedish Living Conditions Survey and 
this survey uses another deﬁnition, namely ‘people being taxed together’. This implies 
that in Sweden only adults and their dependent siblings are part of a household (elderly 
or other persons present in the household but not ﬁling a joint tax form are therefore 
not included). If these ‘other’ people in the household tend to have a lower (adult 
equivalent) income than of the individuals in the single tax unit, this may increase the 
Swedish poverty rates.   
  The household deﬁnition in the CNEF is directly taken from the PSID and 
represents what is called a ‘family unit’ (FU). The FU is deﬁned as a group of people 
living together as a family. They are generally related by blood, marriage, or adoption, 
but unrelated persons can be part of a FU if they are permanently living together and 
share income and expenses (Hill, 1992).21 The discussion above suggests that the 
household deﬁnitions used in the European and United States data are very similar.
  
9.4.2 Income
For the calculation of the Laeken and Orshansky poverty measures we predominantly 
use net household income as a welfare indicator, but for illustrative purposes we also 
estimated  Orshansky  poverty  rates  using  an  indicator  of  gross  household  income. 
As indicated above, total net household income the ECHP data is equivalent to the 
income deﬁnition as used in the Laeken indicators. In what follows, we ﬁrst explain 
what income information is included in the ECHP, how the net and gross household 
income variables are constructed and whether there are methodological differences 
in the income variables between the countries in the ECHP. Thereafter, we explain 
how we constructed similar income variables for the United States in the CNEF-PSID 
and discuss the potential poverty impact of differences between the CNEF and ECHP 
income variables.
Income in the ECHP 
Total net household income in the ECHP is composed of wage income and salary earnings, 
self-employment earnings, capital income, property/rental income, private transfers and 
21 The deﬁnition of the family unit used in the PSID differs from that used by the Bureau of Census and their 
ofﬁcial poverty estimates. The Bureau of Census uses a stricter deﬁnition of family and excludes unrelated 
persons who nevertheless share resources with other individuals living in the same housing unit (Hill, 
1992). This means that a cohabiting couple is treated as 2 different families while the PSID treats those 
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social transfers. Social transfers are composed of pensions, unemployment beneﬁts, 
family  related  allowances,  sickness/invalidity  beneﬁts,  social  assistance,  education 
allowances, housing allowance and any other personal beneﬁts. In kind transfers or 
home food production are not included. The total income variable (hi100) represents 
the annual income of the household in the year previous to the survey. The ECHP 
also includes a household level variable that provides an estimate of the household tax 
burden. This estimate is obtained from a regression that includes the average tax rates 
of wage income for various household types. In other words, the estimated tax burden 
depends on the total household income as compared to the average income of similar 
incomes (Eurostat, 2002). We use this variable to obtain an indicator of gross income 
in the ECHP data.  
  Albeit harmonized, cross-country comparability of the ECHP data is not perfect. 
Some variables are not available for every country. Sometimes this is because the 
information was not collected and in other cases information is conﬁdential.22 For 
instance, in the German ECHP data, the values for various income subcategories are 
conﬁdential but are included in the total income variable. For the UK, Netherlands, 
Spain and Austria the category ‘lump sum earnings’ is missing while information on 
social assistance is missing for the UK. For Austria, sickness beneﬁts also include care 
allowances. Table 9.1 summarizes these income discrepancies for each country and 
indicates their potential effects. 
  Another issue is the fact that the Swedish, Danish and Finnish data are not 
obtained from surveys but based on register data. A study based on the comparison of 
Finnish register and survey data shows that the income distribution based on survey 
data reports higher income levels at the lower end of the distribution than register based 
data and vice versa for the top end of the distribution (Rendtel et al., January 2004). 
If this is a general phenomenon, this implies that poverty rates are likely to be higher 
using register data than survey data. Despite these imperfections, the ECHP remains the 
best alternative for intra-EU poverty comparisons. 
Income in the CNEF-PSID
The CNEF includes pre- and post government income where taxes and government 
transfers form the difference between the two. The basis for our net household income 
aggregate is the post-government income variable. This variable includes all income 
from labour, assets, social security pensions, private pensions, private transfers and 
22 More detailed information on missing information can be found in the extensive variable description 
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public transfers and is adjusted to net values using an imputed tax variable. Gross 
household income includes the sum of all (gross) income sources mentioned above.  
  Overall, analysis of the PSID questionnaires and the CNEF algorithms suggests 
that the PSID takes similar income sources into account as the ECHP. The level of detail 
in the PSID questionnaires is somewhat higher for sources of asset and entrepreneurial 
income and we found different algorithms for the calculation of entrepreneurial income. 
It is therefore possible that the PSID values for these variables are somewhat different 
than if the ECHP methodology would have been applied.23 The value of food stamps 
is included in CNEF transfer income while the ECHP labels such beneﬁts as in-kind 
and does not include them. We think that the value of received food stamps should be 
included in our welfare indicator for two reasons. Firstly, the food stamp programme 
is one of the main programmes targeting poor households in the US; not including the 
value of these beneﬁts would ignore this important poverty reduction effort. Secondly, 
food stamp beneﬁts are issued as ‘near money’ in the form of an electronic debit card 
that can be used to purchase food items in a range of supermarkets. The CNEF does not 
include the value of housing and heating subsidies and education stipends are likely to 
be underestimated because there is no speciﬁc question aimed at this income source.24 
The  PSID  includes  variables  indicating  whether  and  how  much  heating  subsidies 
were received. We retrieved this variable from the PSID and included it in the income 
estimate. 
  Even  when  questionnaires  include  similar  questions  on  particular  income 
sources, methodological differences in data collection and data cleaning may give rise 
to differences in recorded income. For instance, when income from entrepreneurial 
activities is negative, the ECHP sets the observed income from this source to zero. As a 
result, there are no negative observations in the ECHP for this income source while these 
are present in the PSID and the CNEF. To enhance comparability, we set any negative 
values from labour earnings to zero in the CNEF. Comparing poverty headcounts with 
and without the adjustment suggests that the impact of this adjustment on poverty 
statistics is negligible. Differences in top coding between the ECHP and CNEF-PSID 
are another issue. Top coding implies that when income exceeds a certain value it is 
replaced by the (lower) threshold value. In the PSID, the top coding was altered in 1999 
(the thresholds were increased). In the ECHP only values above 99,999,990 were top-
23 A higher level of detail in questionnaires typically increases reported income from these sources. The 
calculation of entrepreneurial income of the PSID also includes certain aspects of asset wage income which 
can also be negative. It is not clear what impact this has on the values of these income sources. 
24 Education beneﬁts or stipends, if obtained, are typically not in cash but provided in the form of a tuition 
waver or another fee reduction. 210
coded, two digits more than the current PSID. As top coding only affects the top of the 
income distribution and our poverty analyses depend on the lower half of the income 
distribution, we did not make any corrections.25  
  One of the reasons why we preferred to use the CNEF-PSID data above the 
original PSID or the CPS data is that the CNEF includes (imputed) indicators on 
households’ tax burden and thus allowed to construct an after tax income indicator. 
The CNEF includes estimates of the households’ federal and state income taxes and 
payroll taxes. The federal and state income tax burdens are imputed using the NBER 
TAXSIM model with the available PSID data while the burden of payroll taxes have 
been estimated using the tax rates reported by the Social Security Bulletin. Butrica and 
Burkhauser (1997) show in a comparison between the TAXSIM model and the PSID 
tax burdens that the mean and median tax burdens are very similar but that the TAXSIM 
model overestimates the tax burden at the higher end of the income distribution.26  
  An issue that is more likely to inﬂuence our USA poverty estimates is that the 
TAXSIM model also incorporates the higher deductions for low income families with 
children (Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)). The EITC is one of the principal federal 
programmes targeted at the poor (together with food stamps and Medicaid). Especially 
at low income levels, the credit is considerable (the EITC can even exceed the value of 
income tax). The simulated tax burden assumes a 100 percent EITC take up rate but not 
all eligible households actually receive the EITC. According to a study of the Internal 
Revenue Service on participation in the EITC programme for the tax year 1996, up 
to 18% of the of the eligible individuals did not ﬁle a tax return (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2002). Because we do not know whether a household actually received EITC, 
the USA poverty estimates using net household income may be underestimating USA 
poverty rates. As the EITC is not available as a separate variable, we cannot estimate 
the potential poverty bias. The difference in Orshansky poverty rates between using 
net income and gross income is very small but this difference measures the complete 
tax effect. The small difference in poverty rates possibly masks larger ﬂows of people 
moving into and out of poverty. 
25 However, this difference in top coding inﬂuences the Gini coefﬁcient. If the PSID used the same top 
coding as the ECHP, the estimated Gini coefﬁcients would be higher. Summary statistics on total income 
showed that the income of some households in the CNEF-PSID indeed was top coded but we could not ﬁnd 
evidence that top coding actually cut-off top incomes in the ECHP.
26 Since 1992, the PSID data do not include an estimate for households’ tax burden. Since then, the public 
user version of the PSID even contains fewer variables needed as inputs for the TAXSIM model. The 
overestimation of the tax burden for the more afﬂuent households is mainly due to the use of standard 
deductions while richer households can have a higher deduction when they itemize the deductions.9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
211
  Perfect comparability cannot be achieved. In many cases the information needed 
to estimate the potential impact of differences in algorithms and other data issues is not 
available. Where possible we have made adjustments to the CNEF data that enhance 
comparability with the ECHP. Nevertheless, we think that both the ECHP and the PSID/
CNEF have been designed to take into account those income sources that are relevant in 
the countries where the survey is held; in kind social assistance plays a much larger role 
in the USA than it does in continental Europe. Education beneﬁts and housing subsidies 
are more prevalent in European welfare states than they are in the USA where tuition 
wavers are more prevalent. Differences in the provision of public goods and services 
such as education and health care are important factors that ideally should be taken 
into account in poverty analyses. Generally speaking, the out-of-pocket costs of post-
secondary education for a family with children are considerably lower in continental 
Europe than in the United States. To provide children similar education opportunities, 
US families thus need a higher income than continental European families. Ideally, 
such differences should be taken into account.
9.4.3 Orshansky poverty lines
The  Orshansky  thresholds,  on  the  other  hand,  are  distribution  independent. These 
poverty lines can be obtained from the website of the Bureau of Census. We merged the 
poverty lines into the ECHP and CNEF data. For the USA data we included the Bureau 
of Census poverty lines for every year. As the household income variables in CNEF 
and ECHP provide and estimate of households’ income in the year previous to the 
survey, we used the 1993 – 2000 USA poverty lines. For the ECHP we ﬁrst converted 
the 1993 Dollar thresholds to the price level of each European country using the 1993 
Purchasing Power Parity rates from the OECD.27 Subsequently, we adjusted the 1993 
thresholds to later years using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the country level 
ﬁles in the ECHP. Thus, we used the same price updating mechanism for the European 
Orshansky poverty lines. This method ensures that poverty lines are not inﬂuenced by 
year to year changes in the exchange rate. We constructed a variable that categorized 
each household in a particular wave as one of the 48 household types. Finally, we linked 
each household to their respective poverty line. The Laeken poverty lines depend on the 
income distribution and are thus only based on the income variable in both datasets.
27 We obtained the 1993 United States thresholds from the website of the Bureau of Census (http://www.
census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld.html, retrieved August 2005) and the purchasing power parities 
from the website of the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/std/ppp, retrieved October 2006)).212
9.5 Exchanging ofﬁcial poverty measurement methods: results28
Existing poverty comparisons most often use relative concepts of poverty and are 
predominantly made with data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) which does 
not have annual observations or a panel component. The OECD makes regular poverty 
assessments  using  relative  poverty  concept  based  on  national  micro-data  (Förster 
& d’Ercole, 2005). Another exception is the work of Timothy Smeeding, who often 
analyses both absolute and relative poverty indicators studying the LIS data (Smeeding, 
2006; Smeeding et al., 2000; Smeeding & Ross, 1997). This study is the ﬁrst to analyse 
poverty in both regions using the ofﬁcial poverty methodologies and applying them to 
both regions. It is also the ﬁrst to provide a comparison of long term poverty indicators 
between the USA and Europe. The aim of this section is to provide a general analysis 
of the poverty results.   We focus on the differences between the Orshansky and Laeken 
poverty estimates using disposable income as a welfare indicator. We analyse poverty 
incidence and poverty gap estimates for the period 1993 – 2000 but we also include 
estimates for the incidence of long-term or chronic poverty.29 We provide breakdowns 
in poverty incidence according to age, gender, household type and main source of 
household income, mostly taking 2000 as a benchmark year. Furthermore, we discuss 
the static effect of social protection beneﬁts on Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates. 
The poverty measures are calculated using the appropriate weights meaning that these 
estimates presented below are representative for the whole population.
9.5.1 Poverty incidence
The poverty incidence ﬁgures represent the percentage of poor individuals in a given 
country. Looking at the 2000 Orshansky poverty rates (Table 9.2 and Figure 9.1) four 
main groups of countries can be distinguished: a large group of countries with low 
to very low poverty incidence (below 7%) including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden; a second group 
28 Our Laeken At-Risk-of-Poverty estimates for the ECHP are highly comparable with those reported on 
the  Eurostat  website  (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal 
&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/&product=sdi_ps&depth=3).  The  difference  between 
our Orshansky estimates for the US and those of the Bureau of Census (http://www.census.gov/hhes/ 
www/poverty/histpov/histpovtb.html) are larger. Although the poverty trends are similar, our estimates 
yield consistently lower results. This difference can be attributed to the fact that we use a different dataset. 
Gouskova and Schoeni (2002) indeed report that PSID income is higher than CPS income. This could 
explain why we ﬁnd lower poverty rates than the Bureau of Census. 
29 Figure 9.1 also includes Orshansky poverty estimates using gross income. We incorporated these estimates 
merely for illustrative purposes as the ofﬁcial US poverty estimates are calculated using gross income.9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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with medium poverty incidence with the US, United Kingdom and Ireland (between 7 
and 11%). The Southern European countries Italy and Spain show high poverty levels 
(17 and 19%) and Greece and Portugal very high levels (26 and 32%). In terms of 
Laeken poverty, differences in poverty rates between countries are smaller and range 
between 10% for Sweden and 24% in the US. The member states from Southern Europe, 
Ireland and the USA have high levels of relative poverty (between 19 and 24%) while 
the Northern European countries have lower levels (between 10 and 14%). France and 
the UK are somewhat in the middle of these two groups (with 15 and 17%).  
  Comparing the poverty incidence between the Orshansky estimates and the 
Laeken  estimates  over  time,  reveals  some  interesting  observations.  Although  the 
ranking from low to high national poverty rates is to a large extent not extremely 
different, it is still not the same (Table 9.3). The Southern European countries (Italy, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal) together with Ireland form a group at the low end of the 
ranking. The Continental and Scandinavian countries form the top of the ranking but 
their mutual positions change over the years. Compared to the ranking using the Laeken 
estimates, the Orshansky estimates seem to produce a more stable pattern over time in 
Europe, while the Laeken estimates are subject to more volatility. The USA is ranked 
consistently at the lowest end in terms of Laeken poverty but occupies middle ranks for 
the Orshansky poverty rates.  
  The Orshansky estimates can by no means be interpreted as a linear transformation 
of the Laeken indicators or vice versa: in some countries there are large gaps between the 
lower Orshansky and the higher Laeken estimates and over time this gap may increase, 
remain constant or decrease. Large differences between Orshansky and Laeken are 
observed for Belgium, Demark, Luxembourg, Austria and the USA in both 1993 and 
2000. Differences are smaller for Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands but in these 
countries the gap is widening over time. Orshansky estimates produced higher poverty 
incidence ﬁgures for the Mediterranean countries and Ireland in 1993 but in the years 
thereafter the Orshansky poverty rates became lower than the Laeken poverty rates in 
Italy and Ireland (Spain shows a similar trend).  
  Trying to understand why these differences occur is not easy. One of the main 
elements is that the Laeken poverty line depends on the income distribution (median 
income) while the Orshansky poverty line is distribution independent. The degree of 
income inequality therefore also inﬂuences the level of the Laeken threshold but not of 
the Orshansky poverty line. Table 9.4 illustrates this point using a couple of indicators 
of income dispersion calculated using the Laeken equivalent adult income distribution. 
Firstly,  in  countries  with  a  higher  income  inequality  (higher  Gini-index)  such  as 
Luxembourg and the US, the difference between Orshansky and Laeken poverty rates 
is large. Comparing both poverty lines to median income, gives 60 % by deﬁnition for 214
all countries in case of the Laeken indicator, but a far smaller number for many of the 
other countries in case of the Orshansky. Luxembourg and the USA have Orshansky 
thresholds that are below 40% of median income while most of the Scandinavian 
and Continental European countries have values around 50-55%. Secondly, for the 
Mediterranean countries the Orshansky poverty lines are higher in value than the Laeken 
poverty lines, varying from 66% of median income in Spain to 91% in Portugal. Clearly, 
this explains why in these Southern European countries the Orshansky poverty rates are 
so much higher than those in the other countries. Nevertheless, the cases of Italy and 
Spain suggest that differences between the Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates are not 
just explained by the degree of income inequality and the levels of both poverty lines. 
In terms of these income dispersion indicators, Italy and Spain are quite similar but 
whereas Spain has approximately equal Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates, Italy’s 
Orshansky poverty rate is 2.5 percentage points lower than its Laeken poverty rate. A 
third reason is the fact that the estimates are based on different adult equivalent income 
distributions: although we use net income to calculate both indicators, the Laeken 
and Orshansky indicators use different equivalence scales to correct for differences 
in household size and demographic composition. All these elements play a role in 
trying to explain the difference in the poverty headcounts using Orshansky and Laeken 
technology. 
  To add another complexity, it is also clear that even changes in the poverty 
incidence over a relative short period (1993 – 2000) are far from similar (Figure 9.1).30 
In countries such as Ireland, Spain, Denmark, Greece and Italy, we ﬁnd opposing trends 
in Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates. In the other countries, the poverty trends run 
parallel or show some divergence. Ireland is an extreme case; there was a very large 
decrease in Orshansky poverty rate during the nineties which was accompanied by 
considerable  increase  in  Laeken  poverty.  In  Sweden  and  Finland  Laeken  poverty 
increased while Orshansky poverty remained relatively constant at very low levels. In 
Denmark, Luxembourg and Austria poverty levels have been rather constant or slightly 
30 There is a considerable difference between the 1996 USA poverty rates calculated using the individual 
level data (using individual weights) or the household level data (using household weights multiplied by 
household size). Both methods can be used and normally yield only small differences, if any. The annual 
USA poverty results displayed in the ﬁgures and tables in the appendix are calculated using the household 
level data. However, using the individual level ﬁles Laeken poverty is 24.6% in 1996 compared to 21.7% 
using household level ﬁles. For Orshansky poverty this is 13% (versus 8.5% in the household level ﬁles). 
The difference in other years is negligible. We suspect that this difference may be related to the CNEF 
household weights in the 1997 survey (1996 income data). In 1997, the PSID sample was refreshed by a 
small sample of post 1968 immigrant families but this group is not included in the CNEF. To be sure, we 
ignore the 1996 results when we analyse USA poverty trends or differences with other countries.9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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hovered around a certain level. Another group of countries show parallel decreases in 
Laeken and Orshansky poverty rates (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, and 
UK).
  All in all the comparison of these two sets of indicators suggest that that the 
Laeken and Orshansky concepts really grasp related but different phenomena. Generally 
speaking, for the ‘richer’ countries the Orshansky poverty estimate is lower than the 
Laeken poverty headcount. However, in ‘poorer’ countries Orshansky poverty rates are 
higher than Laeken poverty rates but, over a longer period, the Orshansky poverty rates 
are typically moving downward in the direction of the Laeken poverty rates in these 
countries. Over shorter time periods, Orshansky and Laeken poverty indicators may 
or may not move less systematically. Chapter 2 further analyses these differences in 
poverty levels and identiﬁes the various sources for the variance.
9.5.2 Long term poverty31
Exploiting the panel dimensions of the datasets we also calculated long term Orshansky 
and Laeken poverty rates using the Laeken at-persistent-risk-of-poverty indicator. This 
indicator of chronic or long term poverty labels an individual as long term poor if he/
she is currently poor and also lived in poverty in at least two out of three previous years. 
Compared to other groups in society, this group is of special concern because having 
low income levels for a long time not only implies the lack of an important source to 
ﬁnance current living standards, but also reduces investment opportunities in health, 
education thereby also reducing prospects of a better future (especially when asset 
levels are also low). Generally, the long term poverty levels are considerably lower 
than annual poverty rates; trends are much smoother but there are similar differences 
between Orshansky and Laeken indicators (Table 9.5).  
  Nevertheless, even if countries have similar poverty rates, their long-term poverty 
rates may differ. For instance, in countries such as Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Finland the Laeken poverty rates in these countries are about 10-11% but 
the long term poverty rates vary from 5.2% in Denmark to 7.1% in Austria. Long term 
poverty rates are also high for countries with both high Laeken and Orshansky poverty 
rates (Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal). The relatively high long term poverty rates can, 
31 The Laeken At-Persistent-Risk-of-Poverty rates for the ECHP countries are equal but in most cases higher 
than the percentages displayed on the website of Eurostat (but the trends are the same). We calculated 
these poverty rates according to the methodology described in ‘Laeken’ Indicators; Detailed Calculation 
Methodology (Eurostat, 2003b). We could not ﬁnd a reason to which this difference can be attributed.216
in addition to their correspondence to high annual poverty rates, also be explained by 
the fact that year to year income dynamics takes place in the relatively large left part of 
income distribution (but below the poverty line); it is less likely that changes in income 
at low income levels involve the crossing of the poverty line. A similar rationale holds 
for the observation that long term poverty rates are relatively lower for the Orshansky 
indicator. Nevertheless, it seems that differences in long term poverty shares between 
countries are not only related to differences in the level of poverty thresholds. For 
instance, Luxembourg and France have similar long term Laeken poverty rates (8.6 
and 8.7%) but the difference between annual poverty rates is about 3 percentage points 
(12.5 and 15.4%). The share of long term poor in France is higher than in Luxembourg. 
One obvious explanation for this is that the degree of income mobility differs between 
countries (including up and downward mobility).
9.5.3 Poverty gap
The poverty gap represents the average income shortfall below the poverty line over the 
total population.32 It is an indicator for the depth of poverty. Using the Laeken indicator, 
the poverty gap is big in Southern Europe and USA (Table 9.6); it is small in the rest 
of Europe with the UK and Ireland taking a middle position. Using Orshansky, we ﬁnd 
similar differences between countries in the poverty gap. The USA is the exception; the 
Orshansky poverty gap is now considerably lower than in Southern Europe. Over the 
period 1993 – 2000 the Laeken poverty gap declined in most countries, hovered around 
for the Netherlands and Sweden, but increased for Denmark, Finland and Ireland. 
Using Orshansky, even more countries show a declining trend; only for Finland the 
poverty gap increases. Ireland again stands out as a peculiar case with a decreasing 
Orshansky poverty gap and increasing Laeken poverty gap. Albeit a difference in 
magnitude, the trends in poverty gaps are similar to the trends in poverty incidence in 
most countries. Only in the Netherlands and Austria, the developments in poverty gap 
are more pronounced that those in poverty incidence. 
32 The poverty gap in Table 9.6 cannot be compared with the Laeken Relative at-risk-of-poverty gap. 
Our calculations are based on the Foster Greer Thorbecke (1984) poverty gap which measures the mean 
proportionate poverty gap over the total population while the Laeken poverty Relative at-risk-of-poverty 
gap measures the mean proportionate poverty gap over the poor population. We chose the Foster Greer 
Thorbecke poverty gap because it satisﬁes the monotonicity axiom: ‘given other things, a reduction in the 
income of a poor household must increase the poverty measure’ (p. 762). The Laeken poverty gap may 
violate this axiom.9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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9.5.4 Age, gender and household type33
Disaggregating the poverty headcount ﬁgures can inform us about the characteristics of 
poor individuals. When discussing poverty according to age groups and family types, 
it should be noted that all the estimates are sensitive to the equivalence scales used.34 
According to Table 9.7, both indicators show that the middle age groups (25-64) have 
the lowest poverty risk in most countries while children and the elderly more likely 
to be poor. However, in countries such as the Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg the 
risk of poverty seems to decline steadily after childhood. In some countries these age-
poverty risk patterns are consistent across both poverty indicators (Italy, the Netherlands 
and Austria) while in most countries the poverty risk of one age group may differ by 
poverty indicator. This seems to be the case especially for the elderly age group. Using 
the Laeken indicator, the poverty risk of elderly is much more pronounced than with the 
Orshansky indicator. In Denmark, France, Ireland, Finland and the UK persons above 
the age of 65 clearly have a higher than average poverty risk for Laeken poverty but less 
so for Orshansky poverty. In the USA and Germany, the poverty risk for the elderly is 
above average for the Laeken indicator and below average for the Orshansky indicator. 
This difference in poverty risk for the elderly may be explained by the existence of a 
basic pension for which each citizen is eligible, irrespective of his/her past contributions. 
This pension may not be very generous but it provides (a considerable) part of the 
resources to satisfy a minimum level of expenditures (close to the Orshansky poverty 
line). In Belgium, young children have a lower poverty risk according to the Laeken 
indicator but a higher Orshansky poverty risk while older children (age 16-25) clearly 
have a higher Laeken poverty risk but an average Orshansky poverty risk. What may 
partly explain a pattern in Belgium is that part of family allowances is provided as an 
(income) tax deduction. In countries such as Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands 
older children typically move away from their parents’ home at a younger age than their 
counterparts in Greece or Spain. Even though these children may still receive support 
from their parents and the state, they are counted as separate households. Moreover, 
even if children in this age group work, their earnings are still relatively low. 
  Poverty among children is an important topic as growing up in poverty may 
jeopardize investment in human capital and thus increase the risk of poverty in later 
33 In deﬁning age groups and household types we followed the same deﬁnitions as used for the various 
decompositions of the Laeken poverty indicators. Table 9.15 and Table 9.16 also give the population shares 
by age group, gender and household type.
34 In line with current international practice, the Laeken indicator is calculated using the modiﬁed OECD 
equivalence scales. The Orshansky method uses a different non-linear weighting scheme. In chapter 2 we 
investigate the (impact of) difference in equivalence scales. 218
stages of the life cycle. Table 9.8 illustrates trends in child poverty for children aged 
0-15 years. Only in Denmark and Finland (no data available for Sweden), child poverty 
is considerably lower than overall poverty rates in all years using both Orshansky 
and Laeken estimates. In Belgium and Greece, the Laeken indicator points to lower 
child poverty rates in some of the years while the Orshansky indicator shows an above 
average poverty risk. In most other countries poverty among children is higher than 
overall poverty for the entire period according to at least one of the indicators and in 
most cases consistently according to both the Orshansky and the Laeken estimates. It 
should also be noted that in most countries child poverty is ﬂuctuating; only Ireland 
shows a steady decline over the period of observation (Orshansky). In the Netherlands 
and the United States, the Laeken indicator shows a steady rise in child poverty and a 
widening gap with the average poverty rate. Also for Portugal the Orshansky indicator 
the gap with the mean poverty rate is increasing. 
  Compared to men, women have a higher poverty risk in most countries (except 
in the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Over time, the gap in male and female poverty 
rates has been declining in Germany and the Netherlands but it increased in Finland 
(especially for the Laeken indicator). In other countries the gap remained more or less 
constant. These patterns are similar for long term poverty, although for countries such 
as Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Finland,the UK and the USA women are considerably 
more likely to live in long term Laeken poverty compared to men (Table 9.10). Only for 
the USA and to a lesser degree the UK, this large difference between male and female 
poverty is also found using Orshansky long term poverty. 
  Inspecting poverty incidence according family type reveals that particularly 
children from single parent households, households with three or more children and 
other households with children have an increased poverty risk. Extremely worse off are 
single parent households (except in Finland and Denmark). Table 9.11 also shows that 
single person households have above average poverty rates. Overall, the Laeken and 
Orshansky measures indicate the same groups as above or below average, but again we 
can identify eight cases in which the difference in poverty risk is considerable (couple 
with at least one person aged above 65 in Belgium, Denmark and the UK, households 
with three or more children in Germany, France, Sweden and the US). 
9.5.5 Main source of income35
It is also interesting to disaggregate the population by the main source of household 
income. We distinguish between six main income sources (wage income, entrepreneurial 
35 Table 9.17 gives the population shares by main source of income.9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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income, pensions, unemployment beneﬁts, other social beneﬁts and private income). The 
ﬁgures in Table 9.12 reﬂect whether the main source of income contributes to having an 
income above the poverty line or not. Poverty among households with wage earnings 
is extremely low in Belgium and Austria and very low in most of continental Europe, 
Scandinavia and Finland. Albeit lower than average, the poverty incidence of working 
households is relatively more important in Southern Europe and the United States. 
Self employed are well off in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the UK. In all other countries and especially in Southern Europe, they 
are overrepresented among the poor. In some countries the difference in poverty risk 
between households with wages as main source of income and self-employment are 
very large (Sweden, Greece, Austria) but in most countries this risk is only somewhat 
higher for self employed households.  
  In the United States households with pensions as main income source have 
higher than average poverty risk according to the Laeken indicator but lower than 
average  for  the  Orshansky  indicator.  Differences  between  Laeken  and  Orshansky 
patterns are less pronounced in the European countries. Rich pensioner households are 
found in the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden; pensioners in all other countries 
are relatively more often poor; especially in Southern Europe and Ireland. This holds 
regardless of the estimator used (Orshansky and Laeken). In Denmark, Ireland and 
Finland differences in poverty risk for this group are more pronounced for Laeken 
poverty than for Orshansky poverty. Something similar can be observed for household 
receiving other social beneﬁts as main income source in the Netherlands, Luxembourg 
and Sweden. However, the number of observations is often very small for the categories 
‘unemployment beneﬁts’, ‘other social beneﬁts’ and ‘private income’. These poverty 
estimates should thus be interpreted with care. People with private income are well off 
in Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg according to both poverty indicators. Households 
whose main income source is derived from unemployment beneﬁts and other (often 
means-tested) social transfers typically have the highest poverty risk. 
9.5.6 Impact of social transfers
We assess the impact of social protection beneﬁts is by evaluating the effect of such 
beneﬁts  on  poverty  rates  (Table  9.13).  Firstly,  we  calculate  poverty  rates  without 
including the income from pensions and other social beneﬁts. In a second step, we 
measure poverty including all market income and pensions but excluding other social 
beneﬁts.36 This indicator is also part of the group of Laeken indicators (At-risk-of-
36 All poverty rates are estimated using the same poverty lines. Thus, we use the Laeken poverty lines from 
the net income distribution to analyse the poverty reduction effects of social transfers on income.220
poverty rate before social transfers). This so-called static analysis abstracts from the 
behavioural effects that would occur if such beneﬁts would not exist. For instance, 
without a pension, older persons would work longer or they may receive more support 
from younger family members. With respect to the US, as special remark needs to be 
made. Tax credits are an important tool used by the USA to assist low income families 
with children; at very low incomes households may actually receive more credit than 
their tax burden. Unfortunately, we only have an estimate of the net tax burden but we 
cannot distinguish between tax credits and tax burdens. This implies that the ﬁgures 
for the USA do not reﬂect the poverty reduction impact of this policy measure. This 
particularly affects the poverty reduction effects of the ‘other transfers’ category. 
  Looking at the relative poverty reductions (Table 9.4), it is clear that pensions 
have the largest impact on poverty rates, particularly in Germany, Greece, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria (poverty rates are reduced by more than 40% 
for these countries). Looking at Orshansky poverty, pensions even have a larger impact 
on poverty (in Luxembourg and Belgium even above 60%). Interestingly, if we rank 
countries according to the poverty reduction impact (from a large to small impact), 
Belgium and the USA are ranked much higher for Orshansky poverty than for Laeken 
poverty. Pensions in these countries are relatively more successful in reducing poverty 
at lower (Orshansky poverty line) income levels. In Italy, on the other hand, pensions 
have by far the largest Laeken poverty reduction of all countries but it only ranks in the 
middle for Orshansky poverty. In Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the UK the effect of 
pensions is much smaller, both in Laeken and Orshansky poverty. 
  The  role  of  other  social  beneﬁts  (family  allowances,  other  social  insurance 
beneﬁts and social assistance) on Laeken poverty is small in Southern Europe. Using 
both indicators, the role of other social beneﬁts is large but decreasing in Finland and 
Denmark (Figure 9.2). In Ireland, other transfers are considerably more successful in 
reducing Orshansky poverty than in reducing Laeken poverty, while in Austria the 
situation is just the opposite. The ﬁgures clearly show that some countries rely more on 
pension beneﬁts to reduce poverty while other countries such as Finland, Denmark and 
the UK rely more on other transfers.
9.6 Conclusion
This  appendix  explained  how  we  compared  the  ofﬁcial  poverty  measurement 
methodologies of the USA (Orshansky) and the EU (Laeken) and provided a general 
discussion of the poverty results. As the ofﬁcial US methodology is based on an absolute 
notion of poverty and the ofﬁcial EU methodology uses poverty as a relative concept, 
a comparison of both methods provides insights into different poverty dimensions in 9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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these countries. Ofﬁcial poverty methodologies differ from other poverty measurement 
methods in the sense that the ofﬁcial ones are more often used as a benchmark to 
develop new policies as well as to evaluate the performance of existing programs. 
Potentially conﬂicting results between these methods put the desirability of current 
policies into a wider perspective.  
  The  Laeken  and  Orshansky  methodologies  are  compared  by  applying  both 
methods on European and United States data. For the EU-15 we used the harmonized 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the years 1994 to 2001. For the 
USA, we selected the Cross National Equivalent Files (CNEF-PSID, 1994-2001). The 
ECHP and the CNEF-PSID both have a cross-section and a panel dimension and are 
nationally representative. We obtained the US poverty thresholds from the Bureau of 
Census and converted the 1993 dollar thresholds to the Member States’ currencies 
using 1993 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) indices. After the conversion of the US 
thresholds to national purchasing power values, we updated the thresholds to other 
years using national consumer price indices. Even though the ofﬁcial USA poverty 
rates  are  calculated  using  gross  household  income,  we  used  net  income  for  both 
indicators. Based on detailed comparisons of the income components in the ECHP and 
the CNEF-PSID, we ﬁnd that the net income variables in both datasets are very similar 
and can thus be used for cross-national comparative poverty analyses. Nevertheless, 
we identiﬁed two aspects should be kept in mind when making comparative analyses. 
Firstly, the use of register data for Sweden, Finland and Denmark may yield higher 
poverty estimates than survey data. Secondly, the assumption of 100% take up of low 
income tax credits (EITC) may underestimate USA poverty rates.  
  The discussion of the results pointed to considerable differences between the 
estimates based on Laeken indicators and the estimates based on an Orshansky type of 
technology. It was expected that in general Orshansky generates lower poverty estimates 
than the Laeken indicators. However, it is puzzling to ﬁnd that a.) these differences are 
less systematic than expected and b.) these differences are not constant over time and 
in some cases even have the reverse sign. That indicates that Orshansky indicators and 
Laeken indicators relate to the same phenomenon but from a possibly very different 
perspective. It is also noteworthy that the differences are more puzzling for the faster 
growing economies in the European Union. Chapters 2 and 3 further analyse the nature 
and the background of these differences. 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Laeken _________       Orshansky (net income) _ _ _ _ _ Orshansky (gross income) . . . . .
Figure 9.1: Poverty incidence per country (% of individuals, 1993-2000)
Note: To facilitate comparison of Orshansky and Laeken poverty trends within countries, we used different 
scales on the vertical axes. For the USA there are no observations 1999 and 1997. 
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Table 9.5: At-Persistent-Risk-of-Poverty rate (% of individuals, 1993-2000) 
Laeken Orshansky (net income)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Belgium 8.5 8.1 7.3 7.9 7.4 2.8 2.3 2.4 2.4 1.5
Denmark 4.2 4.2 4.8 6.2 5.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7
Germany 5.8 6.3 6.1 5.7 6.1 3.0 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.4
Greece 13.5 12.3 13.0 13.4 14.2 17.9 16.2 18.3 18.6 19.0
Spain  11.4 11.0 10.7 10.8 10.5 19.8 19.9 17.7 15.6 14.0
France 8.7 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 4.3 4.1 3.5 3.0 2.5
Ireland 11.8 11.6 12.5 12.8 13.2 16.3 11.3 9.7 8.9 6.7
Italy 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.5 12.6 14.4 13.5 12.5 11.9 11.9
Luxembourg - 7.8 7.6 8.1 8.6 - 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Netherlands 5.5 4.9 5.5 5.0 5.3 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.1
Austria - 6.9 6.8 6.7 7.1 - 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.7
Portugal 14.9 14.3 14.9 14.5 14.8 31.7 31.6 30.0 27.4 27.5
Finland - - 4.7 5.8 5.9 - - 2.0 2.4 2.0
Sweden - - - - - - - - - -
United Kingdom 10.3 10.8 11.6 11.1 10.1 6.6 6.3 6.4 5.5 5.0
United States 13.8 - - - - 5.1 - - - -
Note: After the poverty status of households in a particular year has been determined, the long term 
poverty rates are calculated on an individual level only including those individuals in the panel (with 
a positive longitudinal weight). Note that the annual poverty rates are calculated on a household level 
(albeit counting all individuals in the household) including all households with a positive household 
cross-section weight.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9.8: Poverty incidence for total population and children aged 0-15 (1993-2000)
Laeken 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Belgium (all) 16.7 15.9 15.3 14.2 13.8 12.8 12.9 13.3
- Children age 0-15 19.6 15.6 15.3 13.7 12.7 11.7 11.5 12.1
Denmark (all) 10.3 10.2 9.5 9.3 11.9 11.1 11.5 10.8
- Children age 0-15 5.5 5.4 3.6 4.7 4.8 5.7 4.1 5.1
Germany (all) 14.4 14.6 14.0 12.1 11.4 10.9 10.5 11.1
- Children age 0-15 14.9 18.0 15.4 14.9 13.1 13.2 12.8 13.8
Greece (all) 23.1 21.5 21.0 21.5 20.8 20.5 19.9 20.5
- Children age 0-15 21.3 18.1 19.3 17.6 16.8 17.2 18.6 17.9
Spain  (all) 19.6 19.0 18.0 20.3 18.2 18.8 18.0 18.8
- Children age 0-15 23.4 23.7 23.4 26.2 24.4 24.9 25.1 25.5
France (all) 16.6 15.4 15.2 14.9 14.7 15.2 15.6 15.4
- Children age 0-15 17.6 16.0 16.0 16.2 16.5 17.5 17.6 17.8
Ireland (all) 16.8 18.6 19.5 19.1 19.2 18.5 20.1 21.4
- Children age 0-15 25.0 25.8 26.6 24.8 23.1 20.9 22.1 25.8
Italy (all) 20.4 20.4 20.1 19.5 18.0 18.0 18.4 19.3
- Children age 0-15 24.6 24.1 23.5 22.7 21.1 22.2 25.0 25.0
Luxembourg (all) - 13.2 11.8 11.4 12.2 12.7 11.9 12.5
- Children age 0-15 - 19.0 18.0 16.5 19.5 18.6 18.3 18.5
Netherlands (all) 10.0 11.3 11.7 10.5 10.3 10.7 10.4 11.3
- Children age 0-15 10.1 12.7 14.4 12.5 13.6 14.0 15.1 16.4
Austria (all) - 13.4 14.0 13.0 12.9 12.0 11.7 11.9
- Children age 0-15 - 15.8 18.1 15.1 15.5 13.7 12.4 12.7
Portugal (all) 22.5 22.9 21.5 21.6 20.8 20.5 20.8 20.1
- Children age 0-15 23.4 25.9 23.9 25.3 26.1 26.4 25.5 27.5
Finland (all) - - 8.1 8.3 9.4 10.7 10.9 11.4
- Children age 0-15 - - 4.6 5.1 4.9 7.3 5.7 5.8
United Kingdom (all) 19.6 20.0 19.5 17.8 19.0 19.4 18.7 17.1
- Children age 0-15 27.7 28.7 27.8 26.8 28.8 29.3 27.5 23.6
United States (all) 24.0 24.0 23.8 21.7 - 25.4 - 23.5
- Children age 0-15 29.8 28.0 29.1 27.9 - 32.6 - 32.6
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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Table 9.8 continued Poverty incidence for total population and children aged 0-15 
(1993-2000)
Orshansky  (net income)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Belgium (all) 8.4 7.4 6.0 6.1 5.9 5.4 4.8 3.6
- Children age 0-15 11.3 8.0 7.1 7.0 6.4 5.9 3.9 4.3
Denmark (all) 4.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.4
- Children age 0-15 2.6 2.1 1.5 2.1 1.8 2.3 0.8 1.0
Germany (all) 9.8 10.7 7.5 7.0 6.8 6.3 5.1 5.1
- Children age 0-15 9.6 13.9 8.4 9.4 8.0 7.3 5.7 5.7
Greece (all) 25.7 26.3 27.5 28.1 26.0 28.2 25.0 26.1
- Children age 0-15 26.9 24.9 28.3 28.2 25.6 29.3 28.2 27.9
Spain  (all) 25.4 29.0 29.1 29.8 28.6 24.5 20.6 19.1
- Children age 0-15 32.2 37.4 37.7 39.6 38.7 32.8 30.3 28.2
France (all) 12.6 9.4 8.4 8.8 8.5 8.0 7.1 6.5
- Children age 0-15 14.5 10.6 9.6 10.0 10.3 9.5 8.9 8.4
Ireland (all) 30.1 25.3 25.3 20.1 13.7 13.3 12.6 10.6
- Children age 0-15 41.3 35.3 34.8 27.5 18.8 16.8 15.3 13.8
Italy (all) 22.7 23.2 28.0 23.0 19.4 18.0 17.0 16.7
- Children age 0-15 29.6 30.6 36.6 29.0 25.4 24.9 24.9 24.7
Luxembourg (all) - 1.1 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.6
- Children age 0-15 - 1.9 1.1 0.7 1.5 1.8 0.4 1.1
Netherlands (all) 7.1 8.6 8.4 6.1 6.8 6.8 5.6 6.6
- Children age 0-15 7.7 9.7 10.8 7.0 9.9 9.2 8.4 10.0
Austria (all) - 6.1 5.2 5.8 6.2 5.8 3.9 4.8
- Children age 0-15 - 7.5 6.7 6.6 8.3 6.5 3.3 5.2
Portugal (all) 40.0 42.2 40.2 38.1 38.4 35.5 32.2 32.2
- Children age 0-15 47.0 51.5 49.3 46.5 49.7 46.7 41.1 44.4
Finland (all) - - 4.1 4.5 5.1 5.7 4.6 4.9
- Children age 0-15 - - 2.0 3.0 1.7 2.5 1.7 2.0
United Kingdom (all) 17.6 15.8 15.2 11.4 12.0 13.1 10.7 9.3
- Children age 0-15 27.8 25.4 24.0 20.3 21.4 22.3 17.9 14.9
United States (all) 12.4 11.4 10.6 8.5 - 13.0 - 8.7
- Children age 0-15 18.0 16.0 14.3 11.9 - 17.7 - 13.5
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID232
Table 9.9: Poverty incidence by gender (2000) 
Laeken Orshansky (net income)
Gender All Male Female All Male Female
Belgium 13.3 12.1 14.5 3.6 3.2 4.0
Denmark 10.8 9.0 12.5 3.4 2.7 4.1
Germany 11.1 10.0 12.1 5.1 4.7 5.6
Greece 20.5 19.2 21.8 26.1 24.8 27.4
Spain  18.8 17.3 20.3 19.1 17.4 20.8
France 15.4 14.6 16.2 6.5 5.7 7.3
Ireland 21.4 20.0 22.7 10.6 10.3 11.0
Italy 19.3 18.7 19.9 16.7 16.0 17.5
Luxembourg 12.5 12.4 12.6 0.6 0.4 0.7
Netherlands 11.3 11.7 10.9 6.6 6.8 6.3
Austria 11.9 9.2 14.4 4.8 4.0 5.4
Portugal 20.1 20.1 20.1 32.2 31.3 33.1
Finland 11.4 9.1 13.6 4.9 4.1 5.7
Sweden 10.4 - - 5.7 - -
United Kingdom 17.1 15.1 18.9 9.3 7.9 10.6
United States 23.5 22.2 24.7 8.7 8.1 9.3
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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Table 9.10: At-Persistent-Risk-of-Poverty rate by gender (2000) 
Laeken Orshansky (net income)
All Male Female All Male Female
Belgium 7.4 6.4 8.4 1.5 1.1 2.0
Denmark 5.2 3.9 6.5 0.7 0.6 0.7
Germany 6.1 5.7 6.5 2.4 2.3 2.6
Greece 14.2 13.2 15.1 19.0 17.7 20.2
Spain  10.5 9.9 11.0 14.0 12.8 15.2
France 8.7 8.2 9.2 2.5 2.1 2.9
Ireland 13.2 11.5 14.8 6.7 6.1 7.2
Italy 12.6 11.9 13.2 11.9 11.4 12.4
Luxembourg 8.6 8.8 8.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Netherlands 5.3 5.6 5.1 2.1 2.4 1.9
Austria 7.1 5.0 9.1 1.7 1.3 2.1
Portugal 14.8 14.2 15.4 27.5 26.5 28.5
Finland 5.9 4.1 7.6 2.0 1.5 2.5
Sweden - - - - - -
United Kingdom 10.1 8.8 11.4 5.0 4.0 5.9
United States (1996) 13.8 11.8 15.6 5.1 3.9 6.2
Note: After the poverty status of households in a particular year has been determined, the long term 
poverty rates are calculated on an individual level only including those individuals in the panel (with 
a positive longitudinal weight). Note that the annual poverty rates are calculated on a household level 
(albeit counting all individuals in the household) including all households with a positive household 
cross-section weight.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9.13: Poverty incidence using income but excluding social beneﬁts (2000) 

















Belgium 36.8 22.4 13.3 28.6 10.9 3.6
Denmark 30.3 20.6 10.8 25.5 11.7 3.4
Germany 37.9 20.7 11.1 30.7 12.4 5.1
Greece 38.9 22.7 20.5 42.8 27.8 26.1
Spain  36.4 23.3 18.8 35.8 23.2 19.1
France 41.0 24.4 15.4 33.3 15.2 6.5
Ireland 35.2 29.5 21.4 26.1 19.5 10.6
Italy 41.4 21.9 19.3 38.1 19.2 16.7
Luxembourg 40.3 23.1 12.5 22.2 6.9 0.6
Netherlands 35.0 20.4 11.3 29.7 15.0 6.6
Austria 37.7 21.8 11.9 27.0 11.0 4.8
Portugal 36.4 24.4 20.1 47.3 37.5 32.2
Finland 39.1 28.2 11.4 30.2 17.3 4.9
Sweden - - 10.4 - - 5.7
United Kingdom 38.5 27.6 17.1 32.0 18.7 9.3
United States 32.5 24.4 23.4 18.7 9.9 8.7
Note: 1 The threshold (poverty line) is calculated on the basis of the income distribution after transfers. 2 
Pensions are included in income but other social transfers are not. 
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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Table 9.14: Poverty reduction impact of social transfers (2000) 
% reduction in poverty rates of social transfers 
(as compared to pre transfer poverty rates)
Laeken Orshansky (net income)
Pensions Other transfers Pensions Other transfers
% effect rank % effect rank % effect rank % effect rank
Belgium 39.3  8 24.5 8 62.0 2 25.4 8
Denmark 31.9 11 32.6 2 54.3 5 32.5 3
Germany 45.4 2 25.4 7 59.7 3 23.6 9
Greece 41.7 6 5.6 14 34.9 13 4.0 15
Spain  36.1 9 12.3 11 35.3 12 11.4 11
France 40.5 7 21.9 10 54.2 6 26.2 7
Ireland 16.1 15 23.2 9 25.1 14 34.1 2
Italy 47.0 1 6.4 13 49.4 7 6.6  13
Luxembourg 42.6 3 26.4 4 69.1 1 28.4 6
Netherlands 41.8 5 25.9 6 49.3 8 28.5 5
Austria 42.2 4 26.3 5 59.3 4 23.1 10
Portugal 33.1 10 11.8 12 20.7 15 11.2 12
Finland 27.8 13 42.9 1 42.7 10 40.9 1
Sweden - - - - - - - -
United Kingdom 28.2  12 27.4 3 41.4 11 29.5 4
United States 25.0 14 3.0  15 47.1 9 6.1 14
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID238







































































































































































































































































































































































































Pretransfer income _________       Pretransfer income but including pensions _ _ _ _ _ Posttransfer income . . . . .
Note: To facilitate comparison of Orshansky and Laeken poverty trends within countries, we used different 
scales on the vertical axes. For the USA there are no observations 1999 and 1997.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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Table 9.15: Population shares by gender and age groups (2001) 
Gender Age groups
Males Females 0-15 16-24 25-49 50-64 65+
Belgium 48.5 51.5 19.2 11.0 36.2 16.7 16.9
Denmark 49.5 50.5 20.1 10.2 35.9 19.0 14.7
Germany 49.2 50.8 15.6 10.2 36.0 20.0 18.2
Greece 48.3 51.7 14.7 11.9 34.2 19.1 20.1
Spain  48.9 51.1 15.8 13.0 38.3 15.9 17.0
France 48.6 51.4 19.3 11.8 35.7 16.9 16.3
Ireland 49.2 50.7 23.4 15.5 35.6 14.3 11.0
Italy 48.6 51.4 15.5 10.4 37.1 19.9 17.0
Luxembourg 48.8 51.2 18.6 10.3 40.0 16.6 14.5
Netherlands 49.6 50.4 20.1 10.7 38.6 17.6 13.0
Austria 48.4 51.6 18.5 10.4 38.5 17.4 15.2
Portugal 48.3 51.7 18.2 14.3 36.1 16.4 15.0
Finland 48.6 51.4 19.6 11.1 34.6 19.8 14.9
Sweden - - - - - - -
United Kingdom 47.6 52.4 19.8 10.0 33.7 18.5 18.0
United States 48.1 51.9 23.1 12.4 37.7 15.9 10.9
Note: The 2000 poverty rates are based on wave 8 (2001). Income in wave 8 represents household income 
in the previous year (2000).
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID240
Table 9.16: Population shares by household type (2001) 
Household type1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Belgium 9.9 12.3 11.0 11.7 3.3 9.8 20.2 12.8 9.0
Denmark 10.7 11.7 20.4 7.3 1.8 11.8 18.1 9.4 8.8
Germany 17.1 9.7 11.1 17.2 2.1 9.2 13.3 7.3 13.1
Greece 6.9 11.9 7.1 21.6 1.5 9.6 22.0 4.5 15.0
Spain  5.3 8.9 6.4 22.4 1.1 6.4 15.0 7.3 27.2
France 9.9 11.2 11.1 11.5 3.4 11.8 21.5 10.8 8.8
Ireland 7.3 5.1 5.0 14.9 2.7 5.6 13.7 17.2 28.5
Italy 7.4 9.0 6.3 25.7 1.1 10.8 16.0 7.4 16.5
Luxembourg 10.9 10.0 14.4 18.0 1.3 10.6 15.0 7.6 12.3
Netherlands 15.6 8.6 20.0 8.3 3.6 7.7 20.2 9.3 6.8
Austria 12.8 7.0 10.2 16.5 2.6 9.1 14.9 6.3 20.7
Portugal 3.7 7.7 5.8 21.4 1.5 11.1 14.9 6.6 27.4
Finland 17.9 9.0 13.7 8.4 2.9 10.4 16.8 13.6 7.3
Sweden 20.7 10.5 16.2 - 8.4 11.0 20.1 13.0 -
United Kingdom 13.2 11.4 15.8 11.7 5.8 9.1 14.8 8.8 9.4
United States 13.6 14.6 7.2 8.4 6.8 9.2 14.2 10.3 15.8
Note: 1 Deﬁnition household types: ‘1’ One person household, ‘2’ Two adults, no dependent children, 
both adults under 65 years, ‘3’ Two adults, no dependent children, at least one adult 65 years, ‘4’ Other 
households without dependent children, ‘5’ Single parent household, one or more dependent children, ‘6’ 
Two adults, one dependent child, ‘7’ Two adults, two dependent children, ‘8’ Two adults, three or more 
dependent children and ‘9’ Other households with dependent children. 2 The 2000 poverty rates are based 
on wave 8 (2001). Income in wave 8 represents household income in the previous year (2000).
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID9. Poverty in Europe and the USA
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Belgium 65.7 2.7 21.5 3.5 4.3 2.3
Denmark 74.2 4.0 15.5 0.8 5.0 0.5
Germany 63.9 6.4 21.9 2.1 4.1 1.6
Greece 47.6 25.5 23.7 0.1 1.1 2.0
Spain  60.8 14.1 16.8 1.7 3.4 3.1
France 65.7 6.9 21.1 1.2 4.0 1.1
Ireland 67.8 11.6 10.2 3.2 6.6 0.7
Italy 55.1 16.6 24.0 0.9 1.9 1.6
Luxembourg 71.2 3.2 18.2 0.3 6.3 0.9
Netherlands 70.3 3.1 15.9 0.7 9.1 1.0
Austria 70.9 6.6 17.4 0.5 3.5 1.0
Portugal 65.4 13.7 15.0 0.9 4.2 0.9
Finland 67.5 6.4 14.9 2.7 7.5 1.0
Sweden 67.0 1.9 19.9 1.2 9.7 0.3
United Kingdom 61.1 6.2 19.0 0.4 11.3 2.1
United States1 82.0 11.4 2.8 3.9
Note:  1  For  the  USA  we  cannot  distinguish  between  wages  /  earnings  from  self  employment  and 
unemployment beneﬁts / other social beneﬁts.  2 The 2000 poverty rates are based on wave 8 (2001). 
Income in wave 8 represents household income in the previous year (2000).
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID242




Belgium 5,000 48.8 51.2
Denmark 3,907 49.9 50.1
Germany 11,550 49.0 51.0
Greece 9,260 48.2 51.8
Spain  11,511 48.6 51.4
France 10,696 48.4 51.6
Ireland 4,916 49.3 50.7
Italy 13,338 48.7 51.3
Luxembourg 4,793 48.2 51.8
Netherlands 8,464 49.2 50.8
Austria 5,894 48.5 51.5
Portugal 10,721 48.1 51.9
Finland 5,905 49.0 51.0
Sweden - - -
United Kingdom 9,355 46.7 53.3
United States (1996) 9,297 47.1 52.9
Note: The 2000 long term poverty rate is based on the 1997-2001 panel.
Source: Own calculations ECHP and CNEF-PSID Armoede is ellendig: het gebrek aan middelen om in basisbehoeften te kunnen voorzien 
is een probleem dat moet worden bestreden, en waar mogelijk voorkomen. Vanuit die 
optiek hebben veel landen een sociaal beleid dat er op gericht is om mensen te assisteren 
in het hebben en behouden van een acceptabel minimum. Echter, het ontwerpen van 
een uitvoerbaar, effectief en houdbaar sociaal beleid is moeilijk en vergt veel informatie 
en analyse. In dit proefschrift worden vier belangrijke stappen in het begrijpen van 
armoede en het ontwerpen van een goed sociaal beleid aan de orde gesteld: het schatten 
hoeveel mensen er arm zijn, het identiﬁceren wie die mensen zijn, het begrijpen hoe 
mensen zelf omgaan met armoede en armoede risico’s, en het onderzoeken hoe sociale 
beleidsprogramma’s  effectief  kunnen  bijdragen  aan  het  bijstaan  van  armen  en  het 
voorkomen van armoede. Het doel van de eerste stap is uit te vinden hoeveel armoede er 
is. Echter, om een schatting te krijgen moeten er veel conceptuele en methodologische 
beslissingen worden gemaakt die ook weer van invloed zijn op de schatting. In de tweede 
stap wordt onderzocht wie arm is door middel van het identiﬁceren van karakteristieken 
die verband houden met een verhoogd armoede risico. De derde stap richt zich op het 
begrijpen wat mensen doen om van rond te komen, waarom, en hoe deze handelingen 
bijdragen aan hun welzijn. Het doel van de laatste stap is het bepalen of en hoe sociaal 
beleid in staat is om armoede te verlichten of the voorkomen.
  Uitgaand van wat bekend is uit vorige publicaties; richt dit proefschrift zich op 
vijf speciﬁeke kwesties die gerelateerd zijn aan de bovengenoemde stappen:
-  De effecten van het gebruik van een absolute of een relatieve armoede-indicator 
op het schatten van het aantal armen;
-  De implicaties van het gebruik van een absolute of een relatieve armoede-indicator 
voor het identiﬁceren van de armen en het evalueren van de mate waarin sociale 
zekerheidsprogramma’s armoede verlichten;
-  De kosten en baten van inkomensgeteste versus universele provisie van sociale 
uitkeringen als beleidsinstrumenten om armoede te verlichten;
-  De relatie tussen de armoede risico’s van huishoudens en hun vermogen om hun 
consumptie op peil te houden als ze worden getroffen door een inkomensschok;
-  De manieren waarop huishoudens hun consumptie in balans kunnen houden en de 
rol die sociale zekerheidsbeleid daarin speelt.
Iedere kwestie wordt onderzocht in een apart artikel en draagt bij aan een speciﬁek 
academisch debat en een speciﬁeke discussie over beleidsopties. Hieronder worden 
deze artikelen kort samengevat.
Samenvatting
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Relatieve en absolute armoede-indicatoren in de VS en de EU: het gevecht om de 
cijfers
Dit artikel schat de omvang van armoede in de VS en 15 EU lidstaten gebruikmakende 
van de ofﬁciële armoede meetmethoden in de VS (absoluut) en de EU (relatief). De 
publicatie van deze ofﬁciële cijfers krijgt veel aandacht in de media en de cijfers worden 
vaak gebruikt als argument om beleidsaanpassingen te maken. Deze studie is de eerste 
die vergelijkbare schattingen heeft gemaakt voor deze twee meetmethoden. Armoede 
in de Verenigde Staten is veel hoger dan in Europa wanneer de Europese relatieve 
armoedemaatstaf  wordt  gebruikt.  Echter,  met  een  absolute  Amerikaanse  maatstaf 
bevinden de VS zich in de middenmoot. Onze schattingen tonen niet alleen behoorlijk 
grote verschillen in armoede in een land en tussen landen, maar ook over de tijd. 
Gebruikmakend van jaarlijkse huishoud budget data van 1994 tot en met 2001, laten we 
zien op welke manier sommige armoedeverschillen inherent zijn aan de keuze tussen 
een absolute of een relatieve benadering, terwijl andere verschillen gerelateerd zijn aan 
gemeenschappelijke aspecten betreffende het meten van armoede maar een verschillend 
effect hebben wanneer een absolute of relatieve benadering wordt gebruikt. Voor iedere 
factor berekenen we tevens het individuele effect op de armoedeschattingen. Zo laten 
we zien dat eenzelfde equivalentieschaal een zeer groot en verschillend effect heeft 
op absolute en relatieve armoedeschattingen en op het armoede risico van bepaalde 
bevolkingsgroepen. Verder zijn er in landen met een hogere inkomensongelijkheid vaker 
grotere verschillen tussen absolute en relatieve armoede. Daarnaast laat onze studie 
zien dat het verschil tussen ‘niet genoeg inkomen om in basisbehoeften te voorzien’ 
en ‘veel minder inkomen dan normaal’ niet alleen leidt to verschillen in absolute en 
relatieve armoede op een bepaald moment, maar dat deze concepten economische 
vooruitgang ook anders evalueren. Voor een absolute welvaartsindicator is iedere reële 
inkomensstijging een verbetering, terwijl een verbetering in relatieve armoede een meer 
dan proportionele inkomensstijging van lagere inkomens vereist. Onze studie toont 
empirisch aan dat de ervaringen van landen in bovengenoemde factoren zeer kunnen 
verschillen. Samen leiden deze resultaten dan ook tot de conclusie dat het zowel voor 
de VS, als een sterk uitgebreide EU, van belang is om zowel een absolute als relatieve 
armoedemaatstaven te gebruiken. 
De  beleidsrelevantie  van  absolute  en  relatieve  armoedecijfers:  wat  zegt  een 
cijfer?
Financiële  armoede-indicatoren  krijgen  niet  alleen  veel  aandacht  in  de  media  of 
politieke debatten maar spelen ook een belangrijke rol in het maken en evalueren van Samenvatting
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beleid. Het percentage armen in de bevolking wordt vaak als uitgangspunt gebruikt 
om te analyseren wie er arm is en in welke mate een bepaald programma zorgt voor 
armoedeverlichting. Landen zoals de VS en de EU lidstaten gebruiken één of een aantal 
‘ofﬁciële’ indicatoren op basis waarvan het succes van beleid wordt gecontroleerd 
maar meestal wordt echter maar één soort armoede-indicator gebruikt. In dit artikel 
onderzoeken wij of het gebruik van een absolute of relatieve armoede maatstaf leidt tot 
verschillen in het vaststellen van prioriteitsgroepen en het evalueren van de effectiviteit 
van sociaal beleid in termen van armoedeverlichting. Naast het de armoedeschattingen 
van het vorige artikel gebruiken we hier ook schattingen van langdurige armoede omdat 
chronisch armen kunnen worden beschouwd als een prioriteitsgroep op zich. Onze 
analyses tonen aan dat in rijke landen, waar absolute armoede lager is dan relatieve 
armoede, er niet veel overlap is tussen de groepen chronische armen en armen in absolute 
zin. Langdurige armoedecijfers kunnen dus niet als benadering worden gebruikt voor 
absolute armoedecijfers. Daasnaast vinden we een reeks signiﬁcante verschillen tussen 
absolute en relatieve armoedeproﬁelen: afhankelijk van de gekozen armoede-indicator, 
zullen sommige bevolkingsgroepen dus meer of minder aandacht krijgen. Ten slotte 
laten we zien dat het succes van pensioenen, kinderbijslag en bijstandsuitkeringen in 
termen van armoedeverlichting afhangt van de armoedemaatstaf die wordt gebruikt: 
zo zijn pensioenen vaak voldoende om absolute armoede te voorkomen maar zijn ze 
minder succesvol in het voorkomen van relatieve armoede. Kortom, onze conclusie is 
dat het gebruik van één armoede concept voor het bepalen en evalueren van nationaal 
sociaal beleid misleidend kan zijn en dat het raadzaam is om zowel een absolute als 
relatieve armoede-indicator te gebruiken.
Omvang is ook belangrijk: de kosten en baten van inkomensgeteste en universele 
kinderbijslag in Rusland 
Dit artikel vergelijkt de efﬁciëntie en effectiviteit van universele en inkomensgeteste 
kinderbijslag aan de hand van een beleidshervorming in Rusland. We gebruiken panel 
data van Russische huishoudens over een periode van 2000 tot 2004 om het succes van 
de hervormingen te evalueren en om de effecten van verschillende inkomensgeteste 
en universele programma’s te simuleren. Onze analyses richten zich op twee aspecten 
die slechts zelden tegelijkertijd worden onderzocht: of de juiste groep wordt bereikt 
(targeting efﬁciency) en of de ondersteuning wel effectief is in het verlichten van 
armoede? In theorie zijn inkomensgeteste programma’s effectiever en efﬁciënter omdat 
schaarse fondsen alleen maar gaan naar die mensen die het echt nodig hebben. In de 
praktijk is het echter moeilijk om te identiﬁceren wie wel en wie niet in aanmerking 
komt en kost het geld om dat te doen. Het is dus niet duidelijk in welke mate de baten 246
van een inkomenstest teniet worden gedaan door de kosten ervan. Onze analyses laten 
zien dat sinds de hervormingen in 2000, meer Russische kinderen kinderbijslag krijgen 
en dat arme kinderen een grotere kans hebben om ondersteuning te krijgen. Echter, 
veel niet arme kinderen krijgen ook ondersteuning terwijl één derde tot een kwart 
van de arme kinderen niet wordt geholpen. Bovendien is de mate waarin armoede 
wordt verlicht slechts marginaal verbeterd. Onze simulaties tonen aan dat universele 
programma’s in staat zijn tot extra armoedeverlichting omdat groepen die eerst werden 
buitengesloten nu wel in aanmerking komen. Echter, de hoogte van de kinderbijslag 
is het belangrijkst: de zeer lage kinderbijslag in Rusland maakt de keuze tussen beide 
systemen  haast  irrelevant. Alleen  als  de  kinderbijslag  wordt  verhoogd  zal  er  een 
substantiëlere verlaging in armoede zijn. 
Armoede en het effenen van consumptie in Rusland
Om  te  kunnen  begrijpen  hoe  mensen  met  armoede  en  armoede  risico’s  omgaan 
moeten we een dynamisch perspectief nemen: zelfs als een huishouden niet arm is, 
loopt het wel een risico om arm te worden. In dit artikel onderzoeken we in welke 
mate Russische huishoudens in staat zijn om hun consumptie te beschermen tegen 
inkomensschokken en hoe deze capaciteiten om consumptie te effenen zijn gerelateerd 
aan armoederisico’s. We schatten deze capaciteiten door middel van een dynamische 
panel analyse en we onderzoeken of huishoudens met lagere effeningscapaciteiten ook 
een verhoogd armoede risico hebben. Een innovatief aspect van onze benadering is dat 
wij het consumptiegedrag van huishoudens modelleren met een error correctie proces; 
de intuïtie van dit model is dat mensen voor een tijdje in staat zijn om meer uit te 
geven dan er binnen komt, maar op lange termijn moeten hun uitgaven en inkomsten 
in evenwicht zijn. Tot zover hebben andere studies alleen naar de korte termijn effecten 
gekeken. We passen het model toe op panel data van de turbulente transitieperiode in 
Rusland (1994-2004). Onze resultaten wijzen erop dat huishoudens gedeeltelijk in staat 
zijn om hun consumptie beschermen tegen inkomensschokken en dat uitgaven aan eten 
beter beschermd zijn dan andere uitgaven. De partiële analyses voor groepen met een 
verschillende levensstandaard tonen aan dat effeningscapaciteiten toenemen met de 
levensstandaard. Hoewel chronisch arme huishoudens gedeeltelijk in staat zijn om hun 
consumptie te beschermen, reageren ze op schokken door hun al lage uitgaven nog verder 
te verlagen. Toch hoeven lage effeningscapaciteiten niet altijd te worden geassocieerd 
met een verhoogd armoederisico: armoede is aanzienlijk hoger in rurale gebieden 
maar rurale huishoudens zijn juist zeer goed in staat om hun voedingsconsumptie 
op peil te houden. Deze resultaten geven aan dat de overheid, naast een beleid van 
armoedeverlichting, mensen ook kan assisteren om beter met risico’s om te gaan.Samenvatting
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Risico management: wat doen Russische huishoudens om hun consumptie op peil 
te houden?
Mensen  worden  blootgesteld  aan  veel  en  verschillende  soorten  risico’s  zoals 
werkeloosheid, ziekte, een mislukte oogst of het verlies van eigendommen. Ze kunnen 
zich beschermen tegen de mogelijke effecten van zulke risico’s door te sparen, lenen, 
meer te werken of door hun eigendommen te verkopen. Daarnaast kunnen mensen 
zich verzekeren door middel van formele en informele verzekeringsregelingen. Sociale 
zekerheidsvoorzieningen  zijn  dus  niet  de  enige  regelingen  die  mensen  gebruiken 
om  een  acceptabele  levensstandaard  te  hebben  en  behouden.  De  relatie  tussen  de 
verschillende regelingen en de instituties die daarmee gemoeid zijn is complex en 
zeer speciﬁek voor een samenleving of bepaalde groepen daarin. Om te begrijpen hoe 
mensen ervoor zorgen dat ze zich kunnen beschermen tegen risico’s of de effecten 
daarvan, is het belangrijk om na te gaan hoe mensen dat eigenlijk doen. Dit artikel 
ontwikkelt  een  generiek  raamwerk  dat  het  mogelijk  maakt  om  zulke  consumptie 
effeningsstrategieen te bestuderen in verschillende contexten. In de literatuur worden 
vooral modellen gebruikt om de stabiliteit van consumptie te meten of om juist een 
zeer  speciﬁeke  effeningsstrategie  te  onderzoeken.  Echter,  huishoudens  gebruiken 
verschillende regelingen vaak tegelijkertijd en het succes van de ene regeling kan 
afhangen van de beschikbaarheid en het functioneren van de andere regeling. We 
passen ons raamwerk toe op Rusland en bestuderen een zeer uitgebreide database om 
erachter te komen wat Russische huishoudens doen en hoe deze handelingen kunnen 
bijdragen aan een stabiele consumptie. We kijken hierbij ook naar de rol van sociale 
voorzieningen in Rusland. Onze analyses tonen dat Russische huishoudens sparen en 
geld lenen, maar dat ze daarvoor weinig gebruik maken van ﬁnanciële markten. In 
plaats daarvan verlenen huishoudens zelf krediet aan anderen, krijgen ze een lening 
van hun werkgever of nemen ze een ‘consumptief krediet’ door hun energierekeningen 
niet of laat te betalen. Verder lijkt het verbouwen van voedsel meer een integraal 
onderdeel te zijn van de (in natura) inkomensgenerende activiteiten dan een reactie 
op een speciﬁeke schok. Daarnaast geven de resultaten aanleiding tot de hypothese 
dat het relatief genereuze pensioensysteem leidt tot een herverdeling van pensioenen 
waarbij ouderen, door middel van het geven van giften, naar hun jongere familieleden 
ondersteunen. Hoewel deze studie niet bewijst dat zulke handelingen ook daadwerkelijk 
consumptie-effeningsstrategieën zijn, resulteert de analyse wel in het formuleren van 
speciﬁeke hypotheses die het uitgangspunt kunnen zijn van een vervolgonderzoek.249
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